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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis analyses the Europeanization of national environmental agencies by 
assessing the impact of the European Environment Agency (EEA) and its main 
environmental information and observation network, the Eionet, on three of its 
member countries, namely Germany, France and Britain. 
The EEA began its work in 1994. It established the Eionet to institutionalize 
cooperation with member countries from which it obtains environmental data 
required for its work. This thesis assesses the German Umweltbundesamt (UBA), 
French Agence de l’Environnement at de la Maîtrise de l’Energie (ADEME) and 
Institut Français de l’Environnement (Ifen) as well as the Environment Agency 
(EA) of England and Wales. The different national arrangements for Eionet 
participation are explained and the question of whether the creation of the EEA 
and national participation in the Eionet had a significant impact on the national 
environmental administrations in the three case countries is scrutinised. It is 
argued that all national environmental agencies assessed in this thesis have been 
affected by Europeanization, although to different degrees. This thesis draws 
heavily on historical institutionalism and Europeanization theories when ‗testing‘ 
three hypotheses. Unpublished new empirical findings are also presented.  
This thesis argues that the EEA‘s impact on its member countries has, overall, 
remained very limited which explains the continued divergence between national 
environmental agencies. These findings are in line with historical institutionalist 
explanations. The only exception is the French Ifen which was set up as an 
independent agency in direct response to the creation of the EEA. As explained in 
the thesis, the French exceptionalism was, however, short-lived and largely driven 
by domestic (rather than EU-level) factors.  This thesis provides new empirical 
material and analytical insights into the cooperation of national environment 
agencies and the EEA within the network of Heads of European Environment 
Protection Agencies (EPA network). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The creation of a growing number of agencies at both the national and European 
levels is one of the most significant developments in the administrative structure of 
the EU [European Union] and its Member States.
1
 
 
This dissertation will focus on the growing importance of the role of environment 
agencies at the national and EU level. It aims to assess the changing roles of national 
environment agencies in Germany, France and Britain
2
 as a result of the 
Europeanization process and in particular the wave of agency creation at EU
3
 level. 
 
1.1.1 Choice of topic 
Dehousse considers the emergence of specialized European agencies as one of the most 
interesting developments in EU bureaucracy since the early 1990s.
4
 Instead of an 
increase in the size of the Commission (although some marginal increases did take 
place), EU agencies were created, taking over some of the Commission‘s tasks and 
establishing specialized administrative structures, often networks, linking the national 
and supranational level.
5
 The study of both Europeanization and EU agencies has 
increased significantly, while the role of national agencies in this new context has 
remained under-researched. What is lacking in particular is a better understanding of the 
inter-linkages among and between national administrations and European agencies, 
                                                 
1
 Geradin (2005:241) 
2
 For reasons of simplicity, the terms ‗Britain‘ and ‗British‘ will refer throughout this thesis only to 
England and Wales unless otherwise stated. For the same reasons, the terms ‗Britain‘ and ‗United 
Kingdom/UK‘ are used interchangeably (although the UK also includes Northern Ireland) unless 
stated otherwise. 
3
 The term ‗European Union‘ (EU) will be used throughout to include the European Communities 
(EC) and the European Economic Community (EEC). 
4
 Dehousse (2002:9). The terms ‗EU agency‘ and ‗European agency‘ will be used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis. 
5
 Dehousse (2002:9-10) 
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often taking the form of networks. Previous studies on national administrations have 
focused on regulatory competition between nation states and the EU, the impact of EU 
policies on national administrations or the degree to which national administrations 
have become integrated into the EU‘s administrative apparatus.6 
The analytical focus of this thesis will be on environment agencies in France, 
Germany and Britain and how they cooperate with the European Environment Agency 
(EEA) and its European environment information and observation network (Eionet). In 
order for its networking activities to function properly, the EEA has to work with 
various actors (on a variety of levels), such as EU institutions, member state officials, or 
scientific experts.
7
 Most of this cooperation takes place within the EEA/Eionet 
framework with additional collaboration in the Network of Heads of European 
Environment Protection Agencies (EPA network). However, little is known about the 
developments and attitudes of national environment agencies regarding the creation of 
the EEA, its influence on the participating institutions and possible harmonizing effects. 
When compared to agency developments and agency creation at the national level, the 
creation of the EEA appears to have come at a relatively late point in time.This needs to 
be considered in the context of agency creation at the EU level, which only began to 
take off in the early 1990s. This thesis aims to assess the impact of the EEA‘s creation 
on national administrations by analysing their (degree and types of) cooperation from a 
Europeanization perspective and with the help of historical institutionalist theory. As 
will be explained in more detail in Chapter Two the expectation is that the creation of 
the EEA will have had little impact on national administrations in Germany, France and 
Britain.  
 
                                                 
6
 Héritier et al. (1996), Knill (2001), Trondal (2001), Jordan and Liefferink (2004a) 
7
 Zito (2009b:1237) 
17 
 
1.1.2 Choice of case countries 
The choice of France, Germany and Britain (sometimes referred to as ―the big three‖) as 
case countries for national environment agencies has emerged for the following main 
reasons: both France and Germany were founding members of the EU and played a 
crucial role in its development from the early beginnings. The UK joined in 1973 at a 
time when the EU began to establish a common environmental policy. The UK has 
therefore been affected by and involved in EU environmental policy-making (almost) 
from the start. Moreover, the three case countries are the largest (in terms of population 
and geographical size) EU member states. Although no two countries are the same, 
there are strong similarities between the three chosen case studies in terms of size, 
involvement of EU environmental policy-making and economical development. The use 
of most similar case studies has been described by Seawright and Gerring as ‗one of the 
oldest recognized techniques of qualitative analysis‘.8 
While France, Germany and Britain can be described as having reached a similar 
level of economic and technological development, they show significant differences in 
their political and administrative systems and structures as well as their environmental 
policies.
9
 France is a unitary state with a strong executive. It began a moderate 
decentralization/regionalization process in the 1980s by giving more powers to regional 
councils (conseils régionaux) and general councils (conseils généraux). Germany on the 
other hand has a decentralized federal structure and the representation of the Länder is 
provided by a two-chamber system.
10
 Britain is a state with a strong executive and, 
despite devolution, a strong concentration of powers in Whitehall (in particular with 
                                                 
8
 Seawright and Gerring (2008:305) 
9
 Héritier et al. (1996:31), Knill (2001), Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (1996), Jordan and Liefferink 
(2004a) 
10
 Héritier et al. (1996:31) 
18 
 
regard to England and Wales).
11
 French and German political elites have close bilateral 
relationships and are generally in favour of furthering European integration. Until 
recently, France and Germany have often been referred to as the motor of European 
integration.
12
 However, their national positions regarding EU environmental policy are 
less similar. 
While Germany is generally considered as an environmental leader state,
13
 France 
has taken on the role of coalitionist and friendly onlooker who neither supports nor 
impedes environmental legislation.
14
 After being branded an environmental laggard
15
 
and ‗policy taker‘16 for much of the first two decades of EU environmental policy, 
Britain‘s position changed in the early 1990s. Since then it can be considered as one of 
the pace-setters or ‗policy shapers‘17 in EU environmental policy.18 Moreover, the three 
case countries exhibit important differences in their national environmental regulatory 
styles. French environmental policy is characterized by a more open outlook on EU 
environmental policy with the anticipation of future adjustments to national policy 
procedures.
19
 French regulatory tools are wide-ranging and flexible, and include the 
regional level.
20
 Germany, on the other hand, has a strong interest in traditional 
regulation, relies heavily on the best-available-technology (BAT, Stand der Technik) 
approach, uniform emission limit requirements and often aims to minimize the impact 
of EU environmental policy and/or adaptation costs on established domestic legal, 
institutional and instrument patterns.
21
 British environmental policy has often been 
                                                 
11
 Héritier et al. (1996:31) 
12
 Webber (1999b:1) 
13
 Börzel (2005:165), Liefferink and Andersen (2005) 
14
 Héritier et al. (1996:262), Buller (2004) 
15
 For example Weale (1992), Jordan (2004) 
16
 Jordan and Liefferink (2004) 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Héritier et al. (1996:229), Knill (2001:164), Flynn (2004: 697) 
19
 Héritier et al. (1996:203) 
20
 Ibid.:265 
21
 Ibid.:176, 265 
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pragmatic, involving incremental responses to specific problems.
22
  The traditional 
British approach used to include the best practicable means (BPM) which was later 
developed into the best available techniques not entailing excessive costs (BATNEEC), 
the use of soft regulatory instruments (such as informal agreements between the 
regulator and regulated) and reactive rather than proactive environmental policy 
measures.
23
  
Finally, as will be shown in particular in Chapters Four, Five and Six, the set of 
structures which needed to be put into place to accommodate the EEA‘s Eionet has been 
addressed differently in each of the three countries and the reasons for this will be 
assessed in this thesis. The main focus of this dissertation will be on the different roles 
environment agencies play on the domestic and EU level, the nature of their cooperation 
and the effect which the creation of the EEA has had on them.  
In order for the empirical research to remain manageable, the number of case 
countries had to be restricted to three. A larger number of case studies would have been 
preferable in terms of representativeness. However, one important advantage of a 
relatively low number of case studies is that it allows for the in-depth assessment of 
national Eionet participation arrangements. The chosen countries are all hosts to well-
established and influential environment agencies. Other countries and/or groups of 
similar countries (such as the Scandinavian countries, Benelux countries, Central and 
Eastern European countries and Southern European countries) could be included in 
future research projects. 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Lowe and Flynn (1989:256) 
23
 Héritier et al. (1996:101) 
20 
 
1.1.3 Choice of case study 
In addition to focusing on three case countries, the e Network of Heads of European 
Environmental Protection Agencies will be assessed as a case study in some detail in 
Chapter Eight. The EPA network is an informal network set up by the member 
countries‘ environment agencies in order to enable and facilitate contact and exchange 
at the directorial level. The network‘s secretariat is hosted by the EEA. The network 
brings together heads of environmental agencies (or similar bodies) in order to exchange 
views and experiences on issues of comment interest.
24
 The participating countries are 
EEA member countries and other countries involved in the EEA work programme.
25
 
Due to its informal non-compulsory nature, EEA member countries are not required to 
take part in the EPA network and, indeed, some of them do not (such as France). The 
EPA network as a case study is of interest as it focuses on environment agency activity 
at the international level and their involvement with the EEA, as not all national 
environment agencies are members of the Eionet. Although it hosts the EPA network‘s 
secretariat, the EEA is a network member just like the other agencies.     The EPA 
network is a European network in which participation is voluntary.It was not formed as 
the result of an EU initiative but created by some of its member countries (such as the 
UK and Italy). The case study is of great interest because of its focus on national 
environment agencies‘ reasons behind participation in the EPA network and their roles 
and functions as members of this network. 
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1.1.4 Environmental policy in the EU, Germany, France and Britain
26
 
Environmental issues arrived on the political agenda in France, Germany and Britain 
roughly around the same time in the late 1960s/early 1970s. 
In Germany the environment gained in political importance following the election of 
a reform-minded centre-left Social Democratic Party – Liberal Democratic Party 
coalition government in 1969.
27
 In France the creation of the Ministry of the 
Environment in 1971 moved the focus on the environment from the scientific to the 
political and eventually public sphere.
28
 Although British environmental policy has a 
long history, its development and direction since the 1970s has strongly been influenced 
by its EU membership.
29
 For the EU, the starting point for a common environmental 
policy was the 1972 Paris summit which took place a few months after the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm.
30
 The environment 
began to emerge as a distinct common policy area in the early 1970s. The adoption of 
the first Environmental Action Programme (EAP) in 1972 was one of the important 
milestones. However, EU environmental policy was formally recognized as an EU 
competence only in the 1986 Single European Act (SEA).
31
 While national 
environmental policy-making has not necessarily diminished, it is possible to argue that 
most environmental policy measures in member states originate from EU legislation.
32
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1.2 Agencies and regulation 
1.2.1 The EU as a regulatory regime 
Curtin points out that the EU is ‗more than a classic international organization, less than 
a state‘.33 While regulatory states have been described by Thatcher as having the 
correction of market failures through rule-making as a major function, Eisner defines 
regulatory regimes as  
a historically specific configuration of policies and institutions which structure the 
relationship between social interests, the state, and economic actors in multiple 
sectors of the economy.
34
   
 
Policies decided by the EU largely take the form of regulation.
35
 For the EU, regulation 
is an ideal policy instrument due to the relatively low costs incurred (at least regarding 
the effect on the Union‘s budget) and the separation between rule-making and 
implementation processes.
36
 Legislation is passed either as regulations (which are 
directly applicable), directives (which have to be transposed into national law by 
member states) or decisions (which are binding and aimed at one or more member state, 
institution or individual).
37
 The main instrument used in EU environmental policy is the 
directive.
38
 For the implementation of its policies the EU depends on the member states. 
Regulation is an important tool ensuring the creation of the single market (freedom of 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital).
39
 
Not all regulatory governance models used effectively at the national level can be 
easily applied to the EU.
40
 Scott lists various models of regulatory governance 
employed by the EU, involving different organizations, levels, and character 
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(governmental and non-governmental).
41
 The list includes the models of the 
Commission as regulator, EU agencies, transnational regulatory networks, or the open 
method of coordination, among others.
42
 The efficiency of the listed methods can vary 
significantly. The Commission is in charge of many of the Union‘s executive functions 
and the only institution able to formally initiate legislation.
43
 It considers itself as 
responsible for improving the quality of regulation, avoiding overlap, reducing 
regulation where necessary, and making proposals more understandable.
44
  
In parallel with the reform processes of national regulatory systems, there has been an 
ongoing transfer of regulatory powers to the European level (i.e. deregulation on the 
member state level which is followed by supranational re-regulation).
45
 According to 
Hix and Goetz, deregulation refers to the removal of barriers to trade and re-regulation 
describes, for example, EU legislation and harmonization measures.
46
 Since its 
beginnings, the range and depth of EU-level policy responsibilities has increased while 
simultaneously the EU has steadily expanded its regulatory policy role.
47
 Importantly, 
Hix and Goetz suggest that the process of European integration introduces new 
regulatory policy styles affecting public administration in the member states.
48
 As one 
aspect of this development they consider the creation of new independent regulatory 
agencies.
49
 To what degree are EU agencies able to influence national agencies? 
Dehousse argues that by creating European agencies, EU regulatory interventions can 
be deepened.
50
 However, this would only apply in policy areas where EU agencies have 
been equipped with explicit powers, thus, arguably, not in the case of the EEA which, as 
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will be analysed below, has not been equipped with regulatory powers and has to rely 
on the cooperation of the EEA member countries. McCormick argues that this kind of 
multi-level governance is  
based on the idea of different and overlapping sets of competence among multiple 
levels of government, and suggests that authority is dispersed among these 
different levels, and involves multiple policy actors with multiple powers and 
interests.
51
  
 
When applying the multi-level governance concept to environmental policy, it becomes 
clear that information is increasingly provided by the EEA (acquired through the 
Eionet) for the Commission and EP in particular. The Commission proposes policy 
measures which then need to be agreed by the Council of Ministers and EP (in order to 
become legally binding EU laws). EU policies are implemented (nationally, regionally 
and locally) by the member states. The EU environmental policy-making process thus 
requires actors on different levels of governance to cooperate with each other. 
52
 In 
order to connect the national and supranational levels better, intermediate structures, 
which often took the form of European agencies, were created.
53
 
Majone states that the delegation of policy-making powers to (relatively) 
independent institutions at the national and supranational level is a central feature of 
regulatory reform in Europe.
54
 At the EU level, regulatory powers are not concentrated 
within the Commission, as other EU institutions and importantly the member states 
(often reluctant to increase the Commission‘s powers) stand in the way of complete 
independence.
55
 In most cases, the creation of European agencies involved the 
delegation of tasks previously dealt with by the Commission (or previously delegated to 
other actors by the Commission), rather than an actual transfer of powers. Moreover, 
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Cassese points out that national public administrations, as well as adapting to their new 
role in a supranational context, were under pressure from the EU to adjust their national 
systems accordingly.
56
 According to Cassese, the EU began to influence national 
administrative systems in the late 1970s (with varying degrees of success), reaching its 
height in the 1990s.
57
 Whether the EEA has actively sought to influence national 
systems or institutional set-ups with regard to environment agencies shall be considered. 
 
1.2.2 The role of agencies  
When delegating powers, Majone lists the options available as the delegation to 
(regulatory) agencies, government departments (or the Commission‘s Directorate 
Generals in the case of the EU), self-regulation or control by courts.
58
 Politicians (and 
other affected interests) often decide strategically on the agency‘s goals and personnel 
decisions when creating a new institution.
59
  
There is no agreement in the academic literature on what constitutes the most 
important roles and functions of agencies. Kreher defines agencies as ‗administrative 
authorities or bodies operating outside the central administration‘.60 Magnette considers the 
creation of agencies at the supranational level as an attempt to improve the coordination 
of cooperation between states during the decision-making and the implementation 
phases.
61
 However, with regard to the varying actual powers of EU agencies their level 
of involvement and success remains to be seen. 
With regard to agencies, Thatcher suggests the applicability of the principal-agent 
model which focuses on the delegation of powers by principals (e.g. elected politicians) 
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to non-governmental bodies (e.g. independent regulatory authorities), while creating 
formal controls (via review procedures, budget allocation, staff 
appointments/dismissals, etc.).
62
 Curtin also classes the Commission as a principal 
(although an unelected one) which delegates some of its own tasks to EU agencies.
63
 
However, although the degree of agency independence varies greatly, even agencies 
classed as independent remain influenced by the political frameworks they emerged 
from.
64
 
According to Majone, the advantages of delegating powers to agencies include 
governmental departments having different priorities than the tasks that need to be 
addressed (and can then be allocated to agencies); the likelihood of agencies being able 
to fulfil functions better when these are their sole concern or central interest; the ability 
of agencies to provide the necessary expertise on highly technical issues; and, the ability 
to work more independently compared to government departments.
65
 Majone considers 
the use of expert and independent agencies in statutory legislation ‗a definite 
improvement over previous practices‘.66  
The new public management perspective embraces agencification as one of its 
elements,
67
 referring to  
the tendency to assign to special bodies (agencies or independent authorities) duties 
that were previously performed by special units belonging to the state 
organization.
68
  
 
According to Cassese, new public management reforms have been taking place in 
Germany since 1978 as the so-called new governance model (neues Steuerungsmodell) 
and in France since 1989 as the renewal of public service (renouveau du service 
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public).
69
 However, as the German Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt, 
UBA) was created in 1974 and French environmental agencies (albeit specialized ones) 
were created as early as 1964, these environment agencies came into existence long 
before new public management reforms became popular. Although the creation of the 
Environment Agency (EA) of England and Wales can be placed in the context of new 
public management, which influenced a lot of political developments at the time, 
detailed assessment of the ways in which new public management reforms have affected 
(existing and/or emerging) national environment agencies goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
While the Commission considers the increased involvement of national 
administrations as decentralizing and a more effective way of legislation enforcement, 
Scott notes that in the case of EU agencies this is mainly true regarding their 
geographical location.
70
 Scott further points out that ‗in all other regards, and in 
particular vis-à-vis the member states, EU agencies are instruments of centralization‘.71 
In the perspective referred to by Goetz as comparative public administration, the 
focus is mainly on the bureaucratic parts of the executive, such as ministries, central 
agencies, and other non-elected executive actors.
72
 However, while the comparison of 
different national administrations and institutions can be considered as relatively 
straightforward, it would be more difficult to directly compare a nation state‘s agency to 
a European one. 
1.2.3 National agencies  
For national governments, delegating powers to independent agencies can be a way of 
enhancing their credibility as it shows their commitment to certain policy areas and 
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developments.
73
 However, Andeweg points out that placing government department 
officials in a privileged position as specialized experts can lead to ‗information 
asymmetry‘ in the bureaucracy as they potentially aim at maximising their own 
powers.
74
 Thus governments have to find ways of decreasing such risks, either through 
well-chosen civil servant appointments or mechanisms to strictly control their activities 
(ex ante versus ex post control).
75
 This risk is only enhanced by the creation of agencies, 
which are even further removed from ministers/the government than the civil servants 
working in government ministries.  
With regard to their changing role, Egeberg has described national administrative 
agencies as ‗double-hatted‘,76 referring to their two-fold role within the national 
administrative system and, simultaneously, their growing importance in the EU‘s multi-
level administration.
77
 Thus agencies remain closely linked to their national ministerial 
departments and national administrations, while at the same time actively participating 
in committees, networks and Commission activities (usually the respective 
directorates).
78
 
In many countries the national agencies become part of a network supporting the 
supranational agency.
79
 Overall, this could potentially result in new forms of regulatory 
cooperation between agencies and member states.
80
 However, despite the establishment 
of EU agencies, national agencies have not lost their importance. EU agencies depend 
on their national counterparts for information and cooperation. Due to procedural and 
financial restrictions they rely on national agencies and member countries‘ involvement 
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in their management boards.
81
 Cooperation with a supranational agency could 
potentially have an impact on national institutions, however. Weale notes that the speed 
and structure of national policy developments and responses is mainly influenced by the 
type of government and national governmental structures.
82
 
I will now turn to the national environment agencies of my three case countries, the 
German Federal Environment Agency, the UBA, the French Environment and Energy 
Management Agency (Agence de l’Environnement at de la Maîtrise de l’Energie, 
ADEME) as well as the French Environment Institute (Institut Français de 
l’Environnement, Ifen) and the EA of England and Wales. A more extensive analysis of 
the roles and functions of these national environmental agencies will be put forward in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
 
UBA 
The German UBA was established in 1974. It is mainly responsible for non-executive 
tasks such as environmental research, the collection and dissemination of information 
and its documentation.
83
 It has also a wider public role nationally because ‗it is 
considered to be the most important agency in the environmental policy area through its 
role as an information centre and its influence on the public debate‘.84 The UBA‘s work 
provides the federal government and in particular the Environment Ministry 
(Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, BMU) with a 
scientific basis for environmental policy.
85
 The BMU is responsible for the management 
of national environmental policy, realization of political objectives, priorities and 
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programmes as well as international cooperation.
86
 Other important agencies in the 
environmental field in Germany are the Federal Agency for Nature Conservation and 
the Federal Office for Radiation Protection.
87
  
 
ADEME and Ifen 
In France, some specialized agencies in the environmental field were created as early as 
1964, such as the agency for water management, followed by agencies for waste 
disposal (in 1975), and for air (in 1980).
88
 These agencies were usually able to impose 
(parafiscal) levies which were used to control, promote and invest within their 
respective fields.
89
 The 1990 National Plan for the Environment led to reforms of the 
existing agencies, with several of them being merged together.
90
 The new ADEME and 
the Ifen, both created in 1991, were responsible for statistical and informational support 
for the Environment Ministry.
91
 ADEME has branches in the French regions and is 
responsible for research, levying a range of environmental taxes on industry and 
sponsors environmental initiatives.
92
 Ifen is a body of particular interest, as it was set up 
as the French counterpart to the EEA. The Environment Ministry is responsible for 
legislative and rule-making functions and the agencies fulfil technical and financial 
functions.
93
 
 
Environment Agency of England and Wales 
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The EA of England and Wales and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) 
were both created in 1996.
94
 They combine previously created environmental bodies 
such as the National Rivers Authority (NRA), Her Majesty‘s Inspectorate of Pollution 
(HMIP) and the Waste Regulatory Authorities (WRA), with the SEPA also dealing with 
air pollution.
95
 
The EA‘s main areas of responsibility are water quality, water resource management, 
integrated pollution control and waste regulation.
96
 Regulation of these issues is mainly 
achieved through the issuing of licences, granting consent to discharge or authorisation 
(via regulation or licensing).
97
 Additionally, a variety of rural conservation agencies 
operate across the country.
98
 
The Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) was established 
in 2002. It was preceded by the Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions (DETR) which was set up in 1997, and the Department of the Environment 
(DoE) which was created in 1970.
99
 In 2008 the Department for Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC) was created when the energy and climate policy units were taken out 
of Defra. Defra‘s responsibilities include environmental protection, sustainable 
development, water, countryside, rural development and energy efficiency.
100
  
 
1.2.4 EU agencies 
The creation of EU agencies has resulted from the need to reform existing institutional 
structures, introduce geographical decentralisation and improve the scientific and 
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technical expertise of the EU institutions and particularly the Commission.
101
 Moreover, 
the delegation of powers can further be considered as a way of improving efficiency in 
the EU law-making process.
102
 However, the involvement of agencies in EU law-
making varies greatly depending on policy areas. Yataganas describes the EU‘s 
agencies as having been created with objectives such as flexibility, management 
autonomy, member state involvement and closer attention to citizens‘ concerns in 
mind.
103
  
While the Commission appears to be in favour of the agency model, it is cautious to 
limit the EU agencies‘ independence and has tried to prevent them from having 
regulatory powers.
104
 This seems to be the case for several reasons: firstly, the 
Commission has an interest in protecting its own central position in the development of 
EU policy; secondly, the Commission is concerned about policy ambitions the agencies 
might harbour or develop; and, finally, the Commission is worried about potential 
overlaps in responsibility, which would be far from ideal from a strategic and financial 
perspective.
105
 The Commission appears keen to protect and retain its own powers, as 
became apparent in the process which is now referred to as the Meroni doctrine, 
restricting the delegation of powers to other institutions (see below).
106
 However, it is 
not only for the Commission to decide on the scope of each agency, but member states 
also play an important role. 
EU legislation does not currently provide an official definition for agencies, although 
some explanations are available regarding their creation and roles.
107
 The conditions 
recognized by the Commission for the creation of EU level agencies include the 
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granting of only limited decision-making powers and exclusion of general regulatory 
powers, areas in which the treaties have conferred powers directly to the Commission, 
areas of conflicting public interest, complex economic assessments or the exercising of 
political discretion.
108
 In areas requiring specific technical expertise, some decision-
making powers can be granted, but all agencies are subject to supervision and control by 
the Commission.
109
 Moreover, an aim of the creation of EU agencies, has been the 
reinforcement of effectiveness and visibility of EU law.
110
 The creation of these 
agencies demonstrates the political consensus reached between EU member states and 
institutions for the need of such bodies, which combine national and supranational 
competences at EU-level but with strong reliance on the member states‘ support (to 
differing degrees depending on the policy area).
111
 
The majority of the EU‘s agencies have been created through Council regulation as 
set out in the EC Treaty (Article 235), allowing the Council to take measures in order to 
ensure Community objectives.
112
 The European Parliament (EP) has only had a 
consulting role during the decision-making process on creation of the agencies.
113
 
Agencies at the EU level can be divided into three different generations.
114
 The first 
generation of agencies was made up of the European Centre for the Development of 
Vocational Training and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions, both created in 1975 (and did not use networks to fulfil their 
roles).
115
 In the 1990s, the second generation of EU agencies was set up. It included the 
European Training Foundation, Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market and the 
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EEA (among others).
116
 The third generation, which was set up in the early 2000s, 
included the European Food Safety Authority and the European Aviation Safety 
Agency.
117
 In 2010 there were more than 30 European agencies.
118
 
While responsibilities, functions and tasks assigned to each agency vary, generally 
the supranational agencies were expected to have a decentralising effect, increase the 
profile of the respective policy field or area, aim at being experts in their respective 
fields and provide a forum for dialogue and cooperation within Europe and 
internationally.
119
 Moreover, the agencies operate outside the Commission, although it 
still has representatives on the management boards of the agencies and is, at least 
initially, providing some funding.
120
 However, Shapiro notes, that while there is a 
degree of partial independence from the Commission, due to the structure of the 
management boards (similar to the set-up of the Council in which each member country 
is represented), the agencies are not independent from member state politics 
(intergovernmental politics).
121
 
In its 2001 White Paper on European Governance, the Commission stressed its 
continuing commitment to autonomous EU agencies, the creation of additional 
agencies, and the belief that agencies will improve the application and implementation 
of Community rules.
122
 The White Paper further lists the prevalent conditions required 
for EU agency establishment which include supervision, the absence of regulatory 
powers and restricted decision-making powers.
123
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At the European level (as well as the national level in some cases), the agency 
concept has been stretched to include a variety of bodies which are not truly 
regulatory.
124
 Magnette argued that member state governments prefer to keep control 
over relatively weak agencies with limited regulatory competencies rather than to set up 
independent agencies which are truly regulatory bodies.
125
 They also prefer national 
over supranational agencies, the latter of which would only be created to avoid potential 
non-coordination.
126
 Finally, Magnette suggests that EU institutions agree to the 
creation of a new European regulatory body only if it widens EU competences without 
undermining their own domestic ones.
127
 Although the establishment of EU agencies is 
an important step for the EU‘s political system, the Commission remains in control and 
the delegated tasks do not appear to be substantial in most cases. Nonetheless the 
agencies have more than just symbolic value, in particular regarding their coordination- 
and information-related tasks. 
Chiti categorizes EU agencies into four groups: firstly, agencies acting in the internal 
market sector, secondly, agencies acting in the social regulation sector, thirdly, social 
regulation agencies aiming to produce information in a specific field (to inform as well 
as influence policy and to which the EEA belongs), and fourthly, social policy agencies 
acting as information bodies (with the information directed at other administrations or 
political institutions only).
128
 
At the time of their creation, the EU agencies were not explicitly mentioned in the 
treaties, although the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in December 2009, now 
makes reference to them, listing them as EU bodies.
129
 Previously, the Laeken 
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Declaration on the Future of Europe, preparing the (failed) EU Constitutional Treaty 
had attempted to include some specification and legal basis for the creation of EU 
agencies. However, due to disagreements about the exact wording, agencies were not 
included in the suggested Constitutional Treaty.
130
 Member states therefore missed a 
window of opportunity to amend treaty restrictions (see below) to agency creation.
131
 
Despite being mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty (an indication of how important EU 
agencies have become), restrictions regarding EU agency creation remain. 
The EU agencies‘ role is to complement existing institutions, structures and 
procedures.
132
 In some cases better and more open reporting on compliance by the EU 
agencies might provide a motivation for member states to improve the implementation 
of EU laws. However, this is probably unlikely considering the fact that sometimes even 
the threat of fines (after a second negative judgement by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ)) does not constitute sufficient motivation for member states to improve their 
implementation procedures.  
The majority of EU agencies are responsible for the collection and analysis of 
information, while some also oversee the creation and coordination of expert 
(information) networks in their policy area.
133
 Despite not formally being involved in 
the EU policy-making process and their lack of regulatory powers, the expertise which 
EU agencies provide in the form of wide-ranging information may have an impact on 
the policy-making actors and processes.
134
 Regularly published major reports in specific 
policy areas potentially attract more attention if they include data of all member states 
rather than separate national publications on similar topics. 
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Regulation by information 
Majone describes ‗regulation by information‘ as  
attempts to change behaviour indirectly, either by changing the structure of 
incentives of the different policy actors, or by supplying the same actors with 
suitable information.
135
  
 
Regulation by information is different from direct command-and-control regulation (e.g. 
prohibition and binding standards), although both approaches are often combined.
136
 
Regulation by information involves, for example, the use of information and 
frameworks in the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) which is a new policy 
instrument that emerged from the 2000 Lisbon Strategy.
137
 The OMC was initially used 
in policy areas in which member states have exclusive responsibilities. It involves joint 
decision-making on common objectives, measuring the impact of instruments and 
criteria as well as benchmarking. Thus the generation and dissemination of information 
itself has therefore the potential to become a policy instrument which may be able to 
influence policy development.
138
 The Commission states that ‗sound information on the 
state of the environment and on key trends, pressures and drivers for environmental 
change is essential for the development of effective policy [and] its implementation‘.139 
However, information can be used not only as the basis for legislation but also to 
attempt to change behaviour in line with the gathered information.
140
 Regulatory 
instruments and informational tools (including moral suasion) are not mutually 
exclusive policy instruments. In the environmental policy field they are often used in a 
complementary fashion rather than as alternative instruments. However, the importance 
of information as a policy tool has increased in recent years.
141
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The use of information as a policy instrument would improve the standing and 
potentially the influence of EU agencies which collect and provide policy-relevant 
information. Importantly, Shapiro points out the difficulty of separating information and 
policy-making by stressing their mutual dependence and influence.
142
 Thus having a 
body handling information which is not as directly involved in the policy-making 
processes could be an advantage as its distance ideally increases its credibility.  
Chiti notes that in the EC legal order, the importance of information tasks has 
increased over time (in many cases using mechanisms linking national authorities and 
the Commission).
143
 However, he does point out that these links/networks lack 
regulation at the procedural level (e.g. the conditions around the data collection) and 
advocates the creation of rules and procedures regulating information (at all stages, 
from source to final destination).
144
 
The provision of objective information on the environment from an independent 
European agency (in contrast to information published by the Commission and/or from 
a single member state which may be perceived as biased) is likely to take into account a 
wider range of environmental data and achieve a higher level of credibility.
145
 In 
environmental policy (as well as other areas of social regulation), dependence on 
information is very high.
146
 The Commission‘s commitment to quality and 
independence of expert advice required in the decision-making process is important in 
this regard.
147
 The EEA‘s 1997 report Public Access to Environmental Information 
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further stresses the importance of making environmental information widely 
accessible.
148
     
Majone lists as the first task of the new agencies the establishment of their credibility 
and reputation, which is essential if they are to play a bigger role in public policy.
149
 
Thus, while one of the reasons a government (or regime) creates agencies might be to 
increase its credibility within certain policy areas, the agencies in turn are required to be 
credible.
150
 Agencies tend to be more credible than governments due to their durability 
(e.g. they are not dependent on elections and tend to be more stable), expertise and 
neutrality.
151
 
Vos ascribes the creation of the new agencies to the overall process of Commission 
reform and modernisation on the path to a more political administration.
152
 With the 
political climate at the time making expansion of the Commission unlikely, the creation 
of agencies was a way of broadening EU activities without increasing the size or powers 
of the Commission. According to Majone, the lack of regulatory powers for EU 
agencies has various reasons including the Commission‘s reluctance to give up some of 
its powers as well as member states being opposed to give up powers to supranational 
agencies (which in some cases they had not even delegated to independent agencies at 
the national level).
153
  
Moreover, treaty provisions prevented the Commission from delegating certain 
powers to institutions, which were not explicitly mentioned in the treaties, as set out by 
the so-called Meroni doctrine.
154
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1.2.5 Meroni doctrine 
Even though EU agencies are now mentioned in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty there still 
remains no provision in the treaty for the creation of Community agencies.
155
 The 
Meroni doctrine, which followed a 1958 ECJ decision, does not allow the Community 
to delegate regulatory powers to agencies.
156
 Under the existing EC Treaty rules, EU 
agencies (or other newly created EU bodies) are not allowed to obtain any powers 
regarding the formulation of implementation rules or powers to adopt secondary 
legislation.
157
 Limited delegation of certain powers could be possible (e.g. in the 
implementation process) which would, however, have to be strictly defined and 
monitored.
158
 
Thus in order to delegate significant regulatory powers to EU agencies, treaty 
revision would be required.
159
 No piece of secondary legislation (with the treaties being 
primary legislation) would be able to allow European agencies to have regulatory 
powers.
160
 Geradin warns, however, that by preventing EU agencies from acquiring 
regulatory powers, the needs of a modern administrative state (or in this case state-like 
regime) could not be met.
161
 However, even independently of the ECJ‘s Meroni 
doctrine, many member states were reluctant to support the creation of strong regulatory 
EU agencies (for fear of leading to an EU which might resemble an administrative 
state).  
Changes to the Union‘s institutional set-up must also allow the current balance of 
power of formal institutions to remain intact.
162
 Initially, the Meroni doctrine was seen 
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as preventing the creation of Community agencies altogether, until it was re-interpreted 
(by the Council and the Commission) in the mid-1970s. Subsequently, the first two 
agencies were created, albeit with restricted competences.
163
 Moreover, the Commission 
can only delegate powers which have already been transferred to the supranational level 
by the member states.
164
 This means that the prospect of agencies acquiring full blown 
regulatory powers is further limited by the distribution of competencies within the EU‘s 
multi-level governance system. As a result, EU agencies have been under the direct 
control of the Commission and are not fully independent.
165
 Instead they take on more 
of an advisory role with the Commission retaining the right to the final say.
166
 
The Meroni doctrine has been labelled as out of step with regulatory policy 
developments in Europe, hindering much-needed innovations in EU governance.
167
 As 
Everson points out, the doctrine ‗seems to continue to stand in the path of truly effective 
delegation‘.168 However, the required treaty changes could be undertaken by the 
member states, if they had a desire to do so. 
Due to the restrictions regarding delegation, the Commission‘s tasks and powers 
have increased over the decades, making it more reluctant to share or transfer some of 
its powers to the new agencies.
169
 However, due to the restricted powers of EU 
agencies, the Commission does not run the risk of them trying to maximise their own 
power at the Commission‘s cost. Yataganas describes the Commission as a ‗super-
agency‘ at heart, which has reached the limits of its expansion.170 According to Scott, 
further constraints on supranational regulation and delegation of powers to agencies are 
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the limited powers possessed by the EU at the supranational level and the subsidiarity 
principle which was introduced in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty.
171
 The subsidiarity 
principle states the intention  
to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that 
constant checks are made as to whether action at Community level is justified in 
the light of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level.
172
  
 
 
1.2.6 EU agencies and legitimacy  
Finally, while some aspects regarding regulatory agencies differ depending on whether 
they concern a national or an EU agency, legitimacy issues affect institutions at all 
levels.
173
 Dehousse has identified a gradual shift from decision-making by politicians to 
decision-making by technocrats (in agencies, committees, etc.), which is less transparent 
and allows for less citizen participation.
174
 However, many policy issues which are dealt 
with by the EU require technocratic attention and are too specific and complex or, 
indeed, technical for politicians or the general public to be able to make informed 
decisions without additional policy-related information.
175
 In order to increase their 
accountability, agencies need to ensure visibility, a good reputation and credibility 
regarding their work and ensure the transparency of procedures.
176
  
With member countries and EP representatives (as well as Commission officials) 
forming part of many European agencies‘ management boards, agencies could be 
considered as being a way of improving democracy in the EU.
177
 However, participation 
by member countries and EU institutions in the management of EU agencies does not 
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necessarily equal legitimacy.
178
 Everson points out that the participating interests hardly 
represent an adequate cross-section of the EU‘s civil society.179 Curtin suggests that EU 
agencies could potentially be learning sites for new participatory practices which could 
then be applied to other areas of EU administration.
180
 However, the degree to which the 
new European agencies can be considered as participatory also depends on the 
participatory arrangements of those new European agencies and the different national 
contact points which might allow involvement to varying degrees. 
Due to the limited powers of the European agencies, it is unlikely that they will have 
a significant impact on increasing (or decreasing) the EU‘s legitimacy. Nonetheless, 
Dehousse argues that compared to the non-transparency of the comitology system, the 
setting up of European agencies has led to an improvement in terms of transparency and 
legitimacy and thus also democracy.
181
 Not only are EU agencies subject to more 
scrutiny, they are also more visible and attract more (public) attention than 
committees.
182
 According to Vos, agency networks which involve all interested parties 
could potentially improve public understanding and trust in EU policies.
183
 Moreover, 
due to their visibility, agencies might be able to increase interest in their respective 
fields.
184
 
Prior to the establishment of EU agencies and their information networks, there had 
been demands for more decentralization and more independence within statistical 
information provision which was carried out almost exclusively by the EU‘s statistical 
office and/or national statistical offices.
185
 The new European agencies are subject to 
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varying degrees of supervision by the Commission while the EP has no direct control 
over the agencies, apart from indirect influence through the EU‘s/agencies‘ budgets 
(and in many cases appointing representatives for the management boards).
186
 
 
1.2.7 EEA  
The creation of the EEA followed the realization that high quality environmental data 
was needed in order to support environmental policy-making and monitoring.
187
 As with 
most EU agencies, the EEA is not a fully fledged regulatory body: it does not possess 
rule-making, enforcement or adjudication powers.
188
 Although Regulation 1210/90 
establishing the EEA was agreed upon already in 1990, the agency did not formally 
begin its work from its eventual seat in Copenhagen until December 1993. An EEA task 
force had to be set up within the Commission‘s Directorate General (DG) for the 
Environment because France blocked an agreement on the seat of several EU agencies 
until the end of October 1993.
189
  
The EEA‘s main task is the provision of reliable and comparable information on the 
environment to those involved in environmental policy-making. Like most EU agencies, 
the EEA functions due to network partners in the EEA member countries participating 
in its main network, the Eionet.
190
 The Eionet consists of five centres focusing on 
particular environmental issues (the European Topic Centres, ETCs), with contact 
points in the member countries (the national focal points, NFPs) who allocate further 
contact points nationally in the different subject areas of environmental policy (the 
national reference centres, NRCs, e.g. for water, air waste, climate, etc.). NFPs are 
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responsible for ensuring that the right mechanisms are put in place nationally to ensure 
reporting obligations to the EEA are met and assist the EEA with the preparation and 
implementation of its work programmes (for more on the Eionet see Chapter Three).
191
 
The Eionet is part of the still emerging Shared Environmental Information System 
(SEIS) which aims to make environmental information available as close to the source 
as possible and provide it in one single data repository. 
Geradin categorizes the EEA as an agency with an observatory role, responsible for 
the collection, processing and dissemination of reliable information.
192
 This 
characterization neglects, however, the important role which the EEA plays in 
coordinating the Eionet. It is true that the EEA is not a full-blown regulatory agency and 
lacks powers (at least when compared to the Commission or some national environment 
agencies such as the United States‘ Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)). But, 
as was explained above, the importance of information (and technical expertise), 
particularly in environmental policy-making should not be underestimated.
193
 With 
regard to frequent comparisons of the EEA (as well as national environment agencies) 
to the USEPA, Shapiro stresses that the latter is more comparable to a government 
department (i.e. an environment ministry in the European context) than an independent 
agency.
194
 A comparison between the United States of America (USA) and the EU 
would be difficult because the former is a sovereign state while the latter is a 
supranational union of states. Even if the EU were a state, the different nature of the 
respective environment agencies makes a comparison near impossible. 
The next chapter will assess Europeanization and historical institutionalist theories 
because they provide the theoretical framework for the empirical research findings 
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presented in this thesis. It will also outline the research questions and put forward three 
hypotheses which will then be ‗tested‘ in the remaining chapters.  
 
 
 
  
47 
 
Chapter 2: European integration theories and theoretical 
framework 
 
 
2.1 Agencies and European integration 
This chapter explains how Europeanization and historical institutionalist theories will be 
used to provide the theoretical framework from which the research questions and three 
hypotheses are derived for this thesis. It begins by putting Europeanization and 
historical insitutionalist theories within the context of a wider review of European 
integration theories, leading to the focus on Europeanization and historical 
institutionalist theories as the most suitable theories for analysing the new empirical 
data presented in this thesis. 
According to Hix and Goetz, European integration involves two related processes:  
the delegation of policy competences to the supranational level to achieve 
particular policy outcomes; and the establishment of a new set of political 
institutions, with executive, legislative and judicial powers.
195
  
 
European integration is an open-ended process and degrees of integration differ between 
specific policy areas and over periods of time.
196
 Due to the ongoing changes and 
developments in the EU and its political system, a variety of theories address the issues 
behind European integration. 
 
2.1.1 Intergovernmentalism 
Intergovernmentalism puts national governments and the state at the centre of the 
European integration process.
197
 Following this logic, a state‘s attitude to European 
integration depends on cost and benefit considerations as well as the protection of the 
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national interests and sovereignty of the state.
198
 Pierson identifies three core features of 
intergovernmentalism: (1) the preoccupation of member states with national 
sovereignty; (2) the focus on grand bargains among member states in interstate 
negotiations (such as intergovernmental conferences which agree treaty changes); and, 
(3) the assumption that EU institutions act as instruments of member states.
199
  
When assessing EU environmental policy from an intergovernmental perspective, 
McCormick argues that it can only be applied to certain parts of EU environmental 
policy development such as the adoption of common environmental legislation in order 
to avoid the creation of trade barriers in the common market as a result of strict 
domestic environmental regulation in some member states.
200
 Andeweg points out that 
the privileged role of governments as actors in EU decision-making is widely accepted, 
despite the debate on the EU‘s intergovernmental and/or supranational nature 
continuing to be an issue.
201
 
 
2.1.2 Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism has a very different view of European integration. It is based on the 
Monnet method which relates integration to processes of issue linkage and spillover that 
result in new institutional forms.
202
 Spillover refers to  
a process where political co-operation conducted with a specific goal in mind leads 
to the formulation of new goals in order to assure the achievement of the original 
goals.
203
  
 
Neofunctionalism assumes that in order for policy spillover to take place, certain 
prerequisites have to be met.
204
 According to the neofunctionalist perspective the move 
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to adopt a common environmental policy took place to ensure the functioning of the 
single market. In other words, spillover effects (from the internal markets) triggered the 
adoption of another common policy (i.e. environmental policy).  
Neofunctionalism as a theory of European integration was particularly popular 
during the 1960s and 1970s, as it reflected developments at that time.
205
 From the mid-
1970s, other integration theories gained in importance, particularly those stressing the 
importance of the state (such as intergovernmentalism).
206
 Neofunctionalism enjoyed a 
brief revival in the late 1980s (when the Single European Act came into force) and 
1990s due to the acceleration of the previously slowed down integration process.
207
 
Importantly, Shapiro identifies the creation of EU agencies as ‗a kind of neo-
functionalism‘.208 He argues that in the early 1990s the EU was unable to directly 
further political integration.
209
 But by creating ―merely‖ technical or informational 
agencies (which are located outside Brussels), it indirectly fostered European 
integration in a manner which appeared innocuous at the time although it had important 
long-term consequences.
210
  
It could be argued that intergovernmental and neofunctionalist theories of (European) 
integration have been more valid during different periods of time in the EU‘s 
evolution.
211
  Weale, on the other hand, rejects the intergovernmental-neofunctionalist 
divide as overly simplistic, and argues instead that EU environmental policy is 
dependent on both supranational institutions and member states.
212
 Recently attempts 
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have been made to develop combinations of these two traditional theories although the 
development of new theoretical perspectives such as new institutionalism, policy 
theories, social constructivist approaches and multi-level governance (including policy 
networks) have been even more important.
213
 
 
2.1.3 Integration through policy networks 
Even though the Rhodes model of policy networks focuses on their application at the 
national level, some of the characteristics also apply to international networks.
214
 The 
Rhodes model focuses on the networks‘ membership, degree of stability, degree of 
interdependence (e.g. resources or expertise) and the benefactors of the networks.
215
Due 
to the Eionet being an international network as set out in the EEA‘s founding regulation, 
the Rhodes model has not been chosen as the main theoretical framework for this thesis. 
As will be explained in this thesis the Eionet and EPA network are characterised by core 
features which are very different from national policy networks.  However, where 
appropriate the Rhodes model will be referred to within this thesis.  
Rhodes identifies different types of policy networks: policy communities, professional 
networks, intergovernmental networks, producer networks and issue networks.
216
 
Networks vary according to their degree of integration (from tight policy communities 
to loosely integrated issue networks) and the interests and motivations of the network 
members.
217
 The network structure of the EEA‘s Eionet has been set out in the agency‘s 
founding regulation and become institutionalized.
218
 However, the EEA also 
participates and supports a number of other, less extensive networks (such as the EPA 
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network). The network characteristics identified by Rhodes will be taken into 
consideration when assessing the Eionet and the EPA network (Chapters Three and 
Eight respectively). Majone points out the importance of close cooperation and 
networking to the work of European agencies.
219
 In order to combine decentralized 
implementation with the uniformity required to achieve the single European market, it is 
necessary to ensure similar behaviour from national implementation actors (which in 
turn requires comparable data, convergence in expert opinions and similarity of 
procedures).
220
 If this is to be achieved, there is a need for some sort of structure (i.e. 
agencies), which can coordinate the wider network.
221
 As well as aiming to increase 
interaction between government services, the networks also aim to connect the main 
public and private actors in a given policy sector.
222
 Dehousse describes the European 
agencies as ‗the heart of a network‘,223 acting as coordinators rather than central 
regulators.
224
 
Dehousse considers the creation of European agencies as necessary in order to meet 
the Community‘s functional needs.225 EU agencies set up networks by connecting 
existing institutions at the national level and collaborate with them.
226
 Moreover, 
Majone argues that EU agencies were designed in such a way as to make networking 
unavoidable.
227
 This is not only the case in relation to networks set up by the agencies 
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(together with the member states), but also their management boards.
228
 Moreover, due 
to limited budgets the agencies depend on and cooperate with existing structures.
229
  
According to Dehousse, a decentralized, networking administration is the most 
suitable system for ensuring harmonization (required for the functioning of the common 
market) and their creation needs to be put into context with regard to EU regulatory 
activity.
230
 Moreover, as was pointed out above, many governments were opposed to 
setting up truly autonomous EU agencies as this could have resulted in the loss of 
influence in the harmonization process.
231
 Nonetheless, it has been suggested that 
harmonization measures were not sufficient to create a single market.
232
 
Furthermore, Dehousse argues that within the EU context, regulation by networks 
involves national administrations more directly in supranational policy, resulting in 
more uniformity and harmonization without giving more powers to existing Community 
institutions.
233
 The cooperation of the EPA network with the Commission is one 
example of such involvement (see Chapter Eight). Even without the creation of EU 
agencies, a significant increase in the Commission‘s powers in the near future seems 
unlikely.
234
 
Although national agencies play an important role in, for example, the functioning of 
Eionet, they would not lose their importance should the EEA cease to exist. The EEA‘s 
dependency on the Eionet seems to be significantly higher compared to the dependency 
of national environment agencies on the Eionet or the EEA. The EEA‘s Eionet as well 
as the other networks in which it participates tend not to be involved directly in the EU 
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policy-making process although their indirect contribution (in the form of statements or 
reports) might play an important role. 
 
2.1.4 Administrative integration 
As noted by Knill, the growing importance of EU policies has had an effect on domestic 
administrative systems.
235
 Different administrative structures at the national level deal 
with the same Community legislation. The possibility of the convergence of national 
administrative structures therefore needs to be considered.
236
 Knill defines national 
administrative traditions as the  
general patterns of administrative styles and structures which are strongly 
embedded in the macro-institutional context of the state tradition, the legal system 
as well as the political-administrative system of a country.
237
  
 
The German administrative system is characterized by administrative resistance to 
change, stemming from a strong institutional core as well as a ‗low structural capacity 
for administrative reform‘.238 The French administrative system appears more flexible, 
allowing for more regulatory variety. However, in France there is also little room for 
administrative reforms.
239
 The administrative system of the UK is characterized by the 
openness of its administrative structures and a high degree of structural flexibility which 
operates within a wider framework of administrative styles.
240
 The EU‘s administrative 
system is less well established, partly due to its comparatively recent emergence, 
required ability to accommodate ongoing changes and the need to rely on the member 
states‘ administrative systems and their cooperation.241  
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According to Goetz, European integration tends to modify national executive 
arrangements rather than to transform them.
242
 Consequently, the impact of European 
integration on national agencies is likely to be incremental, rather than radical, with 
change being likely to affect agencies‘ procedures rather than organization or structures. 
Seen from this perspective European integration and the creation of EU agencies (in 
certain policy fields) will not result in the convergence of national agencies. Ideally, at 
least from a supranational point of view, agency procedures (such as the collection, 
evaluation, interpretation and presentation of information) would eventually become 
harmonized. But the overall structures and goals of national agencies would remain 
largely unaffected by the creation of European agencies.  
The EU‘s agencies could nevertheless be considered as potentially having an impact 
in the form of ‗administrative integration‘.243 The administrative integration approach is 
concerned with the growing intermeshing, interaction and integration of national and 
EU administrations.
244
 In the case of EU agencies, administrative integration is 
concerned with the impact of institutional developments – the creation of EC agencies – 
on policy decision-making processes at the Community as well as the national level.
245
 
At the national level, institutional and administrative structures needed to be adapted in 
order to become part of the information networks, such as creating national focal points 
responsible for managing the collected information and passing it on to the respective 
European agency.
246
 
However, Chiti argues that a general model of the administrative procedures 
managed by European agencies does not exist, with procedures varying significantly 
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between different agencies.
247
 Kreher notes that the proliferation of agencies affecting 
relations between national and EU administrations might ultimately result in increased 
administrative integration.
 248
 Kreher further considers the issue of European integration 
as ‗a process of continuous progress and restatement of the relationship between 
European states and their supranational institutions‘.249 In terms of administrative 
integration, the creation of European agencies is a step forward.
250
 Moreover, by 
allowing EU applicant countries and other non-EU member countries to become part of 
an agency network (as is the case with the EEA and Eionet), European agencies can also 
play an important role in facilitating and supporting the integration of new member 
states. The agencies may also gain credibility in relation to what they are trying to 
achieve.   
When considering administrative developments, a variety of perspectives and 
approaches can be found. Olsen points out the competing or supplementary hypotheses 
of global convergence versus institutional robustness.
251
 He is critical of the notion of a 
‗single best way of organizing administration‘252 while pointing out important variables 
such as time, place, definitions, values and purpose.
253
 This is important when looking 
at national environment agencies‘ willingness (and ability) to change for harmonization, 
facilitation or other purposes. National administrative bodies were created within the 
context of specific national political systems. Unsurprisingly their structures, designs 
and practices therefore vary. However, Falkner points out existing national practices 
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and norms might be modified by experiencing different (national and/or supranational) 
practices.
254
  
Sverdrup identifies the lack of a coherent EU administrative policy.
255
 The EU 
treaties do not demand or explicitly promote a specific EU-wide administrative model. 
Instead there was an assumption that different national administrative arrangements 
would not negatively impact on how EU legislation is implemented across different 
member states.
256
 
Knill and others have pointed out that traditional approaches to European integration 
neglect the impact of the EU on domestic administrative change whereas the 
comparative public administration approach neglects the impact of member state 
administrations on European integration.
257
 However, interest in the impact of European 
integration on national administrative/political systems has begun to grow.
258
  
 
2.2 Theoretical approach and main questions 
2.2.1 Europeanization 
This dissertation assesses the changing roles of national environment agencies in 
France, Germany and Britain (England/Wales) within the EU. It analyses to what 
degree, if any, these national environment agencies have become Europeanized in 
relation to the creation of the EEA (which is part of the wave of agency creation at the 
EU level). This dissertation will focus on the effect which the creation of the EEA has 
had on national environment agencies in three case countries and the wider domestic 
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administrations in which these national agencies are embedded (i.e. vertical and 
horizontal Europeanization).  
The Europeanization literature has become an important component of EU studies. 
Since the mid-1990s, Europeanization studies have begun to include systematically the 
impact of EU policy on domestic political arrangements (institutions and procedures).
266
 
The concept of Europeanization can therefore be used to assess what opportunities 
and/or constraints the EU has provided/imposed on national (environmental) institutions 
and politics.
267
 
Although environmental policy has been subject to a large number of 
Europeanization studies, there are very few studies which focus on the Europeanization 
of member states‘ environmental agencies.268 This dissertation aims to help close this 
gap while contributing to a better understanding of the Europeanization of member state 
environmental agencies. 
 
Defining Europeanization 
When defining Europeanization, the focus can either be on what impact the EU has on 
its member states and their administrative systems (i.e. top-down or vertical 
Europeanization), or the impact member states have on the EU (i.e. bottom-up 
Europeanization or uploading effect). Top-down Europeanization approaches often also 
take into account horizontal Europeanization which assesses whether convergence has 
taken place between member states‘ administrative systems or whether they continue to 
diverge.
269
  
Radaelli defines the concept of Europeanization broadly as  
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processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, paradigms, styles, ―ways of doing things‖, and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of 
EU public policy and politics and then incorporated into the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.
270
 
 
Radaelli‘s definition includes a wide range of possible angles from which the impact of 
EU membership on member states (including their domestic administrative structures 
and procedures) can be assessed. When considering the impact of the EEA‘s creation on 
three of its member countries, this thesis draws on Radaelli‘s very complex (and 
inclusive) definition and Olsen‘s more simplified definition of Europeanization as ‗the 
penetration of European-level institutions into national and subnational systems of 
governance‘.271  
The usefulness of Europeanization as a concept has been contested due to the lack of 
a specific definition (which is easily operationalisable for empirical research).
272
 Vink 
and Graziano further define Europeanization as ‗the domestic adaptation to European 
regional integration‘,273 whereby regional integration refers to closer economic and/or 
political links among geographically near countries while domestic adaptation describes 
a variety of developments including administrative adaptation of national governments 
and the adaptation of interest groups to new opportunity structures.
274
 Europeanization 
studies on environmental policies have shown that member state institutions (such as 
environmental agencies and ministries are also affected by Europeanization. Therefore 
Europeanization should be a useful overall approach when assessing the impact of the 
EEA‘s creation on national administrations in the three case countries.275 Its use 
together with historical institutionalism should lead to meaningful analytical insights 
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and provide a useful framework for the categorization of the ways in which national 
environment agencies, institutions and ministries were affected by their participation in 
the Eionet. 
There is relatively wide agreement amongst Europeanization approaches that the 
degree to which EU membership impacts on member states and their administrative 
systems varies greatly from country to country and even between different policy 
areas.
276
 Moreover, due to the numerous ways in which the EU impacts on its member 
countries and their administrations, the exact degrees of influence of different 
developments are harder to establish. The future use of Europeanization as a research 
concept may therefore require its combination with other theoretical approaches. 
 
Top-down approach 
Olsen‘s definition of Europeanization regarding European-level institutions penetrating 
systems of governance at the national level describes vertical Europeanization.
277
 This 
includes aspects of the way in which rules (formal and informal) and procedures from 
the EU-level are incorporated at the national level. The top-down approach to 
Europeanization, as defined by Börzel, focuses on the impact of new EU institutions on 
national political structures and processes (while the bottom-up approach is concerned 
with the creation of EU level institutions including new rules, procedures and norms).
278
  
The theoretical approach used in my thesis will mainly draw on the top-down 
Europeanization (or ‗EUization‘) approaches which focus on the EU‘s impact on the 
domestic level. Although the EEA is not one of the formal EU institutions (such as the 
EP or the Commission), as an EU agency it can nevertheless be expected to have a 
discernible impact on member countries. Being a European agency puts the EEA in a 
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different position compared to environment agencies at the national level. Efforts of one 
or several member states to ―upload‖ their agency set-ups to the EU level would 
arguably not lead to strong downloading pressures because of the restricted powers of 
the EEA which, moreover, has to rely heavily on member country cooperation.  
But top-down measures relating to the creation of the EEA and its Eionet with 
national environment agencies and administrations had to be put in place in order to 
enable the development of cooperation processes between the EU‘s environment agency 
and member state environment agencies/ministries. The way in which the EEA works is 
arguably a good example of the EU‘s dependence on collaboration with national 
administrations which has been increasing in recent decades (due to the EU‘s expanding 
activities).
279
 The involvement and presence of national administrations in different 
areas and levels of the policy-making process impacts not only on the EU‘s political 
system, but also on the national administrations themselves (which have been 
encouraged to get involved in the coordination of national officials in EU structures).
280
 
However, member states with different administrative systems (and even those with 
similar ones) do not all react in the same way to identical Europeanization pressures. In 
other words, (top-down) Europeanization does not necessarily lead to a harmonization 
of national administrative structures across the EU.
281
 
 
Horizontal Europeanization 
The main focus of this dissertation will be on the convergence versus divergence debate 
(see below) and whether the EU influences experienced by national environment 
agencies are of a vertical (i.e. top-down) or horizontal (i.e. convergence) nature. In 
addition to whether Europeanization is purely a top-down phenomenon or a 
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combination of top-down and bottom-up pressures, Bulmer describes the inclusion of 
horizontal integration as the greatest debate in the theoretical literature on 
Europeanization.
282
 Horizontal mechanisms of European integration can also include 
domestic actors in different countries sharing good practice.
283
 Reasons leading to such 
horizontal effects include an increase in cooperation and competition between countries 
as well as an increase in information exchanges and mutual learning facilitated by 
European integration.
284
 Olsen further mentions an increase in contact between national 
models which could contribute to horizontal Europeanization.
285
 This could also lead to 
EU member states working together more closely on a bilateral level than would 
otherwise be the case. The research focus of this thesis will therefore not only be on top-
down Europeanization pressures and processes but also on cooperation between national 
environment agencies, particularly in the context of the EPA network, which may 
possibly increase convergence.  
 
Convergence vs. divergence 
As mentioned above, one important aspect of Europeanization research in general and, 
as will be explained in more detail below, my thesis in particular is whether identical 
EU influences on different national systems lead to convergence in member states‘ 
political systems or whether national differences will prevail. Knill uses Kerr‘s 
definition of convergence, describing it as ‗the tendency of societies to grow more alike, 
to develop similarities in structures, processes, and performances‘286 (although the 
concept of convergence can be further specified).  
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Harmsen points out that despite increased contact between national administrations 
and the EU, no significant convergence to a common European institutional model has 
taken place.
287
 Instead member states have, according to Harmsen, retained diversity in 
their structures and procedures.
288
 In a study on the Europeanization of environmental 
policy in ten member states, Jordan and Liefferink conclude that the member states‘ 
(environmental) policy content has been more affected than their policy styles and 
structures.
289
 If one applies Jordan and Liefferink‘s findings to the creation of the EEA, 
then one would expect it to have had only a limited impact on member country 
environment agencies and administrations.  Such expectations are supported by 
historical institutionalism which tries to explain the lack of change in national 
institutional set-ups with national institutional path dependencies and the ‗stickiness‘ of 
institutions (see below). 
EU institutions and structures have been penetrated and influenced by national 
officials, who are involved in all areas of the EU decision-making process. However, 
national administrations not only participate in the EU decision-making process, but 
they are also affected by EU policies on the domestic level.
290
 However, although 
national administrations have undoubtedly been affected, most Europeanization studies 
fail to detect radical transformations within domestic arrangements, which would 
indicate that a move towards a common homogenized institutional model among all 
member states is not taking place.
291
 Developments at EU level have left a significant 
amount of discretion to domestic institutions and actors, and the penetration of domestic 
institutions by the European level has remained limited.
292
 This approach not only 
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allows member states to remain flexible regarding changes, reforms or adaptations 
which they may or may not want to pursue, it is also more promising due to greater 
opposition the EU level might encounter should it decide to introduce compulsory 
changes to national political and administrative systems. Thus the decisions to change 
domestic arrangements would in most cases originate from the domestic level. 
Europeanization of national structures has taken place nonetheless, with national 
officials (including national environment agency officials) being increasingly involved 
in activities at the supranational level.
293
 
Kassim identifies three main ways in which the EU has impacted on national 
administrations: firstly, by national administrations taking on the role as EU policy 
implementers; secondly, by having to alter and adapt existing national legislation to suit 
EU decisions; and, thirdly, by adapting national administrative structures and 
procedures to allow maximum practical involvement in EU policy-making.
294
 In the 
case of the latter two ways this could potentially lead to the convergence of national 
systems because of the similar EU influences on member states and similar aims of the 
member states at the supranational level respectively. These examples of the ways in 
which national administrations could be affected are included in Radaelli‘s definition of 
Europeanization (see above). However, with Kassim‘s definition aiming to be as 
inclusive as possible, his identification not only supplements Radaelli‘s definition but 
relates it more closely to the focus of this thesis on national administrations. 
Olsen suggests that, as divergence between member states persists, EU arrangements 
appear to be compatible with a variety of national arrangements which are flexible 
enough to adapt to changes at the European level.
295
 Holzinger and Knill further point 
out that convergence is more likely to take place when there is a legal obligation for the 
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harmonization of national organizations, whereas divergence is likely to continue in 
cases where states are given more leeway regarding regulatory options, as would be the 
case in the EEA‘s member countries‘ Eionet participation.296 
 
Fusion theory/European administrative space 
From a different perspective, Wessels‘ fusion theory goes as far as to suggest the 
merging of the national and supranational administrations.
297
 According to Wessels‘ 
theory, member state governments who perceive an advantage in addressing their 
interest at the supranational level, adopt measures beyond simple cooperation, leading 
to supranational institutions and/or procedures in which national and supranational 
actors become enmeshed.
298
 Wessels stresses that this type of fusion would not signify 
the move towards a federal system because member states will guard their 
sovereignty.
299
 Bursens criticised Wessel‘s fusion theory when he pointed out that 
empirical research shows that when national adaptations to EU level changes took place 
they triggered only minor domestic institutional rearrangements and/or constitutional 
reforms.
300
 Wessels himself points out that fusion is not actually the same as increased 
cooperation.
301
  My research on the creation of the EEA will assess whether a fusion of 
national environment agencies has taken place or whether national environmental 
agencies have remained distinctly separate entities with clear responsibilities towards 
national environmental ministries and/or other national government departments. 
The emergence of a European Administrative Space (EAS) has also been suggested 
as a possible result of the convergence of public administrations to a common European 
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model based on the (contested) concept of the existence of a ‗single best way of 
organizing administration‘.302 The creation of an EAS is not, however, required for EU 
membership which has always allowed for a wide range of national administrative 
systems; no specific administrative model has been imposed by primary EU law i.e. the 
EU treaties.
303
 Moreover, secondary EU law is characterized by the widespread use of 
directives (which are very common in environmental policy) that define common policy 
goals but leave it up to the member states how to achieve them.
304
 
Knill pointed out that few Europeanization studies focus on the impact which the EU 
has on national administrative systems.
305
 A study by Martens explicitly mentioned the 
lack of knowledge about the role which national agencies play in European 
cooperation.
306
 My dissertation will aim to reduce the knowledge gaps on EU and 
national agencies in the Europeanization literature.  
When looking at national administrations in the context of EU multi-level 
governance, the focus is often on their relations with the Commission which 
undoubtedly plays a major role in the EU policy-making process. The Commission has 
an important impact on national administrations, for example, through the wide use of 
committees which are attended by national officials. Although the creation of European 
agencies has not created another level to EU multi-level governance, it has added a new 
element to existing EU institutions and had an impact on institutional dynamics within 
the EU. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that EU agencies are likely to have had a 
significant impact on the roles and functions of national agencies the extent of which 
will be assessed in this thesis. 
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Vink and Graziano describe Europeanization research as a ‘European route to the 
study of national politics‘.307 It is the route that has been chosen in this dissertation 
because national politics and administrations cannot (or at least no longer) be researched 
in isolation from EU developments. Instead the impact of EU membership needs to be 
taken into account when researching the roles and functions of national (environmental) 
agencies.  
This dissertation assesses the Europeanization of national environment agencies 
within the EU. It focuses primarily on the impact of the creation of the EEA and its 
main network, the Eionet, but it also assesses the cooperation of the three case country 
environment agencies (and the EEA) within the framework of the EPA network. 
 
2.2.2 New institutionalism 
New institutionalism 
Europeanization is an analytical concept which arguably can be based within the broad 
range of theories that are commonly referred to as ―new institutionalism‖.308 New 
institutionalism adds the analytical dimension of informal rules, conventions and 
routines to traditional institutional approaches which focus merely on formal 
governmental organizations, rules and standard operating procedures.
309
 Olsen defines 
institutions as organizational tools which are used to achieve desired policy goals.
310
 
New institutionalism is made up of a variety of strains including rational choice 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism. Rational 
choice institutionalism considers institutional design as being based on the policy 
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objectives of rational domestic actors who try to pursue their interests within the EU 
decision-making process in which they encounter certain institutional opportunity 
structures and/or veto points.
311
 Sociological institutionalism tries to explain the actions 
of domestic actors within the EU by focusing on the internationalization of (European) 
norms and the potential which this process has for behavioural change and the 
development of new (European) identities.
312
 Finally, historical institutionalism focuses 
on domestic processes of adjustment to the EU over a long period of time while arguing 
that changes will be incremental and slow due to the ‗stickiness‘ of institutions.313 For 
all three types of institutionalism, institutions play a significant role; they do indeed 
‗matter‘.314  
Of the three new institutionalist theories, historical institutionalism and its 
longitudinal perspective is not only compatible with the Europeanization perspective but 
also ideally suited to provide a theoretical framework from which the research questions 
and hypotheses can be derived (see 2.2.3 and 2.2.4). Rational choice institutionalism 
focuses strongly on veto points and opportunity structures. It would not have been able 
to include (as well as historical insitutionalism) the EEA‘s impact on its member 
countries, the main research focus of this thesis. While sociological institutionalism 
would have added the undoubtedly interesting aspect of the emergence of European 
identities, its focus on individual actors and behavioural change rather than on 
institutional actors goes beyond the empirical research which it was possible to 
undertake for the thesis.  
Importantly, the creation of new institutions at the supranational level is likely to 
affect national institutions and administrations, although it does not necessarily result in 
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national institutional changes. According to Olsen, institutional change takes place 
when adapting to changing environments in order to improve performance and policy 
outcomes.
315
 However, institutional robustness and resilience means that changes will 
not take place easily and rapidly (unless the conditions are extraordinary).
316
 New 
institutionalism considers the central role of institutions in political science. It assesses 
issues such as how powers and tasks are distributed and exercised and what resource 
dependencies are created by specific institutional arrangements.
317
 From a (new) 
institutionalist perspective, significant (policy and/or administrative) changes are likely 
to take place gradually over a considerable period of time. The gradual reform(s) or 
slow adaptations are normally the result of new challenges and tasks. Because the 
changes tend to be incremental they are harder to identify but this is exactly what 
historical institutionalism aims to achieve. 
 
Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism explains national differences (i.e. continued national 
divergence) in policy areas with reference to the conservative character (or ‗stickiness‘) 
of national institutions.
318
 It was only in the 1980s, that it came to be considered a useful 
theoretical approach for assessing European integration.
319
 In his work on historical 
institutionalism, Pierson pointed out the ‗need to study European integration as a 
process that unfolds over time‘.320  Historical institutionalism, as a theoretical approach, 
is of particular interest to my research due to its focus on the processes affecting 
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political developments (the historical element), and on how embedded these processes 
(the institutional element) are.
321
 
Institutional change tends to be slow and incremental. The wide-spread use of 
directives, which leave considerable leeway to member states during the 
implementation process, in EU environmental policy-making allows member states to 
minimise changes.
322
 Moreover, in order to avoid arbitrary changes to institutional set-
ups, political institutions are often specifically designed to obstruct institutional (and 
policy) reform, leading to their characterization as ‗sticky‘.323 The ‗stickiness‘ does not 
only refer to institutions but can also include policy arrangements and leads to broad 
patterns of incremental changes.
324
 Liefferink and Jordan identify that national 
differences may not only persist, but might actually become even more pronounced.
325
  
Stacey and Rittberger, among others, point out that historical institutionalism is 
better equipped to explain institutional stability and persistence rather than institutional 
change.
 326
 In this thesis I will consider whether the assumption of continued divergence 
does apply to national environment agencies and if the creation of the EEA has had any 
impact on reducing national differences.  
Explaining stability and persistence is related to the path dependency aspect, which 
forms part of the historical institutionalism approach. The ways in which agencies act or 
react is very much determined by the norms and rules of the systems they are located 
in.
327
 Path dependency utilizes social causation and rejects the suggestion, that similar 
(or even the same) developments or influences will produce the same (or similar) results 
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everywhere, but instead stress the impact of contextual features.
328
 Thus a country‘s past 
and existing institutional set-up and aims will significantly influence not only its 
response, but also its ability to respond to new challenges.
329
 Once in place, institutions 
follow a certain path, which is ensured by mechanisms providing positive feedback or 
increasing returns for this path due to institutional structures and procedures becoming 
established and the institutions themselves becoming recognized and involved.
330
 
Change does still happen, but the extent is somewhat limited and usually takes place 
incrementally although revolutionary change is possible in exceptional circumstances 
(e.g. a policy disaster).
331
  
At the EU‘s supranational level, changes to existing institutions or past reforms and 
decisions are even harder to undo than at the national level because changes would 
require a majority of, if not all, member states to agree, as well as support from the EU 
institutions. For example member states might often find it difficult to bring about 
changes after realizing the unexpected effects and costs of past decisions.
332
 One 
example would be the 1985 directive on Environmental Impact Assessment, as assessed 
by Héritier et al. in their study on Britain, France and Germany.
333
 While the 
implications of the passing of the directive were relatively easily accommodated in 
France and Britain, they were overlooked by Germany, which as a result, faced 
difficulties with its implementation.
334
 
Institutional change at the national level as a result of European integration does not 
necessarily mean that change in different member states takes place to the same extent 
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and/or in the same direction. The involvement of national environment agencies with 
the EEA has been evolving over a period of almost two decades. Historical 
institutionalism offers a promising theoretical framework for assessing (incremental but 
also revolutionary) changes which may have taken place over time in national 
environmental institutions as a result of developments on the EU level (e.g. the setting 
up of the EEA). 
 
Establishing institutional change 
Bulmer and Burch use five dimensions of establishing institutional change: (1) changes 
in the system; (2) changes in organizations; (3) changes in processes; (4) changes in 
regulations; and, (5) change in the cultural aspects of institutions.
335
 
System changes refer to developments affecting the framework of the state and 
government as well as constitutional rules. Organizational changes include changes to 
the structure of offices and positions, the distribution of formal authority and resources. 
Changes in processes affect the way in which business is dealt with, the distribution of 
information and the creation of networks in order to fulfil these tasks. Regulatory 
changes affect guidelines, rules and operating codes as well as the ‗capacity for strategic 
guidance (i.e. the means to ensure that tasks are fulfilled and that forward thinking is 
undertaken)‘.336 Bulmer and Burch‘s final dimension of changes, which is probably the 
most difficult to measure, relates to changes in the cultural aspects of institutions 
including the norms and values which govern the activities that take place within 
institutions.
337
 Although the issues involved in the cultural aspects of institutional 
change are mainly considered in sociological institutionalism, historical institutionalists 
                                                 
335
 Bulmer and Burch (2009:29-30) 
336
 Ibid.:30 
337
 Ibid.:30 
72 
 
usually acknowledge the significance of ideas while some also recognise the importance 
of wider cultural aspects for institutions involved in the policy-making processes.
338
  
Institutions can be affected by global, EU-related, or national factors, and will be 
further influenced by the institutional framework of central government, accountability 
to political environment and significant actors.
339
 As part of the cultural aspects of 
institutions, Mayntz and Scharpf‘s actor-centred institutionalism emphasises the 
importance of the actors which make up institutions.
340
 Knill suggests that approaches 
could be linked, using the agency-centred model to complement the institution-based 
approach.
341
 While the importance of the individuals in certain institutions is 
undeniable, assessing in detail their exact impact on the institutions in which they work 
goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. This thesis will, however, assess some of the 
central roles of core individual actors in national environment agencies. 
Bulmer and Burch‘s first four dimensions of institutional change will be used to 
assess the impact which the creation of the EEA has had on the national environment 
agencies in the three chosen case countries. Bulmer and Burch further apply Börzel and 
Risse‘s threefold classification to capture the degree of domestic institutional change: 
(1) absorption, (2) accommodation and (3) transformation.
342
 Absorption relates to the 
incorporation of EU policies into national settings and structures with little domestic 
change; accommodation means the adaptation of existing processes, policies and 
institutions with only modest domestic change; and, transformation results in the 
replacement of existing institutions, policies and processes involving a high degree of 
domestic change.
343
 Jordan and Liefferink‘s study on the overall extent of 
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Europeanization in ten countries showed that Europeanization is largely met through 
absorption and accommodation.
344
 
The degree to which the creation of the EEA has impacted on the three member 
countries considered will be assessed in this dissertation. Olsen suggests that because 
divergence between member states persists, EU arrangements appear to be compatible 
with a variety of national arrangements which are flexible enough to adapt but resistant 
enough to be maintained during changes at the European level. 
345
 How this applies in 
the case of EEA and Eionet participation requirements will also be considered in 
Chapter Three of this thesis. 
 
The wider context 
Placing the historical institutionalist approach in the context of the two competing 
paradigms of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, Pierson criticises 
intergovernmentalist approaches for their focus on particular moments in time (e.g. 
intergovernmental conferences which negotiate EU treaty amendments), rather than 
processes which occur over a longer time period.
346
 He also criticises neofunctionalism 
for crediting supranational institutions with more powers than they actually possess.
347
 
Pierson identifies as neofunctionalism‘s main problem the importance and autonomy 
which it attributes to supranational actors while neglecting member states‘ strong 
institutional positions (e.g. in the Council).
348
 He proposes the incorporation of key 
elements of both intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism such as the significance of 
supranantional actors, member state constraint and unintended consequences (spillover) 
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which connects well with historical institutionalism.
349
 The intergovernmentalist theory 
of integration, which emphasises, for example, the importance of national interests, does 
overall connect more with the rational choice strain of new institutionalism.
350
 
The creation of the EEA did not require treaty revision. It was created to increase 
policy-making efficiency by improving environmental reporting and providing solid 
environmental information for EU policy-making.
351
 Whether this has led to significant 
domestic adaptation will be assessed in this thesis. Historical institutionalism would 
assume that the impact of EU institutions on national administrations will remain 
largely dependent on factors such as national administrative traditions, institutional 
opportunity structures, and domestic interest constellations.
352
 
Aspinwall and Schneider point out that historical institutionalist research has focused 
mainly on either the EU or the national level, and less on the increasing 
interdependencies and mutual influences between the EU and its member states.
353
 For 
this dissertation historical institutionalism and Europeanization seem to be ideally suited 
for an assessment of the impact which the creation of the EEA has had on national level 
institutions (i.e. environment agencies and administrations). 
 
2.2.3 Research questions 
This thesis will aim to answer the following research questions and try to ‗test‘ the three 
hypotheses which are largely derived from historical institutionalism. 
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The main focus of this thesis is on how and to what extent national environment 
agencies have been influenced by EU level developments. More specifically my thesis 
will aim to answer the following main research question: 
What impact has the creation of the EEA had on national environment agencies 
and administrations? 
Following the creation of the EEA in the early 1990s, the process of establishing the 
agency‘s network within national environmental agencies and administrations took 
place. For a better understanding of the Europeanization process of national 
environment agencies it is therefore important to analyse the relationship between the 
EEA and national environment agencies. My dissertation will therefore assess the 
following additional main research questions: 
Did the creation of the EEA constitute a critical juncture or even a ‗seismic event‘ 
which triggered significant institutional changes at the national level? 
Have national environment agencies (and administrations) been Europeanized due to 
the creation of the EEA? If so, has Europeanization facilitated the move towards 
administrative convergence across the member states? 
Why have member countries chosen different approaches when participating in the 
Eionet? 
In addition to looking at the roles and responsibilities of national environment 
agencies in their respective countries my thesis will also analyse their roles and 
involvement in EU level activities and developments (including their relationship with 
the EEA). This is an important aspect when aiming to assess the extent to which 
national environment agencies have become Europeanized.  
When setting up the structures to accommodate especially the Eionet (which will be 
assessed in detail in section 3.3 of Chapter Three), member countries of the EEA could 
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choose where to place the network‘s main contact points. While the German 
government chose the UBA, in Britain the contact point was located within Defra and 
France created the Ifen which was a newly created agency addressing environmental 
information issues. This thesis will assess the reasons behind the different national set-
ups. 
Little research exists on what impact the creation of a supranational environment 
agency (i.e. the EEA) has on national environment agencies. However, the following 
hypotheses can be derived from the literature. 
 
2.2.4 Hypotheses and methodology 
From the historical institutionalist approach outlined above, the following hypotheses 
can be put forward and will be ‗tested‘ in the chapters that follow: 
 
Hypothesis I 
The creation of the EEA has only had a limited impact on national environment 
agencies and other national institutions directly involved with it. 
From a historical institutionalist perspective it is unlikely to expect that the relatively 
recent creation of the EEA will have significantly affected relations of national 
environment agencies with the departments/ministries to which they are answerable. 
Whether this is indeed the case will be assessed in this thesis. Historical institutionalists 
would point to path dependency and the ‗stickiness‘ of national institutional 
arrangements which in many cases predate the setting up of the EEA which lacks any 
regulatory competences and instead focuses mainly on providing Europe-wide 
environmental information and data. Formative procedures of national institutions 
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continue to influence future decisions, even if some adjustments resulting from EU-
level developments are required.
354
 
Applying Bulmer and Burch‘s dimensions of establishing institutional change,355 the 
impact at the national level is most likely to be reflected in changes to processes, 
regulation and cultural aspects of institutions, rather than changes to organizations or 
political systems. From a historical institutional perspective one would arguably expect 
that despite developments at the European level (i.e. the creation of the EEA and its 
Eionet), national environment agencies continue to be the main point of contact for 
member governments when information on the state of the (national) environment is 
required. This leads to the next hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis II 
Despite being Europeanized to a certain degree, national differences in 
environment agencies have so far prevailed. 
This thesis will assess whether the setting up of the EEA has had a different impact 
on different national environment agencies and domestic administrations. National 
policy structures and policy styles are likely to remain closely linked to their national 
context. According to, for example, Jordan and Liefferink, one might expect the biggest 
impact of Europeanization to be on the content of environmental policy.
356
 Policy 
change in response to external pressure is likely to be slow.
357
 The impact of external 
pressures on national institutions is likely to be even slower if an impact is discernable 
at all.
358
 This is not to say that administrative structures have not been affected by the 
Europeanization process. However, the context of long established national 
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administrative traditions appears to remain the main influence on national environment 
agencies, resulting in continuing divergence. The creation of the EEA and its 
cooperation with national environment agencies represents only a fraction of the work 
undertaken by national environment agencies. The roles of national agencies always 
need to be considered in the context of a country‘s political system and administrative 
traditions (for example the use of agencies and their scope more generally), especially 
with the creation of the EEA at a comparatively late point in time. 
Bulmer and Burch identified the emergence of institutional change when change can 
be detected across a majority of the five dimensions.
359
 It is expected that the creation of 
the EEA did not affect national institutional arrangements to the degree that it could be 
described as a critical juncture.  
Just as Europeanization research needs to differentiate between developments that 
took place because of (or were influenced by) EU membership or EU level 
developments (as opposed to global or national trends or pressures for change),
360
 in this 
dissertation there is a need to separate the effects of EEA‘s creation and 
Europeanization. National environment agencies and administrations would still have 
been subject to Europeanization without the creation of the EEA. In fact, they (or their 
predecessors) have been subject to Europeanization pressures before the EEA was 
created. However, the focus of the thesis will be on the Europeanizing impact of the 
EEA as a European agency on national institutions.  
 
Hypothesis III 
Differences in national administrative traditions lead to different motivations for 
the participation of national environmental agencies in European networks. 
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While hypothesis I and II are aimed at assessing the general impact of the EEA‘s 
creation on its member countries, hypothesis III is put forward specifically to analyse 
the motivation behind the participation of national environment agencies in the EPA 
network. The EPA network case study has been selected in order to focus on the 
participation of national environment agencies in voluntary European networks and the 
way in which such participation (including their contact with the EEA which is also an 
EPA member) might contribute to the Europeanization of member agencies. Hypothesis 
III will be assessed in more detail in the case study on the EPA network in Chapter 
Eight. It provides an important insight into a network which exists alongside the EEA‘s 
Eionet, aiming to bring together European environment agencies. 
The EPA network provides an important forum for meetings and exchanges between 
European environment agencies which often differ in size, set-ups and responsibilities. 
Despite these differences they often face similar issues, particularly in relation to EU 
legislation (the majority of network members being agencies from EU member states). 
The EPA network has been described as providing an important (additional) link to 
the EEA which is also a network member. This appears to be particularly valuable for 
agencies which are not already established in a more structured or even institutionalized 
connection with the EEA through the Eionet. The assessment of hypothesis III aims to 
establish whether the motives of the members of the EPA network to participate are the 
same. Chapter Eight will focus especially on whether the link to the EEA can be 
considered as the most important aspect of network membership.  
Hypothesis I expects that the creation of the EEA will have had only a limited impact 
on national environment agencies (and other national administrations such as 
environment ministries). Hypothesis II stipulates that national differences in 
environment agencies have prevailed and that either no or only very limited 
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convergence has taken place. Hypotheses I and II will be assessed throughout my thesis. 
Hypothesis III will be assessed primarily in the case study on the EPA network (Chapter 
Eight). All three hypotheses will then be reassessed again in the conclusion (Chapter 
Nine). 
 
Methodology 
The aim of this dissertation is to ascertain the ways in which the creation of the EEA 
has affected its member countries, both with regards to their participation in the Eionet 
and more generally. The existing secondary literature on (environment) agencies and 
primary sources (including internal documents as well as external assessments) will be 
assessed critically in this thesis. The most important source of data used in this thesis is 
semi-structured interviews with officials from the EEA and national environment 
agencies and ministries (26 in total). Interviews with the (current and former) NFPs of 
the three case countries were of particular interest as little material on their work was 
available. The interviewees were selected either by establishing via the online databases 
that they played a relevant role as network members, or by finding out whether they 
have occupied positions of interest in relation to the research questions. Moreover, a 
reputational approach was used by asking interviewees to identify other core network 
members. The interviews, which were conducted with the help of semi-structured 
questionnaires, addressed areas such as the setting up of the NFP, the involvement of 
the national level in EEA activities, the impact of the EEA‘s creation on the member 
countries and their participation in the Eionet and EPA network. 
Moreover this thesis also draws on unpublished material such as unpublished internal 
documents obtained from interviewees offering useful insights in addition to the official 
publications. The obtained data was verified by undertaking several interviews on each 
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case country and case study. Moreover, it was corroborated with the help of official and 
internal documents (i.e. primary sources) as well as secondary sources (such as studies 
on environment agencies).  
 
2.2.5 Chapter overview 
Chapter Three will focus on the creation of the EEA, the Eionet and the participation 
requirements for the EEA member countries. The three chapters which follow will look 
at the three case countries. Chapter Four will focus on Germany and the UBA. The next 
chapter considers the French set-up and two environment agencies, the ADEME and 
Ifen. Chapter Six is concerned with the British set up and the Environment Agency of 
England and Wales. The three country chapters are followed by the comparative chapter 
(Chapter Seven) which will compare the findings of the country chapters and relate 
them to hypotheses I and II. Chapter Eight focuses on the case study of the EPA 
network and the assessment of hypothesis III. Finally, the conclusion (Chapter Nine) 
will reassess the validity of the three hypotheses considered while drawing on the 
theoretical framework and the empirical findings put forward in the earlier chapters. 
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Chapter 3: The European Environment Agency 
 
3.1 The EEA 
Despite an increasing number of agencies at the European level, their roles and 
objectives vary greatly. At their creation, a set of individual functions are assigned to 
each agency, with an option for amendments in the future.
361
 The general aims shared 
by the agencies are the dispersal of EU activities and creating a higher profile for their 
tasks or areas of activity.
362
 
The EEA is part of the group of European agencies in the framework of the EU‘s 
first pillar.
363
 Community agencies comprise the largest proportion of EU agencies, with 
only a small number of Common Foreign and Security Policy agencies (in the second 
pillar), police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters agencies (in the third pillar), 
or executive agencies, set up for a limited period of time and located in the 
Commission.
364
 While the Commission has developed set frameworks for executive and 
regulatory EU agencies, a framework for the so-called ―information agencies‖ does not 
exist.
365
 However, the lack of homogeneity of existing agencies not only complicates 
the categorization of their tasks within a consistent framework, it has also raised 
questions about whether such a framework is useful for those agencies.
366
 The 
Commission, the EP and the Council have been working on an inter-institutional 
agreement on the operating framework of European regulatory agencies, in order to 
provide a common approach to the governance of these agencies.
367
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Bearing in mind the emergence of environmental policy at the EU-level in the early 
1970s and the relatively early existence of national, sub-national and regional 
environment agencies (or equivalents under different names), the creation of the EEA 
took place comparatively late. 
At the time of the EEA‘s creation, EU environmental policy was facing a range of 
issues, including a lack of reliable environmental monitoring systems, data limitations 
(with data being either unavailable or not comparable) and the need to defend 
environmental policy vis-à-vis other policy areas.
368
 Information on the state of the 
environment not only plays a role in the implementation of environmental policy, but is 
an important, if not the most important, factor in the policy-shaping process.
369
 Schout 
points out that  
the development of environmental policy demanded administrative innovations. In 
line with new trends in governance, decentralising tasks in agencies and horizontal 
co-operation structures between member states (assisted by agencies) were put 
forward as solutions to the problems mentioned above.
370
 
 
3.1.1 Pre-creation 
Although the Commission published reports on the state of the environment since the 
1970s, they were of poor quality and therefore little use. The 1982-1986 third EAP 
stressed the need for improving environmental knowledge and information and the 
importance of making it readily available to decision-makers, interested parties and the 
public.
371
 In the late 1980s this was supported by a number of Members of European 
Parliament (MEPs), who were keen to establish a European equivalent of the USEPA 
with powers to initiate legislation and also to monitor, inspect and enforce.
372
 The 
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CORINE Programme (Coordination of information on the environment) was created in 
1985 by the Commission following the third EAP‘s call for the collection and 
examination of environmental data from the member states and was a first attempt to 
structure data gathering.
373
 It was considered an experimental project concerned with 
the creation of  
an appropriate methodological framework for rational organization of the work of 
gathering and processing information on the state of the environment in the 
Community, and make it possible to assess overall how environmental phenomena 
interact and to monitor the development of the environment.
374
  
 
To achieve this, close cooperation between the Commission and the member states was 
called for, along with the involvement of the relevant national agencies allowing and 
facilitating access to such data.
375
  
The fourth EAP (1987-1992) pointed out the importance of ensuring the availability 
of comparable environmental data and the need to review the Commission‘s approach to 
the diffusion of information on environmental issues.
376
 It also announced the intention 
to reinforce the environmental aspect of the Community‘s existing statistical 
programme.
377
 In its December 1988 Rhodes Declaration, the European Council asked 
for increased efforts in the environmental policy area by the Community and the 
member states at the national, European and international level.
378
 This was followed by 
Commission President Jacques Delors‘ speech to the EP in January 1989. In this speech 
he announced the Commission‘s plans to ‗propose the introduction of a European 
system of environmental measurement and verification which could be the precursor of 
a European environment agency‘.379 Delors outlined the aims of such a system as the 
creation and expansion of links between regional and national systems (public or 
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private), the establishment of a network concerned with measurement, verification, 
information, and early warning systems.
380
 The option for non-EU member countries to 
join and the establishment of links to global networks was already included in the 
speech.
381
  
Delors‘ ambitious plans even took officials in the Commission‘s DG Environment by 
surprise.
382
 It has been suggested that Delors supported the idea of (and later proposal 
for) an environment agency for Europe in cooperation with the French government, 
which was about to take over the Council presidency in the second half of 1989 and was 
aiming for major environmental initiatives in this period.
383
 Ironically, it was also the 
French government, which later delayed the decision on the agency‘s location by 
several years (see below). The initiative was not only a call for the creation of an 
environment agency and a network but also a clear message that the Commission itself 
would not be further expanded.
384
 
CORINE‘s structures were incorporated in the work of the agency by the 
Commission‘s EEA task force which operated from Brussels until the EEA‘s location 
was decided.
385
 CORINE has been altered and remains active in the following two 
areas: As CORINE land cover which provides information on land cover changes across 
Europe, and CORINE biotopes which is an inventory of major natural sites.
386
 By 
evaluating CORINE‘s shortcomings (too fragmented, member states were ill prepared, 
lack of mechanisms to develop capacities at the national and EU level), lessons could be 
learned and applied, such as creating better structures nationally and at the EU-level or 
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where more resources needed to be made available when creating the EEA.
387
 The 2000 
Arthur Andersen Consultants‘ evaluation of the EEA describes the pre-EEA European 
environmental information system as underdeveloped, with member country 
arrangements varying greatly in terms of organization, scope and methodology.
388
 This 
resulted in policy-making ‗being carried out on an incomplete, insufficient and not fully 
informed basis and policy-makers were not completely aware of their own needs and 
requirements‘.389 The creation of the EEA and its network were formally proposed by 
the Commission on 21 June 1989.
390
 
 
3.1.2 Establishing the EEA 
The EEA was established by Council Regulation (EEC) No 1210/90 of 7 May 1990 and 
has been subject to minor amendments in 1999, 2003 and 2009, following reviews of 
the agency‘s functions. Initially, the EP had pushed for the EEA to have inspection 
powers in addition to its information-gathering tasks.
391
 Therefore it was unhappy with 
the original proposal and threatened to withhold the agency‘s funds. 392 However, 
incorporating the wishes of the EP in the regulation would probably have led to strong 
opposition from most, if not all member states.
393
 The initially envisaged period of two 
years after which a review was to take place was put back in order to allow the agency 
to become fully operational.
394
 The Commission issued proposals and, after consulting 
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the EP, the Council decided on whether the EEA would be issued with additional 
tasks.
395
 
The EEA‘s Regulation 1210/90 called for the creation of a European Information and 
Observation Network (Eionet), whose creation and coordination was one of the EEA‘s 
main tasks.
396
 It described the agency‘s role as providing  
the Community and the member states with objective, reliable and comparable 
information at European level enabling them to take the requisite measures to 
protect the environment, to assess the results of such measures and to ensure that 
the public is properly informed about the state of the environment.
397
  
 
The regulation further sets out that the agency is to cooperate with the member 
countries; incorporate the work of CORINE; develop forecasting techniques; assess the 
state of the environment (quality, pressures and sensitivities); avoid duplication with 
existing activities; design the Eionet, management board and scientific committee; and 
to cooperate with other EU bodies and international organizations.
398
 In order to help 
make environmental data more comparable, the regulation calls for the EEA to 
‗encourage by appropriate means improved harmonization of methods of 
measurement‘.399 The focus on comparability and some degrees of harmonization 
stemmed from earlier experiences with data collection under CORINE, which resulted 
in data that was completely incomparable, having been delivered in a range of formats, 
including tables, handwritten lists, floppy discs, etc.
400
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3.1.3 Location  
Initially it was hoped that the EEA would be up and running by 1989 but this proved to 
be too ambitious.
401
 The legislation which created the EEA was adopted in 1990 but did 
not enter into force until the EEA‘s location was decided upon. 
The decision over the EEA‘s location became caught up in (EEA-unrelated) disputes 
over the permanent seat of the EP as well as the sites of a number of other institutions 
(including the European Central Bank).
402
 France refused to agree on any agency 
locations without assurance that Strasbourg continued to be the second seat of the 
European Parliament (France was not prepared to lose the prestige of hosting EP 
sessions).
403
 Only after ‗a bout of horse-trading‘404 was it possible to agree the seat of 
the EEA. The EEA and Eionet therefore began their work only in 1994. It took until 
1997 for the agency and the Eionet to become fully functional.
405
 
After the adoption of the regulation creating the EEA and Eionet, DG Environment 
set up a task force, which began working on the agency‘s first major reports and the 
Multi-Annual Work Programme.
406
 Thus the agency could start its work although only 
on a relatively small scale, before Copenhagen was eventually chosen as the location for 
its headquarters in October 1993. Apart from Luxembourg, all member states had 
wanted to host the EEA. Italy, Spain and Denmark were the strongest candidates. In 
contrast to most other member states, Denmark had only applied to host the EEA (for its 
symbolic value) and not any other of the newly created agencies, thus clearly stating the 
                                                 
401
 ENDS Report 173 (1989:30), Interview French official (2009c) 
402
 ENDS Report 213 (1992:31) 
403
 Ibid.:31, Europe Environment (1992), Interview French official (2009c) 
404
 ENDS Report 226 (1993:39) 
405
 EEA (2004d:5) 
406
 Schout (1999:88) 
89 
 
environmental field as its priority.
407
 Moreover, it had also offered additional financial 
support for housing the agency (as had some others).
408
 
 
3.1.4 The agency’s remit 
Being a decentralized EU agency, the EEA was a fairly new phenomenon at the EU-
level.
409
 Distance from the Commission, for which the EEA was intended as a key 
source of information, and the member countries, which provided the bulk of the 
environmental data, was perceived as necessary.
410
 The member countries are not only 
information providers; they can also be EEA clients and important actors in improving 
information activities both at the European and the national level.
411
 
In order to ensure comparable information, the EEA reporting requirements 
indirectly encouraged the harmonization of environmental measurement procedures.
412
 
Standardisation or harmonization in the work of the agency refers to  
developing data and information to the level of uniformity required for analysing 
the big picture and setting benchmarks for implementing agreed measures or 
legislation over wide areas.
413
  
 
While the EEA aims to harmonize information and reporting mechanisms, it does not 
attempt to alter national administrative structures (see the following chapters).  
As opposed to economic and social indicators, environmental statistics and data were 
a relatively new field when the EEA began its work.
414
 The agency‘s first priority was 
to establish itself as a reliable and independent source of environmental information.
415
 
Other early tasks included putting the agency on the map, broadening its clientele to 
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include the EP, businesses, the Committee of the Regions and the Council (as an 
exclusive dependence on the Commission would have put the agency in a vulnerable 
position). This ensured that the EEA positioned itself in the EU‘s institutional 
environment and became increasingly interconnected.
416
  From the very beginning, the 
EEA aimed to establish itself as a credible provider of information. The agency‘s 
(relative) independence is the prerequisite for the credibility of the information it 
supplies.
417
 The EEA‘s independence with regards to the kind of work it undertakes (as 
set out in its work programmes) is limited. However, a strong emphasis is put on its 
independence and how to neutralize political interference, which has resulted in the 
EEA‘s data not being doubted in negotiations.418 
The EEA‘s mission is very broad (which is necessary in order to address the existing 
and evolving environmental policy agenda), including practically all environmental 
topics.
419
 However, to begin with there have been some issues regarding the quality of 
the data provided (as had previously been the case with CORINE), and the agency has 
had some difficulties ensuring and improving data quality.
420
 While much of the 
environmental data required by the EEA was already available at the national level in 
most countries, a large proportion of it was not considered useful; either the quality of 
the information was sub-standard or it was not the right kind of information the agency 
required.
421
 In other areas the EEA had to initiate data collection because the required 
data was not yet being collected (such as the data for Eurowaternet, the network for 
inland water resources).
422
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The EEA describes itself as the EU body dedicated to providing sound and 
independent environmental information and ‗a major information source for those 
involved in developing, adopting, implementing and evaluating environmental policy, 
and also the general public‘.423 The relevance of the information provided by the EEA 
can, on occasion, be compromised by its broad range of clients.
424
 Its main clients are 
the Commission, the EP, the Council (and here in particular the rotating presidencies), 
the member countries and the public.
425
 Other clients include pressure groups, 
academia, industry and business (aiming to influence decision-making) or the media.  
 
Box 3.1: EEA key tasks  
 
             Key tasks of the European Environment Agency 
 Coordination of the Eionet 
 Provision of objective information to frame and implement  
effective environmental policies 
 Collection and analysis on state of the environment 
 Provision of uniform assessment criteria 
 Ensuring environmental data comparability 
 Publishing reports on the state of Europe‘s environment and  
ensuring their broad dissemination 
 Promoting application of environmental forecasting techniques 
 Drawing up indicators of environmental impacts 
 Supporting the implementation of EU environmental policy 
Source: ENDS Report 240 (1995:22) 
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The Commission has traditionally been the key user of EEA information; however, over 
the years the use of EEA information has increased steadily within the other EU 
institutions, the member states and the public.
426
 The EEA works with a model referred 
to as MDIAK, which stands for monitoring, data, information, assessment, 
knowledge.
427
 Both the EEA and the member countries are active in all areas of this 
model except monitoring, which is truly the role of the member countries.
428
 From the 
onset, the EEA found itself in the grey area between policy analysis and policy advice, 
leading to initial uncertainties in the relationship between the agency and the 
Commission (see below).
429
 In its review of the EEA, the Commission stated that ‗it is 
clear that the agency has greatly contributed to the quality and availability of 
environmental data and information in Europe‘.430 Rather than aiming to influence the 
decision-making processes directly, the EEA‘s work is aimed at allowing the policy-
makers to make informed choices on the issues under discussion.
431
 Since its creation, 
the EEA has evolved from an organization concerned with the provision of information 
and data on the state of the environment to being able to report on the effectiveness of 
environmental policies and their implementation.
432
 An EEA official explained that this 
move took place because it makes sense for the EEA to play a role in not only pointing 
out which countries are doing well in a certain area and which are not, but also to look 
at why this is the case and what the reasons are for countries having implementation 
problems.
433
 Due to the EEA‘s broad scope and restricted resources (i.e. its small size 
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and budgetary constraints), the agency had to set out its priorities from the beginning 
and gradually add new areas of activities.
434
 
Regulation 1210/90 lists the creation and coordination of the information and 
observation network Eionet as the EEA‘s main task. Establishing, maintaining and 
improving the Eionet is the biggest achievement of the EEA to date.
435
 The network is 
the key factor in ensuring the provision of timely and quality-assured data, information 
and expertise for assessing the state of the environment in Europe. The EEA‘s output is 
not only ensured by the Eionet, the agency also works with external contractors.
436
 
Although monitoring the implementation of policies is not part of the role of the EEA, it 
does, however, play a role insofar as the provision of information on the general 
conditions of the environment might also sometimes include data which allows the state 
of policy implementation to be deduced.
437
 The EEA‘s first director, Domingo Jiménez-
Beltrán pointed out the agency‘s belief that even information on its own can be a 
powerful persuader.
438
 The EEA further participates in the network of Heads of 
Environmental Protection Agencies (see Chapter Eight).  
 
State of the environment reports 
The EEA‘s most high profile publications are the general state of the environment 
reports (SOERs) which are the agency‘s flagship product.439 The agency‘s first SOER, 
the Dobříš Assessment, named after the Dobříš Castle where the first Pan-European 
Conference of Environment Ministers took place in 1991, published comparative 
information on the state of Europe‘s environment for the first time. The EEA task force 
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within DG Environment began with its preparation and completed the work in August 
1994 when the EEA took over to finalise and publish the report.
440
 In the first 
presentation to the management board, several national representatives demanded to be 
allowed to vet the draft for politically embarrassing information, which was refused.
441
 
The report highlighted the poor quality of the European environment and identified the 
areas which required attention most urgently.
442
 Data for the report was assembled from 
information held by the Commission (especially DG Environment), Eurostat, United 
Nations‘ Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations‘ Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and supplemented with additional data from the participating countries.
443
 The 
Dobříš Assessment suffered from the differences of the quality of data provided and the 
delays in its delivery, thus although Europe-wide environmental trends emerged, direct 
comparisons between countries were not yet possible.
444
 The EEA‘s director described 
the report as the best available under the circumstances but not of sufficient quality to 
be used as a basis in policy decisions.
445
 Work on the second report, which was 
published in 1998, showed up areas in which detailed information was still missing and 
reporting procedures needed to be improved.
446
 The third assessment (published in 
2003) identified progress in the sharing and streamlining of environmental information 
reporting procedures, although many remaining gaps and inconsistencies needed to be 
addressed.
447
 In 2007, the fourth report stressed the commitment for SEIS, which would 
include all European countries and regions.
448
 The idea of SEIS takes up former EEA 
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initiatives for the modernization of environmental reporting, such as the European 
Environmental Information System or Reportnet, which include the development of a 
common information system in order to facilitate the sharing of available data. The 
EEA‘s fifth SOER was published in the autumn of 2010.  
Other EEA products include the publication of rough data (as collected and 
forwarded), general and specific reports, briefings, technical reports, factsheets, 
multimedia publications and online information services.
449
 Alongside the provision of 
information, the EEA is involved in developing methodologies and systems as well as 
environmental forecasting techniques.
450
 
The agency‘s annual and multi-annual work programmes are developed by the EEA 
in collaboration with the Commission, the member countries (via the management 
board) and the scientific committee.
451
 In its 2009-2013 multi-annual work programme 
(MAWP), the EEA describes its vision as:  
to be recognised as the world‘s leading body for the provision of timely, relevant 
and accessible European environmental data, information, knowledge and 
assessments.
452
  
 
 
Budget 
The EEA‘s work is mainly funded through Community subventions although additional 
income is received through EEA membership contributions of non-EU member 
countries.
453
 Despite budgetary increases alongside the growth of the EEA in the first 
ten years of its existence, the agency‘s highly ambitious services and products set out in 
the work programmes could not always be achieved.
454
 The resulting need for 
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prioritisation within the EEA, due to constantly prevalent budgetary constraints tends to 
be perceived as a healthy process, although budgetary constraints have led in some 
cases to work being contracted out despite the expertise being available within the 
agency itself.
455
 Since 2004, budget growth in real terms has been very limited.
456
 The 
EEA‘s budget for 2010 was just over £50 million.457 
 
Homepage 
Initial homepage designs have been described as ‗disappointing‘458, however, just as the 
EEA was developing, so was the internet. Moreover, promoting the use of ‗new 
telematics technology‘459 for the dissemination of environmental information to the 
public (as well as internally) was not a part of the EEA‘s regulation until the 1999 
amendment. Since then, continuous efforts have been undertaken to redesign and 
modernise the agency‘s website. The website today is the main distribution channel for 
the dissemination of the EEA‘s information and data and its main communication tool, 
having become one of the ‗most comprehensive public environmental information 
services on the internet‘.460 
 
Languages 
Due to the high cost of translation, many of the EEA‘s reports are published in English, 
with only the summaries being available in all the official languages.
461
 Reports on the 
state of the environment are also published in the EU‘s official languages and for other 
reports there is always the option for member countries to translate publications 
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themselves. The number of languages the agency has to cater for tends to increase with 
every EEA enlargement, which adds further challenges to the procedures.
462
 
In order to make the EEA‘s work more accessible for the public, the main sections of 
the EEA‘s homepage are now available in the languages of all the EEA‘s member 
countries.
463
 Apart from the public, offering EEA publications in all required languages 
is also vital as the target audience includes officials working for national and regional 
administrations.
464
 
 
3.1.5 The EEA’s importance 
The agency‘s early reports already had a significant impact through highlighting the 
ongoing deterioration of the European environment.
465
 The Commission considers the 
EEA as crucial for the  
evaluation and dissemination of information, distinction between real and 
perceived risks and provision of a scientific and rational basis for decisions and 
actions affecting the environment and natural resources.
466
  
 
Now that the agency has matured, it is a recognised player in Europe.
467
 The 2008 EEA 
effectiveness evaluation has found that the agency‘s work could not be achieved more 
efficiently or less costly in any other set-up and concluded that ‗the agency is therefore 
the most efficient way to deliver the products and services required by the 
stakeholders‘.468 
With the importance given to environmental policy nationally, at the EU level and 
internationally, the provision of reliable and comparable environmental information has 
become even more essential. The information provided by the EEA has the potential to 
                                                 
462
 EEA (2002a) 
463
 Interview EEA official (2009)  
464
 Technopolis (2008a:69) 
465
 Schout (1999:88) 
466
 European Commission (1992:5) 
467
 Technopolis (2008a:6) 
468
 Ibid.:8 
98 
 
influence political decision-making.
469
 Gornitzka and Sverdrup point out that rather than 
being neutral, information affects the way in which problems are defined and solutions 
searched for.
470
 The EEA is very aware of its position and potential influence, as an 
EEA official pointed out ‗we have quite a powerful position of just gathering […] the 
data and presenting it as it is, so this is what we do‘.471 Another issue is that the agency 
has always been a pioneer (technical developments, IT innovations, assessments, 
indicators, or frameworks such as driving forces-pressures-state-impact-responses 
(DPSIR), etc.) leading to a lot of countries taking inspiration from the EEA‘s work and 
to using the EEA as an aspiration for themselves.
472
 
 
3.1.6 Changes 
Changes to the EEA’s regulation 
Since 1990, some amendments to Regulation 1210/90 have taken place in 1999 
(Council Regulation (EC) 933/1999), 2003 (Regulation (EC) 1641/2003 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council) as well as 2009 (Regulation (EC) 401/2009 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council). As part of the agency‘s review, four new 
potential areas of EEA activity were considered: The drafting of criteria for 
environmental impact assessment, assisting with policy implementation, promoting 
cleaner technologies and eco-labelling.
473
 Despite good overall progress and promising 
results, challenges in a number of areas remained (such as some ETCs not performing to 
satisfaction or difficulties with information delivery from national networks).
474
 This 
resulted in the Commission – unsurprisingly – concluding that adding major tasks to the 
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agency‘s remit would not be appropriate.475 However, acquiring a role in 
implementation or compliance was never the aim of the EEA, which realized the 
negative impact this would have on its ability to collect environmental information from 
the member countries.
476
 
The main changes to the regulation in 1999 included the introduction of sustainable 
development, advising individual member countries – if requested – on developing or 
improving their monitoring systems, extending the publication of SOER reports to 
every five years, cooperation with the European Union Network for the Implementation 
and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL), and extending management board 
membership to non-EU member countries, among others.
477
 The 2003 and 2009 
amendments were less extensive and included provisions regarding public access to 
information as well as revisions of revenue and expenditure procedures.
478
  
 
EEA Enlargement 
The first EU enlargement since the creation of the EEA took place in 1995 (when 
Austria, Finland and Sweden joined). However, this was still very early in its existence 
and therefore only had little impact.
479
 Countries joining the EU at the 2004 
enlargement had been in contact with the EEA since 1996.
480
 Most of them joined the 
EEA member countries in 2001 and by 2003 they were all EEA members and fully 
involved in the Eionet.
481
 The EEA has helped the new members to develop data 
management and reporting systems.
482
 Generally, countries tend to be very keen on 
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early EEA membership.
483
 For the new EU member states early involvement with the 
EEA has been a useful European integration exercise, helped with the harmonization of 
environmental information systems and has helped in raising the profile of 
environmental issues nationally.
484
 Although there was initially some disagreement over 
the agency‘s member countries, EEA membership does not require EU membership and 
the EEA was the first European body open to EU candidate countries before their 
accession.
485
 It is not only in the EEA‘s interest to increase its own geographic data 
coverage area but also a significant part of the political process of accession.
486
 
Obviously an increase in EEA member countries also results in the growth of the 
Eionet.
487
  
In 2010 the EEA had 32 member countries; the 27 EU member states as well as 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. In addition to the full member 
countries, the EEA cooperates with six further countries from the West Balkans: 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. 
 
Task expansion and reorganization  
Due to an increased focus on policy integration and integrated assessments in 
environmental policy in general, the EEA has continuously improved coordination 
between agency units and the ETCs of the Eionet.
488
 Regarding the performance of the 
member countries in submitting the required data, the overall percentage has risen from 
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roughly one third in the early 2000s to about two thirds of the data being received in 
2008.
489
 So while there are still some deficits regarding the amount of data that is being 
reported, improvements to the data delivery records are ongoing.
490
  
The EEA‘s structure is organized functionally in units (like the Commission) 
reflecting informational work areas and priorities.
491
 Over the years some restructuring 
has taken place.
492
 In 2001 the agency prepared for its enlargement (and accompanied 
rise in staff numbers) by reorganizing into five programme groups, which were 
connected horizontally by cross-cutting teams in order to improve efficiency, 
effectiveness as well as internal and external communications.
493
 The restructuring 
process also took recommendations from a performance evaluation carried out by 
external consultants on board.
494
 The 2000 Arthur Andersen Consultants‘ evaluation of 
the EEA and the Eionet suggested that more attention was required on standard 
procedures, people management and administrative support in order for the EEA to 
progress from its start-up phase to a mature phase and adjust to its evolving needs.
495
 
In its 2003 evaluation of the EEA
496
, the Institute for European Environmental Policy 
and the European Institute for Public Administration identified the stages in the EEA‘s 
development as:  
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Box 3.2: Stages in the EEA‘s development 
 
Stages in the EEA’s development: 
1990-1995: Developing baseline information and assessments on individual 
environmental themes, as reflected in the work of the EEA task force, 
and MAWP1. 
1995-1999: Attempting to link assessments with the effects of environmental 
policies, and developing an understanding of the difficulties of such 
policy evaluation. This phase included work on the interim review, and 
the global assessment, of the Fifth EAP, as presented in the EU 95 and 
EU 98 reports. Eionet achieves the maturity and capacities necessary to 
function efficiently in 1998.
497
 
1999-2002: Seeking to reform the information system, through streamlining, the 
development of indicators and regular reporting, and focusing on 
sectoral integration and prospective analysis. 
2003-2006: A shift towards scenario analysis and assessments in the framework of 
sustainable development, move from the provision of products to the 
provision of services, greater involvement in EU policy development 
and policy effectiveness evaluation.
498
 
Since 2007: Move towards SEIS and accessing information at the source. 
Source: IEEP/EIPA (2003a:26), EEA (1999c:9), Interview EEA official (2009) 
 
A substantial reorganization in order to tailor and focus the EEA‘s organizational 
structure with the agency‘s new five-year strategy‘s direction and priorities took place 
in 2003 and was completed in 2004.
499
 It included the creation of groups in order to 
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allow a more integrated approach in six programme areas as well as a new corporate 
affairs programme aiming at the provision of more effective communication with the 
Commission, the EP, other EU institutions, EEA member countries and the agency‘s 
partners around the world, as well as the inclusion of spatial analysis.
500
 The most recent 
reorganization of the agency came into force at the beginning of 2009 alongside the new 
MAWP. 
 
A role for the EEA in the implementation process? 
A weakness of EU environmental policy is the implementation deficit (which is higher 
than the implementation deficit in, for example, the single market, industry or consumer 
affairs).
501
 Knill and Lenschow link the effectiveness of (environmental) policy 
implementation to the level of embeddedness of existing administrative structures and 
traditions, which makes it harder for some countries to implement legislation.
502
 As in 
other policy areas, the Commission has to rely on national (and often sub-national) 
ministries, agencies and authorities to ensure policy implementation.
503
 EU 
environmental policy has always faced the challenge that individual member states are 
at different stages of implementing environmental legislation. Those member states 
which try to catch up economically with leading member states, often feel unable to 
give environmental protection as high a priority.
504
 While this was true for the EU-15, it 
is even more the case in the EU-27. 
An EEA official emphasised the EEA‘s importance in providing information in 
policy-making, particularly when following up the policies.
505
 However, rather than 
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looking at the extent to which the member countries implement EU legislation, the EEA 
focuses instead on the impact EU legislation has on the state of the environment (i.e. 
policy effectiveness). 
Moreover, with the agency currently being responsible for the quality of the 
reporting rather than the quality of the environment, inclusion into the implementation 
process would require more involvement in the quality of the data and its gathering 
processes.
506
 Greater involvement in the implementation process would also 
significantly alter the relationship between the EEA and its member countries. As one 
EEA official pointed out ‗when you‘re an inspectorate or a compliance organization, 
people will respond to you differently from being an information agency‘.507 More 
generally, Wynne and Waterton suggested a move of regulatory cultures towards more 
information-dependent styles, which would consequently increase the policy importance 
of an information agency such as the EEA.
508
 
 
3.1.7 Criticism 
Burchell and Lightfoot suggest that not having the powers to act in cases of member 
states not meeting the requirements of EU regulations and standards ‗weakens the 
supposed ―objective‖ and independent status of the agency‘.509 However, this is not 
strictly true. It is particularly the aspect of not being involved in the compliance and 
implementation process, which plays an important role in ensuring the agency‘s 
independence and objectivity. Such involvement could significantly affect the 
information member countries are willing to provide. Critics already question the 
accuracy of the environmental information passed on to the agency and whether it is 
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filtered by national ministries or the national focal points.
510
 While it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to ascertain whether this is the case or not, the risk of this happening 
would significantly increase, if the EEA were to be equipped with regulatory powers. 
Another criticism is that the data published by the EEA reports (particularly in the 
SOER) is out of date by the time it is published.
511
 Timely data is not equally important 
in all policy areas.
512
 Nonetheless the EEA is constantly working on the provision of 
more timely and in some cases even real-time data.
513
 
Despite being described as important and influential, it has been suggested that the 
EEA has a lower profile than it could have, particularly in the member countries and to 
some extent also within the EP.
514
 Calls by MEPs for the agency to attract more 
attention to its work in the media and the public and developing communications 
methods are as recent as 2007, thus indicating that more work is required.
515
 However, 
while the agency is responsible for its cooperation with EU and other international 
institutions, the promotion of itself and its work in the member countries is largely the 
responsibility of the national focal points and the way and extent to which they promote 
the EEA varies from country to country. 
 
3.1.8 International Activity 
Over the years the EU has become an important global actor in international 
environmental relations.
516
 It is an actor in its own right and tends to represent a strong 
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pro-environment position in international environmental politics.
517
 The EU has 
developed from a largely economic organization, to ‗an important agent of 
environmental protection‘.518 It is thus not surprising, that the EEA is also active beyond 
the EU‘s borders. An EEA official pointed out that  
the fact that you have so many diverse regions and countries across the EEA 
membership coming together, and sharing and talking to each other, meeting three 
times a year, is absolutely unique, there‘s nothing like it.519  
 
While its set-up is unique (compared to other international environmental cooperation 
measures), the EEA has been described as a ‗role model‘.520 The Eionet does not only 
have an impact on its neighbouring countries, it also has an enormous influence at the 
global level, often being considered as a perfect example for the setting up of other 
regional or even global environmental observation networks.
521
 Regions interested in 
learning lessons from the Eionet set-up are Southeast Asia, African regions bordering 
the Mediterranean and the Arctic and the EEA also has relationships with countries such 
as Brazil and China.
522
 The EEA has also been working closely with the UNEP from the 
start, realizing overlapping mandates and interests and the mutual benefits of their 
cooperation.
523
 Thus, for example, the UNEP‘s Environment Watch (‗a holistic, 
coherent and distributed system for watching the environment‘524) concept is based on 
the Eionet.
525
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3.2 EEA governance and EU institutions 
3.2.1 EEA governance 
Within the EEA, a special effort is made to keep the organizational structure flat, rather 
than hierarchical as is the case in the Commission.
526
 The agency consists of three fairly 
independent parts.
527
 The EEA governance structure includes the management board, 
the bureau, the executive director and the scientific committee. 
 
Management board 
The main tasks of the management board (MB) are outlined in the EEA regulation. It 
decides annual work programmes, five-year strategies, adopts general reports on EEA 
activities, decides about EEA publications, future topics, the ETC work programmes, 
staff policy and generally assesses the agency‘s efficiency.528 The MB consists of a 
representative of each of the member countries, two members designated by the EP, two 
members representing the Commission (and the chairman of the scientific committee as 
an observer) and is concerned with supervising the agency.
529
 In this set-up, national 
interests only play a minor role and decisions tend to be made consensually.
530
 EEA 
member countries, which do not belong to the EU are also represented in the MB. They 
are fully integrated in the board, however, they are unable to take on specific functions, 
sit in the bureau or vote (should a vote take place).
531
 The adoption of decisions in the 
MB per vote requires a two-thirds majority.
532
Although the management board plays an 
important role in approving the EEA‘s work programmes and other organizational 
                                                 
526
 Schout (1999:119) 
527
 Ibid.:119 
528
 Official Journal of the European Communities (1990), Interview German official (2008d) 
529
 EEA (2004c), Official Journal of the European Communities (1990) 
530
 Interview German official (2008d) 
531
 Ibid.  
532
 Official Journal of the European Communities (1990) 
108 
 
decisions, Zito points out that ‗this is more a negative form of control rather than the 
ability to manage the EEA‘s direction‘.533 
The EEA‘s importance is reflected by the fact that the member state representatives 
in the MB tend to be senior environmental policy officials.
534
 The degree of influence in 
the MB has been linked to the degree of preparation the national MB member 
undertakes prior to the meetings.
535
 This can sometimes be related to a country‘s size 
(which could be reflected in the available resources), but this is not necessarily the 
case.
536
 Similarly, the length of EU/EEA membership of a member country may affect 
how important the EEA is considered to be at the national level and thus the degree of 
preparation and number of valid points a country‘s MB member has to make.537 
 
Bureau 
The MB aims to ensure that the EEA is a well-managed, able and swift institution.
538
 
With an increase in the number of EEA member countries, the size of the MB and its 
agenda increased. For this reason, the bureau was established in 1997 (and formalized in 
the 1999 regulation amendments).
539
 The bureau consists of the MB chairperson, vice-
chairpersons, the EP and Commission representatives and is entitled to take executive 
decisions in between MB meetings to allow the effective operation of the agency and it 
prepares MB meetings and decisions.
540
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Executive director 
The EEA‘s founding regulation stipulates that the agency‘s executive director is 
appointed by the MB, based on a proposal by the Commission.
541
 The director is 
responsible for the implementation of the programmes and the daily running of the 
EEA.
542
 The influence of the director on the MB is reported to be quite strong.
543
 
Germany in particular had pressed for the first director to be a German.
544
 It argued 
that it is not only the largest and industrially strongest member state, but Germany was 
also the only country with unification experience which is important, particularly in the 
light of future EU enlargement to the East.
545
 This was opposed by most member states 
which were of the opinion that Germany already had too much influence in Europe.
546
 
The EEA‘s first director was Domingo Jiménez-Beltrán who is a Spanish environmental 
policy official.
547
 Although it was an objective decision for a well-qualified 
professional, the influence of political motivations was obvious and not denied as Spain 
was among the candidate countries short-listed for the EEA‘s headquarters and the 
appointment of a Spanish director was considered a partial compensation.
548
 
In the beginning a lot of focus was on publishing everything the EEA produced to 
avoid turning into a ‗graveyard of data‘.549 Although the focus in the early days was on 
quantity rather than quality of publications, it helped establish the EEA, giving it 
enormous exposure and great visibility.
550
 Jiménez-Beltrán was followed as an 
executive director in 2003 by Prof. Jacqueline McGlade, a British-Canadian 
environmental scientist. 
                                                 
541
 Official Journal of the European Communities (1990) 
542
 EEA (2004c), EEA (2008b) 
543
 Technopolis (2008a:63) 
544
 Interview German official (2009) 
545
 Ibid. 
546
 Ibid. 
547
 Ibid. 
548
 Europe Energy (1994) 
549
 Schout (1999:122) 
550
 Interview EEA Official (2008d)  
110 
 
 
Scientific committee 
The scientific committee consists of scientists designated by the MB. It advises the MB 
and the executive director on scientific matters and recruitment of the agency‘s 
scientists.
551
 It is considered to be the interface between EEA and the scientific 
community.
552
 The scientific committee is consulted on the agency‘s work programmes 
and takes part in the quality control of the EEA‘s and ETCs‘ reports, and looks at issues 
that might become important in the future.
553
 The scientific committee‘s involvement 
also helps safeguard the agency‘s credibility and policy of openness, for example, by 
publishing its opinions.
554
 
 
3.2.2 The European Commission 
The Commission‘s work is not reduced to EU administration, it is also the only 
institution that initiates policy, drafts proposals and monitors compliance in the member 
states.
555
 However, the final decision about adopting new legislation lies with the 
Council and the EP in areas in which the co-decision procedure is applied.
556
 
The Commission is further responsible for drafting the various EAPs. In 1972 the 
Environment and Consumer Protection Service (ECPS) was created within the Industry 
Directorate to provide bureaucratic support for the EAP.
557
 At that time environmental 
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issues were still treated as subordinate to economic interest and a potential obstacle for 
the creation of the common market.
558
 
The evolution of the ECPS to an independent DG for Environment, Nuclear Safety 
and Civil Protection by 1981 reflected the increased importance given to environmental 
issues, and importantly allowed the DG to initiate policy.
559
 DG Environment‘s status 
was further protected through the SEA in 1987, due to environmental protection 
becoming a Community competence.
560
 DG Environment is the main Directorate-
General involved in environmental policy, but not the only one (DG Agriculture, DG 
Energy and Transport, DG Fisheries, among others, participate as well).
561
 A shift from 
a more general environmentalist outlook to a more technical and bureaucratic approach 
has increased the DG‘s credibility.562  
DG Environment has been the EEA‘s main client from the beginning.563 In the early 
years, the Commission‘s interpretation of Regulation 1210/90 was to consider itself and 
the member states as the main users of the EEA‘s outputs.564 However, this was not 
made explicit by the text, which had simply referred to the Community (which included 
the EP, the Committee of the Regions and other bodies).
565
 This is not to say that the 
Commission did not turn out to be the agency‘s main client, but it is by no means the 
only one, nor should it be. 
In the beginning, the EEA was perceived as a potential competitor by DG 
Environment, which considerably strained relations, despite an initial harmonious and 
productive relationship between the Commission and the EEA task force.
566
 This 
                                                 
558
 Burchell and Lightfoot (2001:82) 
559
 Ibid.:83 
560
 Ibid.:83 
561
 McCormick (2001:103-104) 
562
 Ibid.:103 
563
 Schout (1999:138) 
564
 Wynne and Waterton (1998:127) 
565
 Ibid.:127 
566
 House of Lords (1995a:9) 
112 
 
contributed to the emergence of a healthy amount of tension between the agency and the 
Commission (similar to corresponding institutions at the national level).
567
 The 
Commission regarded itself as the policy-maker and in control of the agency‘s output 
while expecting the EEA to serve the Commission.
568
 This tension led to the agency 
demanding greater visibility and recognition of its independent standing. Frictions 
between the Commission and the agency reduced over time, mainly due to better 
management of mutual relations and the clarification of respective roles.
569
  
Martens identifies two phases in the relationship between DG Environment and the 
EEA: (1) 1994-2003 inter-institutional tension and (2) 2003-2007 (and beyond) 
institutional consolidation and partnership.
570
 Changes in the relationship are due to a 
number of reasons, including two important personnel changes in both institutions: a 
new director-general at DG Environment and a new executive director in the EEA.
571
 In 
addition to the EEA not changing its approach by continuing to provide policy analysis 
rather than purely environmental data reporting, the fall of the Santer Commission in 
1999 and the decision by the new Commissioner to cooperate more closely with the 
EEA and its new director and to abandon the Commission‘s perception that the EEA 
should be restricted to data production were significant factors.
572
 Moreover, the 
Commission‘s resignation also led to a review of the Commission and a change in 
attitude towards its work and the management of its relationships with its partners 
(including the EEA).
573
 By planning and synchronising EEA services and products with 
the needs and working areas of the Commission in mind, policy relevance of the 
                                                 
567
 Interview German official (2008d) 
568
 Ibid., European Commission (2003:12) 
569
 European Commission (2003:10) 
570
 Martens (2010:887) 
571
 Ibid.:890 
572
 Ibid.:888,890 
573
 Interview EEA official (2010c)  
113 
 
provided information has increased.
574
 Moreover, tensions between the agency and the 
Commission (in this case predominantly DG Environment) were not EEA-specific. 
Many of the other independent EU agencies have experienced friction with the 
Commission‘s respective DGs, mostly due to overlap and areas of contention.575 
Groenleer further points out that while initial problems such as the EEA‘s desire to 
demonstrate its autonomy from the Commission might have alienated the institutions 
from one another, they also strengthened the (perceived) independence and reputation of 
the EEA, which did not want to be seen as following Commission orders.
576
 
While DG Environment was mainly interested in the information (data and analysis) 
to support its policies and policy processes, the EEA also wanted to add policy-related 
comments to its analysis.
577
 Another area of potential conflict was the impact of EEA 
state of the environment evaluations as they could be perceived as a criticism of DG 
Environment‘s effectiveness.578 Moreover, the relative distance from the decision-
making process allows the agency to highlight more provocative topics and take 
positions based on its own convictions.
579
  
An EEA official stressed the importance of open-mindedness on both sides in trying 
to work together to improve unsuccessful policies:  
If you are two bodies in the same kind of game, of course you should help each 
other. Why not sit down and discuss it? And sort of share the view in which 
direction the policy should go. I‘m not quite sure we‘re there yet.580  
 
So while relations between the Commission and the agency have improved significantly 
over time, there still appears to be room for improvement. On the other hand, tensions 
about, for example, the data or how it is published are usually restricted to relatively 
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minor issues and are perceived in the agency as ‗quite normal‘.581 However, there is also 
an increasing awareness within DG Environment that it might benefit considerably from 
a strong, independent EEA, which provides the Commission with independent and 
convincing arguments of the need for additional action.
582
 Martens points out that over 
time, the relationship between DG Environment and the EEA has become more 
reciprocal and has moved towards mutual recognition.
583
 But the Commission is not 
only a client of the EEA, it also has organizational responsibility and has to ensure the 
existence of an adequate legal basis for the EEA (and its adherence to the regulation).
584
 
DG Environment has not only established itself as the EEA‘s main client but is also 
responsible for the proposal of the agency‘s budget.585 Being part of DG Environment‘s 
budget, can lead to a tendency for the DG to try to influence the way in which the 
agency‘s budget is used, i.e. where the focus of the EEA‘s work should lie.586 The 2008 
effectiveness evaluation of the EEA concluded that the Commission and especially DG 
Environment‘s informational needs are largely being met by the agency.587 For some 
sectors within DG Environment (such as those involved in strategic planning and 
evaluation), the EEA is the main source of information.
588
 
 
3.2.3 The European Parliament  
The EP is another important client of the EEA. The EP and its Environment Committee 
in particular have traditionally been strong proponents of the agency.
589
 The EEA‘s 
reports give the EP an important tool not only to evaluate policy effectiveness but also 
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to somewhat control the Commission.
590
 The EP is, however, not able to work as 
closely with the EEA as the Commission does.
591
 Traditionally, the EP has been 
pushing for the expansion and improvement of environmental legislation while steadily 
increasing its powers vis-à-vis the Council.
592
 The EP is now an equal legislative player 
to the Council under the co-decision procedure, used for the adoption of most 
environmental legislation.
593
 The task of drafting reports on environmental legislation in 
the EP mainly falls to the Committee for the Environment, Public Health and Food 
Safety. It is one of the largest and most powerful committees in the EP.
594
 Despite 
changing leadership, the committee‘s direction and focus on the promotion of an 
environmental agenda in the EP has remained remarkably consistent.
595
 Rather than 
work on specific measures, the EP can consult the EEA in the preparation of proposals 
to ensure that they have a proper factual basis.
596
 The Environment Committee tends to 
have greater interest in EEA products and reports, although the general reports on the 
state of the environment are also appreciated within the EP.
597
 
Nonetheless, outside the EP‘s Environment Committee, the use of EEA services and 
information by MEPs is (still) quite limited.
598
 Problems regarding the timeliness of 
EEA reports impacted on the agency‘s reputation in Parliament.599 However, due to a 
lack of mechanisms in the EP to formulate precise demands sufficiently in advance, the 
situation is not improved easily.
600
 Overall, the role of the EP as information users is 
more passive than that of the Commission, often relying on the EEA to predict how best 
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to serve the EP‘s information needs.601 On issues such as the EEA‘s role, independence 
and budget, the Parliament has supported the agency.
602
 Martens points out that EEA 
employees tend to regard the EP as ‗an ally in the EU system‘.603 
The EP representatives from the MB report back to Parliament (just as the EEA‘s 
director does on a regular basis). The EEA‘s relationship with the EP is not as close as 
with the Commission, but there has also been less conflict and the EP still supports calls 
for a stronger EEA.
604
 Giving the EEA more powers is not only opposed by the member 
states, the agency itself is also sceptical of such a move. As one EEA official pointed 
out 
it might compromise our neutrality and independence if we also dealt with 
controlling whether the countries comply with EU legislation. It is the 
Commission‘s role to do that. Each of us has our role and we respect the other 
one‘s role, so I think it would be going too far.605  
 
 
3.2.4 Other EU institutions and bodies  
Due to its predominantly national perspective, the Council of Ministers is likely mostly 
to rely on national information provided by national agencies or departments rather than 
the EEA. However, the EEA plays an important role for the rotating Council 
presidencies in the preparation of environmental policy issues which it would like to or 
needs to address. This cooperation has also helped in establishing links with the member 
states (outside the existing networks) and offer support to the Council in the decision-
making process.
606
  
                                                 
601
 Technopolis (2008a:82) 
602
 Martens (2010:892) 
603
 Ibid.:892 
604
 Interview German official (2008d), Interview EEA official (2008d), Technopolis (2008a:67) 
605
 Interview EEA official (2008d) 
606
 European Commission (2003:9) 
117 
 
With the EEA not being the only EU body working on the collection and 
dissemination of environmental data, duplication of work had to be avoided. This is 
particularly important in the cooperation of the EEA, Eurostat and the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC). Although the latter are both dealing with a broader range of statistics and 
research, some of it invariably concerns environmental data, in some cases similar or 
identical to the EEA‘s work. 
Eurostat also collects information from the member states rather than gathering data 
themselves.
607
 However, in contrast to the EEA, Eurostat‘s focus is on reporting rather 
than analysing environmental data, for which the EEA has been criticised.
608
 Moreover, 
as Eurostat has been collecting environmental data since the 1980s, the EEA was 
expected to make as much use as possible of Eurostat‘s statistical information system 
(as well as the statistical systems in the member countries).
609
 The EEA and Eurostat 
have been cooperating to varying degrees since 1995.
610
 Although areas in which their 
work overlaps are relatively few, it is still an unnecessary duplication of work.
611
 
The cooperation with the JRC involves the harmonization of environmental 
measurement methods, the standardization of data formats and the development of new 
environmental measurement methods and instruments.
612
 Together with the JRC the 
EEA will help to establish new research and technologies to meet existing and emerging 
environmental challenges.
613
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The Group of Four 
In order to improve cooperation in the field of European environmental information, the 
so-called Group of Four (Go4) was created in 2005.
614
 It consists of the Commission‘s 
DG Environment, Eurostat, the JRC and the EEA, which have adopted a technical 
agreement that sets out the division of their roles and responsibilities and how they will 
work together.
615
 The framework was created to include and connect the four main EU 
bodies involved in providing environmental data for policy-making processes in the 
EU.
616
 Although the JRC and Eurostat are technically part of the Commission, they 
have a different role to DG Environment, but are nonetheless more closely connected 
than the EEA is.
617
 Much of the EEA‘s daily work takes place within the Go4 
framework, whose biggest project is to streamline environmental reporting and provide 
web-hosting for specific thematic areas contributing to the creation of SEIS.
618
 In 
addition to the Go4 arrangement, the agency has several alliance officials located in 
Brussels, where they deal with the Commission on a daily basis and aim to work with 
all the relevant EU institutions and bodies.
619
   
 
3.2.5 Other partners and clients  
Member countries 
The EEA member countries are mainly responsible for gathering the majority of data 
required.
620
 In addition, the coordination of the network‘s activities at the national level 
is the responsibility of the member countries (see section 3.3 on the Eionet). While 
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member countries are expected to cooperate, they were not always able to deliver the 
required information immediately.
621
 New monitoring systems often needed to be put in 
place as the capacities of the member countries for the monitoring and delivery of 
environmental information vary considerably.
622
 Although there is no formal obligation 
for member countries to adapt, some pressures for adaptation were perceived simply 
through participating in the agency‘s networks, most notably the Eionet.623 The agency 
is not attempting to replace existing national and sub-national reporting structures but 
wants to bring them together in compatible formats. It is by no means a quick or easy 
process, as procedures and structures are highly complex.
624
 Moreover, the EEA also 
provides a link to the environmental research community.
625
 
 
International Organizations 
Cooperation with international organizations is part of the EEA‘s remit, which was 
strengthened in the first amendment of its regulation in 1999.
626
 The agency‘s main 
international partners are the UNEP, UNECE and OECD.
627
 International organizations 
are not only clients but also partners of the EEA and some joint reporting initiatives 
have been successful.
628
 The EEA has very good links with other international 
organizations (such as the USEPA) with whom it collaborates, for example, on 
environmental information and information technology issues.
629
 
 
 
                                                 
621
 Schout (1999:141) 
622
 Ibid.:141 
623
 Ibid.:141 
624
 EEA (1999d:5,10)  
625
 Arthur Andersen Consultants (2000:17) 
626
 EEA (1999d:12) 
627
 Ibid.:12 
628
 Technopolis (2008a:47) 
629
 Ibid.:30 
120 
 
The public 
The 2008 EEA effectiveness evaluation divides the public into three categories as EEA 
clients: the professional public (e.g. scientists), the public at large and the local 
public/local community in Copenhagen.
630
 The public at large tends to be hard to cater 
for, because the information needed could be unavailable in the required language, too 
specific or not part of the EEA‘s provisions.631 Overall, the EEA tends to be less well-
known than national environment agencies. 
The agency has links with environmental NGOs (non-governmental organizations), 
who benefit from the agency‘s outputs. However, the agency has to monitor the extent 
and closeness of the links with NGOs, as it could potentially affect how it is perceived 
in terms of its reliability and independence.
632
 Businesses as clients of the agency tend 
to be more interested in technical data.
633
 The press mainly relies on the agency for 
providing relevant and reliable expert information.
634
  
 
3.3 European Environment Information and Observation Network 
The Commission‘s 2003 review of the EEA describes the Eionet as  
a crucial infrastructure in the decentralised set-up of the EEA. Not only is it the 
main channel of primary data for the agency, it also brings in expertise from across 
Europe and serves as a forum to discuss agency activities and priorities.
635
  
 
The network encourages reporting format harmonization and capacity-building, 
provides a platform for discussion and facilitates contacts to experts all over Europe.
636
 
The EEA was not set up as an independent organization; instead the subsidiarity 
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principle was taken into account, leading to the strong involvement of the member 
countries in building a European network.
637
 However, even without the subsidiarity 
principle, the EEA would not be able to fulfil its role without the inclusion and 
cooperation of the member states and their existing environmental information 
networks; the task would have been simply too big and costly. It has been pointed out 
that  
the EEA is not supposed to be a massive agency, [...] it is one of its strengths that it 
connects individual agencies and creates a common pool of knowledge and is 
positioned like a spider in its web, being a central unit.
638
 
 
The Eionet has come into being because the EEA relies on it to feed its reporting 
activities.
 639
 It connects the best available national expertise with national and EU level 
policy-makers via the EEA.
640
 Eionet is a partnership network of the EEA, its member 
countries and cooperating countries, as well as the key network at the core of the EEA‘s 
activities. It is crucial for the ability of the EEA to meet its information provision 
requirements.  According to its mission statement,  
the European environment information and observation network aims to provide 
timely and quality-assured data, information and expertise for assessing the state of 
the environment in Europe and the pressures acting upon it. This enables policy 
makers to decide on appropriate measures for protecting the environment at 
national and European level and to monitor the effectiveness of policies and 
measures implemented.
641
 
 
The Eionet‘s three main purposes are: firstly, to support the EEA‘s data collection, 
reporting and assessment activities; secondly, to support member countries and DG 
Environment (as well as other relevant DGs) in their data collection and reporting work; 
and finally, to facilitate and streamline data flows between countries, EU institutions 
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and international bodies in order to minimise the duplication of work.
642
 The Eionet is 
not just an operational but also a telematics network.
643
 
The Eionet consists of the EEA itself, the ETCs, NFPs and NRCs, forming a network 
made up of around 900 experts from national environment agencies and other bodies 
and more than 300 national institutions dealing with environmental information. With 
regards to the creation of Eionet, the EEA had to ensure the setting up and organizing of 
the network. It had to contact partners and ensure common methodologies for the 
collection and distribution of data.
644
 The Eionet allows member countries‘ capacities to 
become increasingly interconnected.
645
 The network has further been accredited with 
reinforcing environmental monitoring facilities in the member countries.
 646
  
The EEA does not ensure data delivery through regulations, instead the aim is to get 
the support from all the member countries in the management board.
647
 If the MB 
members believe in a particular cause or indicator and agree to deliver the data then it 
will usually be delivered.
648
 
An advantage of the Eionet is its flexibility: every country can decide for itself which 
institution they would like to work with the agency and at which level.
649
 The EEA is 
‗just dependent on the countries having the appropriate set-up and being able to engage 
the appropriate experts within their national level‘.650 However, depending on the 
national structures and arrangements, appointed people can be found at different 
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distances to the policy-making process, NFPs and MB members can be either within the 
same institution (and even the same department) or in different institutions.
651
  
Not all components of the Eionet structure are controlled by the EEA, whose staff is 
controlled by the management board, as are the ETCs who were contracted by the 
EEA.
652
 For NFPs and NRCs, the control lies with the host institutions of the respective 
member countries.
653
 
 
Diagram 3.1: The Eionet 
 
The European environment information and observation network  
 
 
Reproduced from: EEA (2009d) 
 
When considering the Eionet in the context of the Rhodes policy networks model, it 
most resembles a policy community (with restrictive membership, high continuity, high 
vertical interdependence, in this case based on shared information delivery 
responsibilities).
654
 The Eionet is hierarchically structured with the EEA being the 
coordinator of the network. Although the member countries can choose the way in 
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which they participate in the Eionet, they do not have the option of not being part of it. 
The interests/aims of the network are set out by the EEA‘s founding regulation and need 
to be prioritized before additional tasks can be considered. 
 
3.3.1 European Topic Centres  
The five ETCs are in charge of the data collection on various topics (and the publication 
of their findings).
655
 ETCs are defined by the EEA as  
a consortium of organizations from EEA member countries with expertise in a 
specific environmental area and contracted by the EEA to support the EEA work 
programme.
656
 
 
The ETCs are subordinate to the EEA. The agency has direct input through the ETCs‘ 
work programmes and largely provides their budget.
657
  
The ETCs were appointed by the EEA on each of the priority topics mentioned in the 
regulation and require approval from the management board.
658
 ETCs work on air and 
climate change; biological diversity; sustainable consumption and production 
(previously resource and waste management); water; and land use and spatial 
information (previously terrestrial environment).
659
 The ETCs‘ work is set out in the 
EEA‘s five-year strategies (the MAWPs) and annual management plans.660 Each ETC is 
made up of a leading organization and specialist partner organizations, which combine 
resources and expertise and are selected by the management board following a Europe-
wide competitive selection process.
661
 ETCs facilitate the provision of data to the EEA 
and Eionet.
662
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It has been suggested that the central capacities of the EEA are being weakened by 
concentrating a significant amount of topical expertise in the ETCs despite this 
restricted – albeit renewable – lifespan, and little policy orientation.663 However, the 
inclusion of the ETCs‘ work (or bulk of their work) in the EEA itself would 
significantly alter the agency‘s structure and size and might not necessarily lead to more 
efficiency. Moreover, it would also require changing the EEA‘s founding regulation. 
Due to their small number, not every member country hosts a topic centre and there 
is great competition for the ETCs as they add prestige to national institutes which host 
them, because they get a lot of work and data, additional funding and provide good links 
to other European projects, experts and institutions.
664
 However, for countries that lose 
out in the competition to host an ETC, there is still the option of being part of the 
consortia, which consists of a number of institutions providing expertise and increasing 
capacities.
665
 
 
3.3.2 National Focal Points  
The NFP is the main link between the EEA and the national level of the member 
countries. The work of the NFPs is central to the Eionet‘s success.666 The regulation 
establishing the EEA and Eionet allows the member countries to designate individually 
the institutional arrangements of the Eionet at the national level, choosing institutions, 
‗which in their judgement could contribute to the work of the agency‘.667 Due to the 
variety of national institutional set-ups and NFP locations, it can be hard to precisely 
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present their work.
668
 NFPs are not only nominated and funded by the member 
countries, they also remain under the countries‘ control.669 
Generally, NFP tasks involve the development and maintenance of the national 
network; facilitating and coordinating contacts, requests and deliveries between the 
national level and the EEA; acting as advisers to their MB member; promoting key 
publications; and developing contacts to other relevant networks (such as Eurostat).
670
 
Each national focal point consists of (at least) one person, who is the main contact for 
the EEA in the member countries. NFPs are usually located within national ministries or 
national environment agencies. They have a good overview of relevant and related 
organizations in the member countries and insight into national data gathering 
systems.
671
 NFPs are crucial to managing the network around the EEA and in aiming to 
adapt national monitoring systems in their respective administrations.
672
 However, 
whether an NFP is able to achieve such adaptation depends on a variety of factors, 
including the position of the NFP in the hierarchy of their national administrations, the 
degree of administrative openness or resistance to change, structural procedures, 
constrictions of political systems, support of their work within the administrations, and 
so on. 
Additionally, NFPs need to be closely connected to their respective national MB 
member, providing them with insights into developments at the national level and on the 
agency‘s agenda.673 Together with the MB, the NFPs are crucial for ensuring the 
consistency of the information, which is supplied.
674
 In some cases, NFPs also attend 
the management board meetings and in some member countries the NFP is even the 
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alternate MB member.
675
 A range of mechanisms can help NFPs to establish themselves 
in their national administrative systems. This includes a high level backing form the MB 
member, the reputation of Eionet increasing their visibility and influence or EEA visits 
creating additional awareness.
676
  
All the NFPs meet three times a year, exchanging views and developments, 
discussing Eionet-related issues and expressing national interests and concerns. The 
meetings are informal and cooperation and issues related to the NFPs working with the 
agency are more important than national positions.
677
 The focus on the NFPs working 
together has been described as one of the strengths of the NFP meetings and the 
network.
678
 Due to the differences in NFP set-ups and their differing strengths and 
weaknesses, a strong coordinator (as exists in the EEA) is vital.
679
 It is not uncommon 
for former NFPs to end up working for the EEA, either as national experts or ―proper‖ 
EEA staff.
680
 This benefits the agency‘s networking and enriches its work by providing 
a different perspective.
681
  
Another aspect of Eionet‘s work is that NFPs are both an institution and a person.682 
Thus not only the institutional location of the NFP has an impact, but also the kind of 
person taking on the role, the atmosphere they create around their work and how well 
they manage to sell the EEA to the people in their national agency, ministry or 
institution.
683
 NFPs also defend and promote the agency‘s interests in the member 
countries.
684
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The three case countries focussed on in this thesis have set up their NFPs in different 
institutions: The German NFP is located in the UBA, the British NFP within Defra and 
until recently the French NFP was located within Ifen, which is now part of the 
Environment Ministry‘s Environmental Statistics Service (Service d’Observation et 
Statistiques, SOeS). 
 
3.3.3 National Reference Centres  
The member countries also nominate the NRCs, who consist of national experts (or 
groups of experts) in  
organizations which are regular collectors or suppliers of environmental data at the 
national level and/or possess relevant knowledge regarding various environmental 
issues, monitoring or modelling.
685
  
 
NRCs relate to particular areas of environmental and ETC activity (such as climate 
change, air quality, energy, biodiversity, etc. and their number and structure can vary 
according to changing requirements and priorities of the EEA strategy).
686
 Different set-
ups regarding the respective national information networks and most importantly a 
country‘s resources available for the Eionet (which is often coupled to the countries‘ 
size) significantly affect the number of different actors able to take on the role of 
NRCs.
687
 
The relevant NRCs work together with their respective ETCs (either directly or via 
their NFP), presenting their activities and discuss future measures, which strengthens 
the relationships between ETCs and NRCs and between countries.
688
 The frequency of 
NRC meetings depends on their subject areas, with the most active NRCs usually 
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meeting once a year, although they tend to be in contact all through the year.
689
 All 
NRCs are nationally funded and each EEA member country is responsible for 
organizing the relationship between the NRCs and the NFP.
690
 An additional level 
between the NFPs and the NRCs can be found consisting of primary contact points 
(PCPs), grouping thematically related NRCs together and overseeing their work.
691
 
 
3.3.4 Functioning of the Eionet 
Priority data flow 
The EEA publishes a yearly progress report on how successful member countries are in 
delivering the required data, set out in the priority data flows.
692
 Being unable to force 
the submission of information, the EEA has from the onset relied heavily on 
benchmarking in order to receive the required information and has been relatively 
successful in its efforts.
693
 The priority data flows are a useful benchmarking tool 
regarding the countries‘ performances and also as an encouragement (or 
‗competition‘694) for countries to improve their response.695 Although the EEA‘s 
credibility depends on the data delivered by its member countries, it has no other 
instrument to obtain timely data and ensure quality and has to rely on the member 
countries‘ cooperation and goodwill.696  
The data collected in specific areas is used to update the core set of environmental 
indicators, which are the basis of the agency‘s reports and assessments.697 The set of 
priority data flows is identified by the EEA in cooperation with the Eionet and covers a 
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range of environmental themes.
698
 Countries are assessed regarding their progress on 
agreed well-defined objectives, which are stable in order to allow countries to put the 
required reporting procedures in place to provide the data the EEA needs for its regular 
products.
699
 
Despite providing the required data on time, the variation in national approaches can 
affect the quality of the data provided.
700
 Problems, such as the strength of the NFP, its 
ability to coordinate or the quality or quantity of reported data can in some cases be 
related to the monitoring traditions, national policy coordination systems or resources 
available at the member state level.
701
 Thus, several of the new member countries are 
performing just as well or better than some old member countries in the priority data 
flows.
702
 
 
Disadvantages of the Eionet structure 
The elements of Eionet appointed at the national level can vary in quality, largely 
related to the appointed officials, their expertise, resources and closeness to policies 
which differs from country to country, often depending on national structures.
703
 Due to 
the EEA only having limited control over some of the Eionet‘s components, the quality 
of the relationships within the network plays an important role in its success.
704
 
While the network‘s flexibility has generally been perceived as positive, it can also 
have disadvantages. If a country appoints an NFP in a position of little influence in a 
hierarchical institutional set-up, it is likely to affect what they are able to achieve.
705
 In 
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the new member countries, NFPs tend to be in higher positions in their respective 
institutions, tending to be either at directorial level or with very good contacts to the 
director, often working as NFP teams in order to fulfil their tasks.
706
 
But it is not only the opportunities (or lack of) that appointed individuals will be 
presented with; their personality and dedication will influence not only the degree of 
success in, for example, the priority data flows but also to some extent the degree of 
influence they will have within the Eionet, as all EEA member countries are considered 
equals. The right choice of official is even more important for the role of NFP than it is 
for the NRCs. This is not only true for officials involved in the Eionet, but the EEA as a 
whole, as the chairman of the MB pointed out in 1999: ‗The quality of the agency‘s 
work depends fundamentally on the quality of the staff‘.707  
 
Restructuring Eionet 
Its founding regulation requires the agency to periodically re-examine the component 
elements of the Eionet and make changes where required.
708
 So far, restructuring of the 
Eionet has mainly affected the number and areas of ETC and NRC activity.  ETCs and 
NRCs are adapted to accommodate new or close down no longer relevant areas and 
aspects of the agency‘s work programmes.709 Normally the NFPs would assess their 
respective national NRC structures in relation to the new strategies and either create 
new NRCs or eliminate those that are no longer active in this context.
710
 Other areas 
addressed include the frequency of meetings and their structure, cooperation and 
contacts between meetings, or the increased use of tools such as teleconferences.
711
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3.3.5 New NFP Role Description 
In the legislation establishing the EEA, there is little information given with regards to 
the exact role of the NFP. It merely states that  
Member States may in particular designate from among the institutions referred to 
in paragraph 2 or other organizations established in their territory a ‗national focal 
point‘ for coordinating and/or transmitting the information to be supplied at a 
national level to the agency and to the institutions and bodies forming part of the 
Network [...].
712
 
 
With the role and tasks of the NFPs having evolved alongside the EEA, the Eionet had 
come to a stage where the work carried out by the EEA went well beyond its original 
(very vague) description.
713
 And although the new NFP role description mostly contains 
the work the NFPs were already doing anyway, it had not before been written down in 
such detail.
714
  
In the role description, the main task of the NFP remains the ‗establishment, 
development and maintenance of the national network on the basis of the actual Eionet 
structure and other requirements‘.715 It further gives detailed descriptions about the way 
in which the NFP is expected to coordinate the national activities of the network, 
support national network members, cooperate with the MB member, promote EEA 
information and publication at the national level and participate in EEA projects (such 
as SEIS).
716
 NFPs are also expected to cooperate with fellow NFPs, cooperate with the 
EEA and the ETCs as well as the European level (in particular the Go4).
717
 
Additionally, the role description also outlines the desired skills and expertise and the 
position the NFP should occupy within its organization in order to enable it to function 
properly.
718
 Finally, the document setting out the NFP roles has been agreed by the 
                                                 
712
 Official Journal of the European Union (2009: Article 4, Paragraph  3) 
713
 Interview EEA official (2010a) 
714
 Ibid. 
715
 EEA (2009c) 
716
 EEA (2009c) 
717
 Ibid. 
718
 EEA (2009c) 
133 
 
EEA‘s management board, thus allowing the NFPs to have some clout vis-à-vis their 
respective superiors within their institutions or MB members.
719
 Should, for example, 
issues arise regarding the NFPs resources, they can refer to the role description (‗this is 
what I have to do and what we have agreed on‘720). Moreover, having a detailed 
description of the NFPs‘ role allows new member countries or new officials in the 
existing member countries to get a clear idea about what the work as an NFP involves.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
Over the years the EEA has matured and has become a well established agency and 
environmental actor in its own right. According to Martens the EEA has gradually 
become ‗a more stable, predictable and trustworthy partner within the EU‘s 
administrative system‘.721 In order to fulfil its objectives, the agency has to rely on its 
member countries‘ cooperation in the Eionet, which has become well-established and 
functions successfully. Regarding the evolution of the agency from a small task force 
located in the Commission to a Copenhagen-based staff of around 200, its achievements 
have been immense. Apart from the initial growth of agency staff in order to make the 
EEA fully functional, the biggest impact has been its ongoing enlargement to 32 
member countries (and six cooperating countries) in the beginning of 2009. This was, 
however, part of the agency‘s objectives and part of its perception as a truly European 
agency, rather than purely an EU agency, and as an intended development it is of little 
use when looking at how the agency has adapted to changing conditions. 
The EEA has managed to move from being considered as a competitor by the 
Commission to being an accepted and valued (if unequal) partner. The role of the EEA 
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has been described as ‗a bridge between the Commission and the member countries‘.722 
While the member countries have been supportive of the EEA and its work from the 
beginning (not least via the MB), the agency‘s relationship with the Commission only 
improved over time.
723
 
The EEA has been able to move on from merely providing information on the state 
of the environment – a role which it had to focus on while it was still establishing itself 
– to playing a role in assessing policy effectiveness.724 Moving into the field of 
analysing the effects of EU environmental policy was possible for the EEA due to the 
vague wording of its mandate in the founding legislation, allowing it to go beyond the 
provision of policy support.
725
 
Aside from the rapid growth in member countries in the early 2000s, changes to the 
EEA have been gradual, rather than radical. The historical institutionalism perspective 
and path dependency fit nicely with the EEA closely following its founding 
regulation.
726
 However, this does not mean that the EEA did not take advantage of the 
regulation‘s vagueness by expanding its work into areas which were not necessarily 
intended to be addressed by the EEA (e.g. policy effectiveness evaluations). Once the 
agency expands its tasks, it becomes more difficult for the Commission to reverse this 
development. 
The regulation establishing the agency is the overarching framework within which 
the agency acts. Its amendments do not fundamentally alter the EEA‘s remit and the 
agency‘s own MAWPs in coordination with the EAPs appear to have had more impact 
on the agency‘s priorities, work procedures and structures than changes to the 
regulation. Regular review procedures of the EEA‘s structures and effectiveness as well 
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as new requirements in line with changing MAWPs have led to a number of 
reorganizations within the agency itself and its main network, the Eionet (where 
changes have taken place mainly in relation to the activities and numbers of the ETCs 
and NRCs). The role actors (EEA and national network officials) play or are able to 
play depends on a range of factors, including their level in the organization, personal 
relations (within the network and to superiors) and most importantly in many areas of 
the work personal commitment can make a difference. 
The influence of the agency on the components of its main network, the Eionet, 
appears limited, and with the EEA not aiming to harmonize national administrative 
structures but instead concentrating on standardising environmental data reporting 
formats and procedures, the focus has to be on the degree to which the EEA has had an 
impact in this respect.  
Whether the involvement of national administrations in the EEA‘s work through the 
Eionet has resulted in an increased Europeanization of these administrations or whether 
it has mainly had a localised effect on the individual members of the network will be 
considered in the following chapters. While the EEA is expected to have had a 
harmonizing effect on national data reporting arrangements, this effect is not expected 
to have extended to the agencies and ministries involved with the EEA. The way in 
which the EEA‘s reliance on the cooperation of its member countries in the Eionet to 
fulfil its mandate affects the member countries themselves will be considered in the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 4: The German Federal Environment Agency 
 
4.1 The UBA 
This chapter focuses on the role of the Federal Environment Agency and how it has 
been affected by the creation of the EEA and its participation in the Eionet. 
 
4.1.1 Pre-creation 
1969 is widely considered to mark the beginning of environmental policy in 
Germany.
727
 Previously, isolated laws addressed environmental issues (such as air 
pollution in the 1960s).
728
 However, for the environment to be considered a policy area 
in its own right, it required the development of a ‗comprehensive concept of 
environmental protection‘.729 
The formation of a coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the 
Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) in 1969 can be considered as the starting point of 
German environmental policy.
730
 The 1969 official government declaration 
(Regierungserklärung) to the Federal Parliament included the solving of environmental 
problems among its priorities.
731
 1969 was also the year when an environmental 
department within the Interior Ministry (Bundesministerium des Innern, BMI) was 
created.
732
 Soon the task of protecting the environment developed its own dynamism 
first in politics and then in society as a whole.
733
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A 1970 quick-start programme (Sofortprogramm) was followed by the 1971 
Environmental Programme outlining initial steps to protect the environment.
734
 The 
guidelines established in the programme were progressive for that time.
735
 Despite 
initial opposition from different (industrial) sectors, the 1971 Environmental 
Programme stated that  
the federal government considers the creation of a federal agency for 
environmental protection as a central umbrella organization for the effective 
concentration of existing federal bodies and institutions in the field of 
environmental research and the assumption of non-ministerial tasks in the federal 
environmental responsibilities framework.
736
  
 
This was followed by the federal Commissioner for efficient administration 
(Bundesbeauftragte für Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Verwaltung) proposing organizational 
and administrative structures for such an agency.
737
 The creation of a central scientific 
authority, which combined some of the existing institutions and bodies that dealt with 
environmental protection issues, was controversial.
738
 It nonetheless went ahead 
although it resulted in the initial exclusion of some bodies from the UBA.
739
 The aim 
was to combine different environmental protection sectors in one body, rather than 
having a different institution for each sector.
740
  
The UBA‘s creation took place at a time when environmental problems became more 
visible and pressing, resulting in political actors increasingly requiring scientific 
support.
741
 Although information itself cannot be considered neutral, the process of 
acquiring it should be as rigorous and unbiased as possible. For example, it should 
avoid allowing (often polluting) industry undue influence.  
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4.1.2 Creation of the UBA 
The UBA was created by an act of the Bundestag on 22 July 1974. Its founding 
legislation, which was last changed in 1996, specified that the UBA is answerable to the 
BMI.
742
 In 1986 an independent Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Protection 
and Reactor Safety (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, 
BMU) was set up to which the UBA has become answerable. The UBA‘s main task is 
to provide scientific assistance to the ministry to which it is answerable (i.e. the BMI 
and later the BMU) as well as other relevant ministries within the federal government. 
Other responsibilities include developing and operating an environmental planning 
information system, central environmental documentation, measuring national air 
pollution, providing central services for research and development to the BMI/BMU, 
the coordination of environmental research at the federal level, and informing the public 
about environmental issues and protection.
743
 The decision to create an agency, which 
focused on different environmental media (i.e. air, water and soil), rather than a range of 
different media-specific agencies, has proven to have been an advantage, because it both 
broadened the perspectives of the specialists involved and put the agency in a stronger 
position politically.
744
 The creation and design of the UBA was inspired by the USEPA, 
which had been created in 1970.
745
 However, in contrast to the USEPA, the UBA did 
not receive the authority to inspect or to issue instructions.
746
   
The location of the UBA in Berlin was highly controversial.
747
 More than 50 cities 
and towns had applied to be chosen as the site for the UBA.
748
 As the founding 
president of the UBA, Prof. Dr. Heinrich Freiherr von Lersner explained, the Western 
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powers of the Allies (i.e. America, Britain and France), which still had residual powers 
over the status of Berlin in particular, were not opposed to the setting up of the UBA in 
Berlin and the protests of Russia and the GDR were ignored.
749
 The status of West 
Berlin either as part of the Federal Republic of Germany or an independent city and 
whether federal administrative institutions could be located there was contentious.
750
 
The Federal Authority for Environmental Protection (Bundesstelle für Umweltschutz) 
began its work in Brühl, a town near Bonn, in 1973.
751
 It had a staff of 32 and was 
already led by the person who was to become the UBA‘s first president.752 When it 
moved to Berlin in 1973 it was renamed UBA.
753
 The move from Brühl to West Berlin 
was possible also because the UBA was not granted the right to issue instructions to the 
Länder.
754
 
 
4.1.3 Role of the UBA 
The tasks assigned to the UBA by the federal government and legislators can be divided 
into three categories: First, providing scientific assistance to the BMU, and other federal 
ministries (e.g. health, education and research, transport, construction and urban 
development) on matters of environmental protection; second, applying important 
legislation requiring scientific knowledge (e.g. the authorisation of chemical products) 
and third, providing information about environmental protection to the public.
755
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The state of the environment is constantly being examined and assessed in order to 
discover environmental problems as soon as possible.
756
 In many cases the UBA 
prepares technical information and material required in the discussion of policy 
initiatives.
757
  
 
Box 4.1: The key tasks of the UBA 
 
Key tasks of the UBA: 
 Scientific support to the BMU, especially for the preparations of 
environmental legislation (on air pollution, noise abatement, soil 
protection, waste management, water management, health-related 
environmental protection aspects) 
 Development and operation of an information system for environmental 
planning and central environmental documentation 
 Providing the public with information about environmental issues  
 Coordinate environmental research on the federal level, provide services 
for research to the BMU 
 Support the federal government in environmental impact assessment 
 Cooperation on awarding the environmental label (―blue angel‖), 
promotion of environmentally friendly products 
 Emission reporting (for example, in the context of the Kyoto Protocol) 
 National focal point of the EEA, participation in the Eionet 
Source: UBA (2003a:28-30) 
    
While the UBA sets its main work areas itself, additional tasks can be allocated to it by 
the BMU. However, assigned tasks aside, the UBA is able to publish reports under its 
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own name, and its position is not always congruent with that of the environment 
minister or the government.
758
 This was the case on, for example, increasing petrol 
prices, introducing a motorway toll and the introduction of speed limit on motorways 
(which the UBA has been in favour of for more than two decades).
759
Despite being an 
institution largely concerned with scientific developments, the concept of freedom of 
science does not wholly apply to the UBA.
760
 The UBA remains subject to instructions 
from the BMU which is not bound to make use of the scientific results, reports, 
conclusions or recommendations drawn up by the agency.
761
 Thus in the rare case of the 
ministry deciding that certain findings by the UBA would not provide adequate support 
for its own agenda, it can prevent the general release or publication of such reports.
762
 
The UBA also represents Germany in international environmental committees and 
meetings and also advises private and regional bodies.
763
 
Scientific research is an important part of the UBA‘s work. It is partly done 
internally or contracted to external scientific institutes.
764
 Special effort is put into 
allocating research contracts to independent research institutes in order to ensure 
impartial assessments.
765
 In some cases this meant giving research jobs to institutes 
abroad which are not linked to the influential (German) chemical industry.
766
 Moreover, 
all UBA staff are vetted to ensure their independence and avoid any potential conflict of 
interest.
767
 Budget restrictions since the early 1990s affected the UBA‘s ability to 
undertake its own scientific research.
768
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Importance of the UBA 
The UBA is a well-established and respected agency, which fulfils an important role in 
Germany. Environmental policy-makers depend on a large range of scientific 
disciplines. As the UBA‘s first president stated, the BMU needs the agency to provide 
the scientific basis for environmental policy.
769
 The UBA is an important interface 
between environmental sciences and environmental policy-makers. It prides itself on the 
breadth of its scientific services, which it considers to be unrivalled in Germany.
770
 In 
Germany, the UBA ‗is clearly the most important agency in the environmental policy 
area.‘771 
Cooperation with universities and research institutions in Germany and abroad takes 
place on informal and formal levels.
772
 The UBA participates in roughly 450 German, 
250 European and 200 international scientific or subject-specific committees.
773
 
Regional environment agencies (Landesumweltämter) are more focussed on 
enforcement and generally have responsibilities in more specific policy areas.
774
    
 
The UBA’s organizational structure 
At the top of the UBA hierarchy stands its president.
775
 Until 2009, the position of UBA 
president had been occupied by only two different officials. This is quite unusual 
considering the UBA was created already in 1974. The stability and continuity of UBA 
presidents strengthened the agency‘s position vis-à-vis the BMU and raised its broader 
political and public standing. 
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Its first president, Prof. Dr. Heinrich Freiherr von Lersner, insisted on the main 
BMI/BMU orders being distributed within the UBA and contacts made by its officials 
through him, thereby institutionalising a presidential governance structure within the 
agency.
776
 This set-up, however, has been criticised for being time-consuming, 
inflexible and problematic for an organization of the size and thematic variety as the 
UBA.
777
 Instead it has been suggested that giving more powers to the heads of divisions 
could improve the agency‘s functioning.778  
In 2009 the UBA‘s budget was about 100 million Euros and its employees totalled 
approximately 1,130.
779
 The UBA‘s structure is split into six divisions: (1) the Central 
Office, (2) Environmental Planning and Sustainability Strategies, (3) Environmental 
Health and Protection of Ecosystems, (4) Environmentally Compatible Engineering and 
(5) Chemical and Biological Safety Division.
780
 The German Emissions Trading Office 
(Deutsche Emissionshandelsstelle, DEHSt), which was set up only in 2004 constitutes 
division E (the sixth division for Emissions Trading), which, unlike the other five 
divisions, is financed entirely from external fees.
781
 
 
4.1.4 Changes 
The UBA and East Germany 
Paradoxically, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was the first country in the 
world to include environmental protection in its constitution (in 1968), and began 
passing environmental laws relatively early.
782
 However, despite the concept of 
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environmental protection being addressed at such an early date, the overall results were 
nonetheless very poor.
783
 From the mid-1970s onwards, economic and foreign policy 
issues were put before environmental concerns, resulting in the neglect of 
environmental protection as a whole.
784
  Environmental problems in the GDR included 
poor water quality (polluted drinking-water, river and lake contamination, with only 
three per cent considered as healthy), high use of agricultural pesticides, high sulphur 
dioxide (SO2) pollution, and contaminated waste sites (Altlasten).
785
 The catastrophic 
state of the environment in the GDR surprised even critical experts, with large parts of 
the country having to be decontaminated and cleaned up.
786
 Environmental 
achievements included high recycling rates which were due to raw material shortages 
and reductions in road transport which were due to oil shortages that resulted mainly 
from economic pressures rather than environmental concerns.
787
 Nonetheless, one 
criticism made after unification was that instead of trying to combine (positive) 
environmentally friendly elements of the GDR with existing West German practice, the 
former were replaced with the West‘s procedures and administrative system.788 Jänicke 
and Weidner point out that the GDR provides a warning that the mere existence of 
governmental environmental institutions is not sufficient to ensure successful 
environmental policy.
789
 
Environmental problems in the new Länder, some of which differed significantly (in 
range and severity) from those experienced in the old Länder, had to be addressed as a 
matter of urgency after unification.
790
 In an environmental protection declaration, the 
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environment ministers both East and West Germany identified the systematic ecological 
restoration of the former GDR as the main priority for environmental policy in the 
1990s.
791
 Together with economic, political and social union, environmental union was 
agreed, resulting in the GDR accepting West-German environmental legislation.
792
 
Following German unification, economic slowdown and the immense cost of not 
only cleaning up environmental pollution in Eastern Germany but also the cost of 
unification as a whole has led to a decrease in support for costly environmental policy 
measures (such as the national carbon dioxide (CO2) tax or emission-cutting 
initiatives).
793
 Consequently the federal government called instead for EU-wide 
ecological effectiveness measures while also taking into account more strongly 
Germany‘s international competitiveness.794 
 
Unification and its impact on the UBA  
Two years before the fall of the Berlin wall, both German states decided on a mutual 
agreement outlining future relations in the environmental protection field.
795
 It aimed to 
exchange scientific and technical information as well as practical experience in addition 
to undertaking a discussion about environmental protection measures.
796
 Contacts 
between the East German environment agency, the Institute for Environmental 
Protection (Institut für Umweltschutz der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik), which 
was located in Wittenberg, and the UBA existed prior to the fall of the wall in 1989.
797
 
However, due to the controversy surrounding recognition of the GDR, all contacts 
between the East and West German agencies took place on an unofficial level, often via 
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East German universities, to which the UBA president would, be invited for a lecture or 
event.
798
 
Pre-unification, environmental data in the GDR was strictly confidential.
799
 The 
Institute for the Environment‘s initial report on the state of the environment constituted 
the first broad and critical overview of the most important environmental problems in 
the GDR.
800
 Previously, information on the environment had been classified material for 
ideological reasons.
801
 Only partial environmental data was made available and 
exchanges between state institutions were restricted.
802
 Estimates and calculations of 
environmental pollution had replaced scientific measurements because in many cases 
the technology was simply unavailable.
803
 Moreover, much of the available information 
had been tampered with in order to play down existing problems or to fulfil 
commitments outlined in the planned economy.
804
 Complaints by the public had been 
ignored and civil society movements – whether they focussed on environmental 
protection or other issues – were suppressed.805 This strategy proved unsuccessful as 
environmental groups later formed part of the political protest movement, which 
eventually led to the collapse of the GDR.
806
 
Former UBA president von Lersner identifies the effects of German unification as 
the biggest challenge the agency has faced.
807
 It resulted in significant changes in the 
UBA‘s structure and size.808 Thus the most important organizational change which took 
place to the UBA‘s structure was entirely unrelated to Europeanization and Germany‘s 
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EU membership. Just as all federal governmental institutions, departments and 
ministries needed to adjust to unification, the UBA had to adapt as well. Unification 
significantly increased the UBA‘s workload, which, in addition to dealing with 
environmental problems in the West, included assessing the state of the environment in 
the former GDR, designing measures to improve it and embarking on projects to 
address the relevant issues.
809
 Although, as was mentioned above, the UBA‘s location in 
West Berlin had initially been heavily contested, after the fall of the Berlin wall its 
geographic position at the centre of the former GDR made the agency a main contact 
and information point for scientists, businesses, GDR officials and the general public 
from the new Länder.
810
 
The UBA also gained 197 new employees who had previously worked in the GDR‘s 
environmental protection sector.
811
 They made up about a fourth of the UBA‘s 
workforce.
812
 Some environmental experts had already joined the UBA shortly after the 
fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989, but the majority of them were taken on 
following unification a year later.
813
 A period of adaptation followed for the new staff 
who had to get used to different ways of working in the UBA. As the former UBA 
president Troge pointed out, in the former GDR, reports on the environment had tended 
to be seen only by direct superiors.
814
 In contrast, all of the UBA publications are often 
widely distributed and have to be comprehensible and verifiable at all times.
815
 
Additionally, as part of the new Länder adapting to a federal system, the creation of 
Land environment agencies was required.
816
 The UBA helped with their set-up by 
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delegating some of its officials to the new Länder.
817
 Research projects planned by the 
UBA had to be postponed in order to be able to afford the collection of data and 
subsequent assessment of the state of the environment in the former GDR, the 
development of action plans and model restoration measures.
818
 
 
Additional Changes 
Former UBA president Troge identified the three biggest changes for the UBA as (1) 
unification, (2) the integration of the Institute for Water-, Soil- and Air Hygiene into the 
UBA and (3) the UBA‘s move to Dessau in 2005.819 None of these three changes was 
directly instigated and/or affected by the EU/Europeanization. 
Since its creation in 1974, the UBA has recommended the integration of the Institute 
for Water-, Soil- and Air Hygiene (Institut für Wasser- Boden-, und Lufthygiene, 
WaBoLu) into the agency in order to increase and expand its research facilities.
820
 
However, this merger happened only in 1994 after (financial) scandals within the 
Institute were unearthed by the media. Previously the Institute had belonged to the 
former Federal Health Office (Bundesgesundheitsamt).
821
 As part of the integration of 
the Institute in 1994, the UBA‘s organizational structure was modernized by becoming 
more cross-media oriented and sector-specific.
822
 The main aim of this organizational 
reform was to integrate environmental objectives into other policy areas as well as to 
increase the UBA‘s focus on global environmental protection issues.823  
Following Germany‘s unification, the Bundestag moved together with many federal 
ministries, agencies and quasi-governmental organizations from Bonn to Berlin, the new 
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capital. However, the geographic relocation also took place in a different direction 
because a federalism commission (Föderalismuskommission) recommended locating 
some federal governmental institutions in the new Länder. The move of the UBA to 
Dessau, which is in the state of Saxony-Anhalt, took place in May 2005. In early 2006 
just over half of all employees worked at the new headquarters in Dessau.
824
 The other 
half is located at one of the UBA‘s (eleven) other locations (including stations for 
monitoring air quality) although most work at the previous site in Berlin.
825
 The 
relocation to Dessau had some disadvantages. Existing UBA staff were mostly opposed 
to the relocation and some took out a lawsuit against Environment Minister Töpfer in 
the administrative court.
826
 Due to Dessau‘s relative geographic remoteness, the UBA 
has found it harder to attract qualified personnel.
827
 This comes on top of the 
uncompetitive public sector wages when compared to higher business salaries.
828
 
Moreover, in order to continue to be recognized as an important source of information 
by political actors and the media, the ongoing presence in Berlin is important due to the 
closeness to government.
829
 
Other developments taking place are the UBA‘s active involvement (since 1999) in 
the federal government‘s ‗modern state – modern administration‘ programme 
(Moderner Staat – moderne Verwaltung) which is aiming to adapt and modernise 
existing administrative structures.
830
 From 2002 onwards, new areas (such as 
sustainable development, environmental health, international environmental protection 
and climate change) gained in importance, while work intensity on previously dominant 
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issues (such as monitoring and analysing environmental data) has been reduced.
831
 
Whenever new environmental policy topics arose, existing approaches were widened 
and/or new departments were created within the UBA.
832
 Moreover, the UBA‘s way of 
working evolved from concentrating on individual sectors (such as soil, air and water) 
to a more cross-sectoral, integrated approach (with a focus on environmental quality).
833
 
 
Box 4.2: Stages in the UBA‘s development 
 
Stages in the UBA’s development: 
1974-1990: Establishment phase: establishing the UBA‘s position in Germany; 
gradually increasing its tasks (although not its powers), overall 
relatively stable development (same president for the whole period)  
1990-1994: German unification phase: increase in staff due to unification which 
increased geographical area covered 
1994-2004/2005: Consolidation and organizational modernisation phase: 
inclusion of Institute for Water-, Soil- and Air Hygiene 
(1997/1998); major internal restructuring taking into account the 
cross-sectoral approach and the inclusion of sustainable 
development principle 
Since 2004/2005: Relocation and expansion phase: move of headquarters to 
Dessau (2005); responsibility for the DEHst 
 
 
In July 2004, the UBA obtained authority over the newly founded German Emissions 
Trading Authority (Deutsche Emissionshandelsstelle, DEHst) which is responsible for 
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the national regulation of the EU emissions trading system (including the monitoring of 
emission allowances, reporting and the issuing of fines in cases where operators failed 
to meet their obligations under EU legislation and/or the Kyoto Protocol).
834
 Overall, 
however, the UBA‘s legal obligations have remained the same.835 
 
4.1.5 Clients and partners 
Environmental groups began to emerge in the mid-1970s, many of them opposing 
nuclear energy and forming part of the left-libertarian agenda.
836
 With the increase of 
environmental problems, the environmental groups‘ focus widened to include issues 
such as acid rain and global environmental problems.
837
 Traditionally, environmental 
groups were not included in the policy-making process in Germany, which was an 
important factor leading to the creation and support of the Green Party in 1980.
838
 In its 
work, however, the UBA takes scientific research results from (environmental or other) 
NGOs into account. It tends to have close links with these organizations and arranges 
workshops on specific issues for NGOs, pressure groups and enterprises. 
Environmental awareness in Germany is not only concentrated on environmental 
movements or environmentally oriented pressure groups, environmental protection has 
become a major public concern.
839
 The UBA considers the public as its most important 
ally on environmental protection issues and informing the public as ‗one of the 
Agency‘s most important tasks‘.840 Going beyond scientific assistance for the 
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government, the UBA takes the task of informing the public and generating public 
support very seriously. 
In order to inform and engage the public, the UBA publishes leaflets, brochures, 
provides information on its homepage, in electronic newsletters, at conferences and 
press releases.
841
 By responding to millions of individual questions and requests from 
the public, the UBA considers itself as having played an important part in creating the 
high level of environmental awareness as it exists in Germany today.
842
 
While informing the public is listed in the UBA‘s founding regulation, other parts of 
the government administration were much more guarded and only allowed highly 
restricted access until the 1994 Environment Information Act 
(Umweltinformationsgesetz) which was brought about by the (delayed) transposition of 
the EU directive on Access to Environmental Information.
843
 While there had been talk 
of transparent environmental protection allowing the public to be informed on and have 
access to a range of environmental data and analysis, official data was traditionally 
regarded as confidential within the German administrative culture and also within the 
industrial sector (which often refused to provide information to the UBA or the 
public).
844
  
 
4.1.6 International activity 
The UBA‘s credo is making its knowledge and experience available not only nationally, 
but also internationally.
845
 Part of its international activity is hosting the EEA‘s national 
focal point in the UBA. Moreover, the UBA took (and still takes) part in a variety of 
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twinning and advisory projects designed to assist new EU member states, accession 
countries and applicants as well as countries bordering the EU in attaining EU 
environmental protection levels.
846
 The UBA is very involved in EU-level 
developments through (among others) committees, consultations, and various input and 
feedback processes.
847
 With the large impact EU legislation has on the member states, 
the UBA provides scientific support not only to the BMU and other ministries but also – 
although to a more limited extent – to the Commission.848 
Despite its active involvement at the EU level, the absence of a Europeanization 
strategy (Europäisierungsstrategie), especially in the light of the ever-increasing 
importance of the EU in environmental policy, has been criticised.
849
 Such a strategy 
could include the coordination of tasks with EU institutions and institutions in other 
European countries.
850
 This has been pointed out by a 2007 UBA evaluation, which 
focussed on the agency as a whole. Within division I (the division dealing with 
cooperation at the European Union and international level and the EEA) some 
coordination and close sector specific cooperation obviously exists. However, it was 
suggested that UBA and its work could benefit from a more clearly defined overall 
European perspective.
851
 The UBA‘s president at the time, Prof. Dr. Troge, pointed out 
that when looking at the environmental topic areas the UBA is dealing with, in practical 
terms it is almost impossible to differentiate any longer between national, European and 
international issues (although legally this differentiation is possible).
852
 Thus because 
there is such a strong orientation in the UBA‘s work towards the EU – about 90 per cent 
of its work is affected by EU measures and legislation – such a strategy was not 
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considered necessary.
853
 The UBA had been subjected to the Europeanization process 
almost since its creation in 1974 which coincided with the EU moving into the 
environmental policy field (see Chapter Three).
854
 
In addition to its European level activities, the UBA works together with the United 
Nations (UN, UNESCO and UNEP), the OECD, and the World Health Organization 
(WHO).
855
 The national and EU level aside, UBA staff also participate in international 
conferences and committees.
856
 The UBA is a member of the EPA Network, which 
connects environment agencies in Europe (see Chapter Eight).  
 
4.2 The UBA in the national context 
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is a parliamentary democracy based on a 
division of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of 
government. It is a three-tiered system which includes the national level, federal states 
and local authorities.
857
 In addition to the federal level (Bund) and the 16 states 
(Länder), responsibilities are also distributed among districts (Kreise) and 
municipalities (Gemeinden). Each Land has its own constitution, government, 
parliament and environment agency. 
In most policy areas the federal government relies on the states and municipalities for 
the execution of its laws, due to not having its own administrations in those areas.
858
 
State governments participate in federal-level law-making through the Bundesrat, in 
which state government members approve legislative proposals which affect the states 
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directly.
859
 Moreover, the Bundesrat has a veto over some federal laws while 
constitutional changes require a two-thirds majority by the Bundesrat and the Bundestag 
(lower house).
860
 As a result, policy-making in the FRG can be very complex and time-
consuming.
861
 Rüdig identifies five main forces shaping contemporary environmental 
policy in Germany: (1) local and state government, (2) federal environmental 
institutions, (3) the EU and international environmental policy arenas, (4) environmental 
policy instrument traditions and (5) non-governmental organizations.
862
 While all these 
aspects are undoubtedly important, the main focus in this thesis will be on the UBA as a 
federal environmental institution. 
 
4.2.1 The UBA and the BMU 
Up to the early 1970s, the environment was considered a policy field of little 
importance.
863
 Between 1971 and 1986 environmental policy issues were mostly dealt 
with by the BMI and, to a lesser degree, the Ministry for Agriculture and the Health 
Ministry, although several other ministries (such as Economic Affairs and Transport) 
were responsible for aspects of the federal environmental policy.
 864
  
The department for environmental protection within the BMI was created in autumn 
1969.
865
 The BMU was only established in 1986 following the Chernobyl nuclear power 
station disaster.
 
The establishment of an independent environment ministry would have 
been desirable at an earlier stage, as it was considered to create greater visibility and 
focus. The newly created BMU became responsible for environmental and nature 
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protection, nuclear plant security and radiation protection, as well as health-related 
environmental protection.
866
 In order to function effectively, the staff working in the 
areas for which the new ministry had become responsible were transferred to the 
BMU.
867
  It had been feared that the BMU would not be able to stand up to stronger 
ministries (such as the Economics, Agriculture and Transport Ministries).
868
 The BMU 
is responsible for national environmental policy and the realisation of political 
objectives, priorities and programmes.
869
 It participates in the legislative process and 
controls or supervises subordinate authorities.
870
  
The UBA was created twelve years before the environment (together with nature 
conservation and reactor safety) was assigned an independent ministry. Together with 
the Federal Agency for Nature Conservation (Bundesamt für Naturschutz) and the 
Federal Office for Radiation Protection (Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz) the UBA is now 
answerable to the BMU.
871
 In addition to the above mentioned agencies, the BMU is 
also able to draw on a number of independent expert bodies which provide it with 
advice.
872
 Following the creation of the BMU, the Bundestag also set up its own 
environment committee.
873
 The Committee on the Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety addresses ecological issues (including climate change, nuclear 
power, animal protection and renewable energy) under the sustainability principle.
874
 
Early German environmental policy shows that for policy successes, the existence of 
a separate environment ministry is not necessary. It has even been suggested that 
because environmental policy competencies were located in such a strong ministry as 
                                                 
866
 UBA (2003a:26) 
867
 Pehle and Jansen (1998:95) 
868
 Weidner (1995:15) 
869
 UBA (2003a:26) 
870
 Ibid.:26 
871
 Ibid.:28 
872
 Ibid.:28 
873
 Pehle and Jansen (1998:107) 
874
 Bundestag Homepage (2009) 
157 
 
the BMI, better outcomes were achieved because the ministry was able to assert itself 
against other powerful ministries in the policy-making process.
875
 
Being part of the BMU‘s portfolio, the ministry has a coordinating and supervisory 
role regarding the UBA‘s activities.876 This requires ongoing (formal and informal) 
exchanges between the two institutions.
877
 The areas of UBA research activity are 
shaped by the political and environmental topics and research requirements of the 
BMU; they are set out in an annual environmental research plan 
(Umweltforschungsplan).
878
 Agreement on new topics and relevant research areas is 
usually reached by consensus.
879
 However, in the case of disagreement, the BMU can 
overrule the UBA.
880
 Although its tasks include the preparation of political and 
administrative decisions, the UBA itself is not directly involved in the legislative 
process.
881
 
As a scientific institution, the UBA had to continuously perform a balancing act of 
positioning itself as an independent scientific institute while also forming part of the 
executive which required a certain degree of loyalty.
882
 The UBA‘s aim was to occupy a 
position somewhere between being completely independent (but not influential) and 
being the voice of the ministry (but lacking scientific credibility).
883
 
Occasionally, the UBA‘s president has been reprimanded for his position and/or 
UBA statements.
884
 On rare occasions, the BMI/BMU (or even the Chancellor) has 
sought to publicly distance itself (him-/herself) from the UBA‘s positions.885 For 
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example, in 1994 the UBA‘s president von Lersner was in favour of increasing the price 
of petrol, engine efficiency of cars and improving public transport networks.
886
 He was 
then publicly and officially castigated by the government‘s spokesperson who referred 
to him as incompetent and warned that he might have to face consequences for his – in 
hindsight relatively harmless – statements.887 This incident visibly illustrated how 
strongly the UBA was (and still is) bound by the political guidelines which are 
determined by the BMI/BMU and/or Chancellor.
888
 There were, however, also cases 
where the UBA had the implicit support of the interior (and later environment) minister, 
who could not publicly support its position due to opposition from the Chancellor 
and/or economic minister.
889
  
 
4.2.2 Federal level and the Länder 
The federal set-up of Germany has led to a distribution of powers over various levels, 
even in the same policy area. With regards to competencies in the environmental field, a 
constitutional amendment in 1972 granted the federal government concurrent power in 
several areas of environmental policy, including protection from radiation, air pollution 
control, noise abatement, criminal law relating to environmental protection matters and 
statutory regulations on waste management.
890
 In those areas power is shared between 
the Bund and Länder, with federal law superseding state law while the government has 
the ability to issue detailed regulations.
891
 In other areas (nature conservation, water 
management or regional planning), the Bund can only issue framework laws to which 
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the states then add specific legislation.
892
 A major federalism reform 
(Föderalismusreform) in 2006 brought about only relatively minor changes to the 
environmental policy competences of the Länder and federal government.
893
 Moreover, 
it failed to adopt a long planned Environmental Act (Umweltgesetzbuch) which was 
meant to unify and make more transparent the large number of environmental laws in 
Germany.
894
 
Most ministries can draw on agencies, institutes or expert councils which provide 
them with technical assistance (often through monitoring, assessments, preparing 
regulations and informing the public).
895
 In order to be able to carry out these tasks, they 
are staffed with scientific and technical experts. They have been provided with 
appropriate facilities for measurements, monitoring and analysis of – in this case – the 
environment while other federal authorities focus on the implementation of law and 
some agencies combine both functions.
896
 In order to efficiently advise and inform 
policy-makers and to inform the public, an agency needs to be as neutral as possible 
regarding its scientific work and output because its credibility and influence depend on 
it.
897
 However, it is possible for the UBA to take a position which can be considered as 
controversial within the ministry or even the public.  
 
The UBA and the Länder 
Environmental law in Germany is dominated by the federal level in areas of air 
pollution control, chemicals, waste management, noise abatement, nuclear safety and 
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genetic engineering.
898
 Due to federal framework laws the Länder have relatively little 
room for policy-making on their own.
899
 In some areas, however, the Länder have 
passed important laws nonetheless, including nature and landscape conservation as well 
as water management.
900
 
Similar to the federal level, the state authorities usually have specific departments 
concerned with environmental policy (formulation and implementation) as well as 
agencies responsible for environmental research, planning and development.
901
 All 
states have environmental ministries, which are in a strong position due to their right of 
self-determination (Article 28 on the federal guarantee of Land constitutions and of 
local self-government).
902
 Land environment ministries are responsible for the 
distribution of funds for environmental protection and monitoring the state of the 
environment.
903
 
Because responsibilities are divided between the federal level, the Länder and the 
municipalities, intensive cooperation and coordination is required. It involves 
information exchange on issues such as scientific findings, environmental problems, 
experiences in environmental law implementation and planned environmental 
measures.
904
 In contrast to the late creation of the BMU, some states set up their own 
environment ministries as early as 1971 (e.g. Bavaria).
905
 Meetings between the 
environment ministers from the Länder (Umweltministerkonferenz which also includes 
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the federal environment minister) take place twice a year.
906
 They are concerned with 
the coordination of state and federal environmental policy.
907
 
The majority of the environmental administrative tasks are exercised by the Länder, 
who also distribute administrative responsibilities and tasks to their authorities.
908
 Their 
responsibilities can vary depending on the Land in which they are located, but also on 
their size and the size of their municipalities.
909
 Some responsibilities of the 
municipalities have been allocated to them by the Länder authorities, others are based 
on their constitutional right to self-government.
910
 Institutions at the state and local 
levels are responsible for enforcement and prosecution.
911
 However, there are 
significant differences in implementation and enforcement processes and structures in 
different Länder, as local authorities have the right to self-administration.
912
 The Land 
environment agencies‘ competences tend to be significantly narrower than those of the 
UBA.
913
 However, while the Länder have a certain amount of flexibility regarding the 
way they implement federal environmental legislation, most of the legislation itself is 
decided at either the national or EU level.
914
 The Länder still play a part in the law-
making process through the required agreement of the Bundesrat. They are also directly 
involved in the implementation of the laws.
915
  
Overall, like the BMU, the UBA has relatively little influence in environmental 
policy areas which are within the exclusive competence of the Länder. Apart from 
passing some wider framework laws, the federal level can only indirectly try to 
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influence Länder policy-making in these cases.
916
 This was often a source of conflict 
between the UBA and the Länder.
917
 Changes in responsibilities from the regional to the 
federal level, as demanded by the UBA, were not always pursued.
918
 While the UBA 
has no right to issue instructions on areas for which the responsibility lies with the 
Länder, cooperation between the UBA and the Land environment agencies is 
nonetheless an important aspect of their work. Thus although the UBA does not legally 
or formally exercise any influence on the Land environment agencies, its informal 
influence does play a role.
919
 It is therefore not uncommon for Land environment 
ministries or agencies to approach the UBA and ask it to address certain issues at the 
federal level (on which the Länder were unable to reach agreement).
920
 Because a large 
extent of environmental policy is made at EU level, the focus has moved away from 
shared environmental responsibilities within a federal system.
921
 It does, however, raise 
a number of other issues such as the degree of Länder involvement in the EU decision-
making processes.
922
 While this might apply to the policy-making and agenda-setting 
procedures, federalism still creates barriers affecting the implementation process. 
 
4.2.3 Germany and EU environmental policy 
As one of its founding members, Germany has not only played an important part in the 
development of EU environmental policy, but has also been influenced by supranational 
environmental legislation. The German government stated already in its 1971 
environment programme the significance of European cooperation and coordination as 
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well as its intentions to participate in finding solutions to shared environmental 
problems and its support for the adoption of the first European EAP.
923
 The German 
1971 Environment Programme was generally considered a success, with then interior 
minister Genscher even referring to it as ‗a blueprint for European environmental 
policy‘.924 
From the early 1980s onwards, Germany was among a group of environmental leader 
states (together with Denmark and the Netherlands which were joined by Sweden, 
Finland and Austria in 1995) that demanded EU-wide high environmental standards.
925
 
Domestically in these countries, environmental issues are highly salient and public 
pressure for strict policies to address environmental problems is high.
926
 Strict EU 
environmental policy was also in Germany‘s interests for industrial competitiveness 
reasons.
927
 German industry did not want to find itself disadvantaged by stricter national 
standards than its foreign competitors and EU-wide regulation would open up new 
markets for its environmental technology industry.
928
 
 
Germany’s role in EU policy-making  
Environmental leader states (such as Germany) tend to demand on the EU level the 
introduction of environmental standards which are similar to their own domestic 
standards.
929
 EU policy initiatives are not exclusively formulated by the Commission, 
but also take into account national proposals. 
930
 In the 1980s, Germany managed to 
significantly influence EU environmental policy, most prominently in the field of air 
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pollution (due to suffering heavily from acid rain).
931
 However, from the 1990s 
onwards, some EU policy initiatives, such as the environmental information directive 
and the directive on environmental impact assessments, were not actively supported and 
even opposed by Germany.
932
 
The Länder also expanded their activities from the regional and national to the EU 
level. Most of the Länder have established (joint) offices in Brussels from where they 
monitor EU-level developments, build alliances and lobby relevant institutions and/or 
officials.
933
 The inclusion of the subsidiarity principle in the Treaty of Maastricht 
(which was welcomed by the Länder) further secures their position nationally and at the 
EU-level.
934
 
 
Implementation 
In contrast to its often highly ambitious position during the policy-formulation process, 
Germany‘s implementation record left a lot to be desired in some areas of 
environmental legislation. Thus its role as an environmental leader state cannot be 
extended to all aspects of the policy cycle.
935
 Difficulties regarding the implementation 
of EU environmental laws are largely due to the federal administrative structures.
936
 
Environmental standards formulation and implementation are separated with the Länder 
being mainly responsible for enforcing environmental laws, many of which have been 
formulated by the federal government and/or the EU.
937
 The often mentioned 
implementation deficit in Germany does not apply to all areas of EU environmental 
policy. Some EU policy measures were implemented quickly and efficiently (e.g. air 
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pollution control measures or cadmium reduction measures).
938
 In cases brought before 
the ECJ, it was explicitly stated that complications due to a federal system cannot be 
used as an excuse for non-implementation and/or delays in the implementation 
process.
939
 Instead they have to be anticipated and addressed on time.
940
 Highly 
developed and differentiated domestic environmental institutions and practices, which 
are often inconsistent with EU requirements, further complicated compliance with EU 
environmental laws.
941
 
 
Administrative adaptation  
German national administrative traditions are characterized by stability and continuity 
of long established cultures and procedures, rarely undergoing major innovations or 
reforms.
942
 This tends to impede adjustments to EU policy requirements.
943
 Despite 
recognised problems (such as inflexibility, ineffective implementation and bureaucratic 
inefficiency) domestic environmental policy principles and structures tend to remain the 
same.
944
 Moreover, change that does take place usually happens within the existing 
administrative system, leaving organizational frameworks unchanged.
945
  
 
4.3 The UBA and the Eionet  
The NFP for the EEA‘s Eionet is located within the UBA‘s Environmental Planning and 
Sustainability Strategies division. The NFP is the main link between the EEA and the 
member countries. Because secondary sources and EEA and UBA primary documents 
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merely list the host department of the German NFP (within the UBA) without providing 
any information or analysis about its cooperation with the EEA, the main sources of 
information are interviews with current and former UBA officials. 
 
Setting up the NFP  
Due to the nature of the Eionet as a highly flexible network, each country could 
individually choose where to locate its NFP and NRCs by determining the most 
appropriate institution for collecting national data and providing it to the EEA.
946
 The 
task of setting up the NFP was given to the divisional head at the UBA who had been 
liaising with the task force created to build up the EEA.
947
 Due to the high rank and 
workload of the head of division, the decision was made to allocate the work of the NFP 
to a different member of staff.
948
 The position of NFP was specifically allocated to a 
member of staff with a broader, more strategic overview of environmental matters, 
rather than a scientific expert.
949
 The German NFP consists of one person, assisted by 
another UBA official. 
 
4.3.1 Working of the NFP  
While the UBA is responsible for gathering some of the data required by the EEA, a 
significant amount of data comes from the Länder (depending on the area of 
responsibility) and is collected by the NFP before being passed on to the EEA.
950
 
The NRCs consist of national experts in the specific field. About 90 per cent of the 
24 NRCs are located within the UBA itself.
951
 Initially, it was envisaged that NRC 
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functions would be allocated throughout the Länder as well. But it was later decided 
that the NRCs which are responsible for the coordination with their counterparts in the 
Länder, should be located at the national level.
952
 As a result, the NFP does not contact 
the Länder directly but goes through the NRCs.
953
 This arrangement needed to be 
secured through legislation in the form of an administrative agreement on the exchange 
of environmental data between the federal level and the Länder 
(Verwaltungsvereinbarung zwischen Bund und Ländern über den Datenaustausch im 
Umweltbereich) which was passed in 1996.
954
 This agreement outlines data provision 
duties of the Länder as well as the federal government in the light of increasing 
international reporting obligations in the EU (including the EEA), OECD and UNEP.
955
 
The passing of the legislation is a direct consequence of the UBA having become the 
NFP for Germany.
956
  
As part of the priority data flow reports, countries are assessed and compared with 
regards to their progress in information provision (e.g. whether data provisions are on 
time and complete). Germany‘s performance in the priority data flow varies 
significantly, ranging from 64 per cent in 2001 to 100 per cent for the first time in 
2009.
957
 Although there are no consequences for countries failing to reach high 
percentages (or even 100 per cent) with regards to their reporting obligations, NFPs can 
nonetheless use the results.
958
 It is thus possible for the NFP to discuss the reasons for 
possible shortcomings with the head of the division/the UBA, assess why they 
performed badly in certain areas, what would be required to improve the performance 
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(e.g. more resources, higher commitment from the NRCs or the Länder) and aim to 
improve in the future.
959
 As a German official pointed out, for the countries ‗it is a 
benchmark and they can compare themselves, so it is a very good motivation tool‘.960 
 
When setting up the Eionet participation in the UBA, some challenges had to be 
overcome. While UBA officials were generally interested in participating in Eionet 
through being an NRC, their role had to be integrated into the existing work profiles of 
national experts. Time and money had to be allocated as all NRC activities needed to be 
nationally funded (as they do not receive financial support from the EEA).
961
 As all 
countries had to participate in the Eionet there was no room for manoeuvre and the 
required structures had to be put in place.
962
 
In the first years of the Eionet being set up there had been some difficulties with 
regard to the EEA-related cooperation between the BMU (providing the MB member) 
and the UBA‘s NFP.963 The main reason for this was the distribution of roles and 
responsibilities. Due to there being no clear communication structure, contacts and 
communication were only sporadic, with the NFP side feeling neglected and the MB 
side not knowing what was going on.
964
 In 1997/98 a more systematic and efficient way 
of communicating was worked out by both parties.
965
 
Initially, the NRCs‘ – and therefore NFP‘s – dependence on the Länder in the 
provision of data, was seen as ‗an enormous extra burden‘.966 Not only did they have to 
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ensure the delivery of the relevant data, it also had to be on time, complete, comparable 
and consistent with other member countries.
967
 
This was accompanied by technical problems (regarding the formats in which data 
and information was stored and delivered) which generally impeded communication 
between the EEA and NFPs as well as among NFPs themselves.
968
 The EEA was 
always technically advanced and pushed towards the use of an electronic 
communication system (as set out in its founding regulation).
969
 Eventually the EEA 
developed its own software which facilitated communication, installing national Eionet 
servers in the member countries and providing the relevant training to the people 
involved at the national level.
970
 The EEA also consulted a number of NFPs which 
wanted to get involved and could therefore tailor technical applications according to the 
NFP‘s and Eionet‘s needs.971 
Overall the sudden exposure of national environmental data and information took 
some getting used to for the member countries, including Germany.
972
 Although 
national data and information had previously been reported (mainly directly to the 
Commission), it had never been published in a comparable manner before.
973
 Countries 
had to get used to being directly compared to other countries.
974
  
Another, more general but potentially crucial problem of the NFP is the language 
issue.
975
 The EEA does not possess a large translation apparatus for its outputs (as the 
main EU institutions do), most of which are in English. NFPs and ideally also NRCs 
therefore have to be able to speak English. This issue has been solved (in the UBA) by 
                                                 
967
 Interview German official (2008a) 
968
 Ibid. 
969
 Ibid. 
970
 Ibid. 
971
 Ibid. 
972
 Ibid. 
973
 Ibid. 
974
 Ibid. 
975
 Ibid. 
170 
 
choosing bilingual officials to fulfil the role of German NFP (being able to act internally 
as translators if required). 
 
ETCs 
Out of the set of eight first ETCs, two were located in German institutes: the ETC on 
Catalogue of Data Sources at the Land Environment Ministry in Lower-Saxony 
(Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium, NUM) and the ETC on Air Emissions at the 
UBA.
976
 A number of German institutes participated within other ETCs. Out of the five 
ETCs active in 2009, none was hosted by the UBA or any other German organization, 
which, however, does not mean that they are not part of a number of ETC consortia.  
 
The NFP and the management board member 
Germany‘s EEA MB member (and the alternate MB member) has traditionally always 
been a BMU official from its General International Cooperation Directorate.
977
 
Preparing the MB member is part of the NFP‘s responsibilities.978 The MB member 
and the NFP stay in close contact through official meetings prior to MB meetings.
979
 
The NFP and another BMU official responsible for cooperation with the EEA brief the 
MB member on relevant issues, previously distributed documents and internal 
positions.
980
 In the BMU the MB member is considered as a mediator between national 
politics and the EEA.
981
 The MB member promotes EEA positions in Germany but also 
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raises matters which are of interest to the German government and/or the general public 
at the meetings.
982
 
Within the MB, being well-prepared for the meetings is considered more important 
than a country‘s size for the ability to influence decisions.983 The amount of preparation 
undertaken by the members of the MB is by no means proportionate to the size of their 
country (although a lack of resources in smaller member countries might be a 
detrimental factor).
984
 For the (previous and current) German MB members, getting 
involved has always been a central concern.
985
 The EEA has always been regarded as 
important and there was an attempt to retain continuity of MB members (by 2010 there 
have only been three different German MB members).
986
 
 
4.3.2 Effects on the UBA 
The EEA is not equally well-known throughout all of its subject areas and units within 
the UBA and/or BMU. Knowledge about the EEA often depends on whether a topic is 
addressed at the EU-level or internationally and how active the EEA is in a particular 
field.
987
 Where the EEA and its work are better known, it is considered as well-
established, especially considering its relatively small size and limited scope.
988
 
The EEA not only works for (and thus also has an effect on) the Commission, EP and 
the public although those are important ―clients‖. Its influence by ‗holding up a 
mirror‘989 to Germany is also important. The EEA is thus an important source of 
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reflection on achievements and shortcomings. The EEA played a supporting role during 
Germany‘s preparations for its 2007 EU and G8 presidencies.990  
It has been suggested that it is generally harder for the EEA to play a prominent role 
in long established administrations, with the agency being better known and more 
influential in Central and Eastern European countries (or EEA member countries like 
Turkey) which have set up modern day environmental administrations only more 
recently.
991
 This is partly due to the often very limited resources of administrations 
(environment ministries and agencies) in the latter countries. It is also because the EEA 
often played a guiding and capacity-building role when national environmental 
institutions in these countries were created.
992
 
The EEA itself is not able to influence the working of national environment agencies 
or ministries in its member countries.
993
 On issues concerning the networks which 
include and rely on national administrations, the EEA can try to promote a certain 
directional focus. However, discussions about such issues as the restructuring of the 
Eionet take place in cooperation with the NFPs.
994
 The EEA provides a set structure 
whilst incorporating a degree of flexibility (to facilitate, for example, expansion with 
new member countries).
995
 
Bilateral cooperation takes place between the UBA and the French environment 
agency (ADEME), environment agencies in Austria and Switzerland but also 
environment agencies in the newer EU member states (such as the Czech Republic, 
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Poland or Rumania).
996
 As with other policy areas, the EU has become more important 
for German environment policy.
997
 As one UBA official commented 
over the years the importance of the EU has become clearer for the [...] UBA. 
When the UBA was created, how many areas in environmental policy were 
regulated by the EU? None. And today you would look [hard] for areas which are 
not regulated by the EU. This illustrates the development nicely.
998
 
 
Although this development is not solely attributable to the EEA‘s creation, it has 
possibly had an impact by connecting people more systematically and/or facilitating 
interaction. The EEA has added another dimension to the existing set-up.
999
 Since the 
creation of the EEA, the UBA has seconded at least one of its staff to the agency at any 
one time.
1000
 
Within the specialist areas, many contacts get established through working together 
in committees, leading to informal links, rather than organized official networks. While 
these contacts are still expandable, they can already be considered as quite extensive.
1001
 
These international connections, however, cannot directly or exclusively be attributed to 
the existence of the EEA, as they are not solely established through Eionet 
participation.
1002
 This does not, however, mean that the creation of the EEA had no 
impact whatsoever on the UBA. The UBA‘s involvement in Eionet has resulted in the 
data flow from the Länder to the national level becoming more systematic and 
organized.
1003
 Previous reporting arrangements (or, to be more precise, lack of 
arrangements) had resulted in the data flow being ‗all over the place‘.1004 The imposed 
deadlines and newly created structures put in place a system of procedures from which 
German environmental policy benefitted. In addition, the creation of the Eionet 
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improved communication on different topics in the UBA, giving it a broader strategic 
overview of the work of the Länder, the UBA and the EEA.
1005
 With regards to the 
BMU, the broad European strategic work received an extra boost in the UBA due to its 
cooperation with the ministry in a broader context (in addition to the already existing, 
well-established contacts between the BMU and UBA at the various topic levels).
1006
 
The creation of the EEA and its cooperation with the UBA also impacted on the 
national experts within the latter agency which saw itself being confronted more directly 
with current and future priorities of EU environmental policy.
1007
 Moreover, by 
verifying data and analysing the state of the German environment, experts are required 
to increase their focus on national problems and to further work on improving data 
flows.
1008
 In some areas, however, national experts criticised their role of merely 
providing data without being able to have any other scientific input.
1009
 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
It can be concluded that the creation of the EEA did not constitute a critical juncture 
triggering significant institutional changes in Germany. Having in place a long and 
well-established environment agency at the national level, which works closely with 
Länder environment agencies, the creation of the EEA simply added another, 
supranational dimension to the UBA‘s work. Some changes (e.g. agreement on the 
exchange of environmental data between the federal level and the Länder) needed to be 
made in order to ensure the UBA was able to fulfil its information provision role. 
However, these were regulatory changes of small proportion, not critical junctures or 
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‗seismic events‘. When looking at Bulmer and Burch‘s dimensions for establishing 
whether an event constitutes a critical juncture
1010
 (see Chapter Two), the same 
conclusion applies. There were no changes to the system or organizations, only some 
changes to processes and regulation (for more details see hypothesis I), thus not 
resulting in a critical juncture for the UBA.  
Although Europeanization of the UBA has taken place, this development is not due 
to the creation of the EEA and the UBA‘s participation in the Eionet. With European 
legislation playing an important role in national environmental politics since the 1970s 
and the environment being considered a policy area reaching beyond national borders, 
Europeanization of the UBA is hardly surprising. The contribution of the EEA‘s 
creation on the Europeanization of the UBA appears to be small although it did add an 
additional layer of involvement and contacts to its already well established European 
outlook. The means by which Germany ensured participation requirements of the EEA‘s 
Eionet network involved specifically choosing an official with a broader overview over 
environmental matters (and language skills) and changing legislation in order to ensure 
the provision of the relevant information to the NFP and the Eionet. Whether 
Europeanization has led to administrative convergence will be discussed in the 
comparative chapter (Chapter Seven). Moreover, participation by UBA officials in EU 
committees as well as advising national policy-makers on issues under discussion at the 
supranational level, have resulted in a more open, international and especially European 
perspective. 
Hypothesis I postulates that the creation of the EEA has only had a limited impact on 
national environment agencies and other involved parts of the national administrations. 
The historical institutionalist approach expects little change to national institutions 
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unless there are exceptional circumstances. Considering Bulmer and Burch‘s 
dimensions of institutional change
1011
 in relation to the impact of the EEA‘s creation on 
the UBA, no changes to the system or organizations took place. Changes to processes 
did take place in order to fulfil the required information reporting obligations and 
successfully participate in Eionet. The changes to processes not only affected the 
creation of the position of the NFP but also the involvement of a significant number of 
other officials in their roles as NRCs and information providers. In contrast to the NFP, 
NRC work is added to existing roles carried out by officials. Thus, as some small 
changes to the processes did take place, it would be more fitting to speak of adaptation 
rather than change, or as Börzel and Risse would classify it, accommodation
1012
.  
Other ways in which the vertical processes have been affected nationally include the 
provision of an additional link between the UBA and BMU (through the briefing 
obligations and cooperation between the NFP and MB member). The setting up of the 
EEA has also created an opportunity to reflect on the UBA‘s reporting performance 
through the measure of Germany‘s performance in the priority data flows.  
With regards to how the regulatory arrangements have been affected by the creation 
of the EEA and the UBA‘s participation in the Eionet, there is most notably the 
administrative agreement on the exchange of environmental data between the federal 
level and the Länder, leading to the data flow between the two levels to become more 
organized. It was introduced as a direct result of the role the UBA had to play in the 
Eionet. Again, this change at the regulatory level can be classified as accommodation. 
This was the only regulatory change which can be directly linked to the creation of the 
EEA and the Eionet. It is surprising that Germany‘s successful participation in the 
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Eionet required legislation which outlined the reporting obligations of the Länder to the 
federal government and beyond.  
The lack of impact of the EEA on the UBA and BMU is also highlighted by the new 
empirical findings put forward in this chapter which show that the EEA is not well-
known in the UBA and the BMU (let alone non-environmental agencies or ministries) 
as well as the general public. Surprisingly, apart from the people directly involved 
through the networks (or the MB) not many officials are aware of the EEA and its work. 
The main impact the creation of the EEA and Eionet has had on the UBA appears to 
be on the information reporting procedures from the Länder to the UBA/federal level. 
Networking between departments and international networking has also become more 
systematic since the EEA/Eionet was set up. Moreover, due to the institutionalisation of 
the Eionet‘s NFP and NRC structure, it has become easier for national experts and 
specialists to contact their counterparts in other countries. 
It is remarkable that there was any impact at all on an agency which has existed as 
long and is as well established as the UBA. However, reforms and reorganizations that 
did take place appear to be largely unconnected to the existence of the EEA or even EU 
membership. Examples include the intake of a large number of environmental officials 
from the former GDR, the modernisation of the UBA‘s structures which are better able 
to take into account cross-media issues and the move from Berlin to Dessau. 
Although a Europeanization strategy within the UBA does not exist, the agency has 
nonetheless been subject to Europeanization (as can be expected from a national 
environmental institution). The UBA has been affected by the gradual move of more 
and more environmental policy-making competences to the EU level. It has also been 
affected by the linking of scientists across Europe (among one another and with EU 
178 
 
officials) through participation in EU committees. The latter development can be 
considered as a less obvious, indirect Europeanization effect on the UBA. 
The effects of the creation of the EEA and the setting up of the Eionet have been 
more direct and intended. They are also more easily identifiable. Although the NRCs 
are numerous and include virtually all areas of environmental policy-making, the EEA 
is not particularly well known outside the Eionet framework. Therefore on the UBA as a 
whole, the limited impact of the Eionet is not surprising. 
Thus while the EEA‘s creation has had some impact, it is not far reaching and does 
not affect the position which the UBA occupies nationally (regarding its role and 
relations to other domestic institutions such as the BMU). Finally, in addition to the 
overall stability of the German political system and its institutional landscape, it has to 
be remembered that by the time the EEA started its work, the UBA had already been 
operating for twenty years. 
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Chapter 5: The French Environment and Energy Management 
Agency and the French Environment Institute 
 
 
5.1 The ADEME 
This chapter looks at the role of the ADEME and the Ifen where the Eionet‘s NFP for 
France is located. 
 
5.1.1 Creation of the ADEME 
The idea behind the creation of a French ―super-agency‖ for the environment did not 
originate from the Environment Ministry
1013
, the affected agencies themselves or 
environmental groups but came from governmental services (the Prime Minister‘s 
division).
1014
 The suggestions were supported by the environment minister at the time, 
Brice Lalonde.
1015
  In the past, the number of agencies dealing with environmental 
matters alongside one another had been criticised for complicating a unified 
environmental policy approach leading to their (partial) amalgamation.
1016
 
The ADEME was created in December 1990 by combining the Air Quality Agency 
(Agence pour la Qualité de l'Air, AQA, created in 1980), the National Agency for the 
Recovery and Elimination of Waste (Agence Nationale pour la Récupération et 
l’Elimination des Déchets, ANRED, which had been created in 1975), and the largest 
and most influential French Energy Management Agency (Agence Française pour la 
Maîtrise de l’Energie, AFME, created in 1982 from several bodies including the Solar 
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Energy Commissariat and the Geothermal Committee).
1017
 As well as taking over the 
tasks of these agencies, ADEME was also given responsibilities in additional fields, 
including air pollution prevention, noise abatement and (since 2009) combating climate 
change.
1018
 Due to being well established and already functioning efficiently, the water 
agencies were not included in the ADEME.
1019
 
The plan creating the ADEME was controversial and lead to conflict.
1020
 There was 
significant opposition to the plans within the Environment Ministry itself, fearing that 
simply due to its size (and corresponding budget) the new agency would be more 
powerful than the ministry it was supposed to be subordinate to.
1021
 The smaller 
agencies which were to form part of the ADEME also voiced concerns that the new 
agency would be dominated by the larger AFME.
1022
 Other points of contention 
included the future location of the new agency and the selection of its first president.
1023
 
However, the law creating this new large environment and energy management agency 
was passed rapidly as part of the French government‘s Plan Vert (Green Plan, see 
below). 
Initially, the agency was supervised jointly by the Ministry of the Environment and 
the – more dominant – Ministry of Industry (after dropping the Research Ministry due 
to fears about the complications that might arise from having three supervisors for a 
single agency).
1024
 Eventually, changes were made and the ADEME found itself under 
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the joint supervision of the Environment Ministry and the Ministry for Higher 
Education and Research.
1025
  
 
5.1.2 Role of the ADEME 
The ADEME is classed as an industrial and commercial public agency (Établissement 
Public à Caractère Industriel et Commercial).
1026
 ADEME‘s mission is described as 
‗encouraging, supervising, coordinating, facilitating and undertaking operations with the 
aim of protecting the environment and managing energy‘.1027 Its prime mandate is the 
use of its expertise to support research and technological innovation, develop and 
improve monitoring systems and advise government authorities.
1028
 The 2007-2010 
Charter Agreement on objectives between ADEME and the state pointed out that  
ADEME aims to be the point of reference and the obvious partner for the general 
public, businesses and local authorities, acting as a tool of the state in the 
realization of best practices designed to protect the environment and manage 
energy.
1029
 
 
The agency has no regulatory powers and is not involved in the process of proposing 
laws.
1030
 It aims to be a source of proposals in order to initiate and further public 
policies. 
1031
 However, it can only advise the ministry on planned measures, but it is 
then up to the government, whether or not it takes the agency‘s opinion into account.1032 
On occasion the ADEME has played a participatory role in drafting national and local 
policy.
1033
 The agency considers the provision of expertise to public authorities as one 
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of its primary missions, fulfilling the state‘s needs for expert advice, technical and 
economic support services, at all levels, local and regional, national and 
international.
1034
 
 
Box 5.1: ADEME‘s role and functions 
 
ADEME: main role and functions: 
  
Designing, managing and financing research programmes:  
research and technological innovation in the fields of energy and the environment  
 
Advice and expertise:   
offering technical skills, advice and financial assistance to companies, public  
authorities and individuals  
 
Developing practical tools and disseminating best practices:  
promoting model initiatives, studies, research projects and fieldwork and help 
spread most effective practices and best technologies 
 
Financing decision-support assistance, exemplary operations and projects:   
providing support in promoting energy efficiency and environmental 
conservation 
 
Training, information, communications and awareness-raising initiatives:   
guidance for companies, public authorities, NGOs and the general public 
 
 
Source: ADEME (2010) 
 
The ADEME works further on developing, disseminating and promoting practical 
methods and best practice in order to help spread effective measures and the best 
technologies.
1035
 It works in close collaboration with producers and users in the field in 
order to follow technological and organizational innovations from their conception 
through to the deployment phase.
1036
 A large part of the agency‘s remit in addition to its 
motivating and advising role involves the collection of environmental information, 
coming up with and planning new environmental ideas and technologies, trialling them 
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and making them available to as many users as possible.
1037
 These users include 
decision-makers in order to guide their choices but also to companies, public authorities 
and individuals.
1038
 ADEME supports the development of French environmental and 
energy policies.
1039
 It also assists local and regional authorities through the support of its 
regional offices.
1040
 
Although the ADEME does not carry out research on its own, it manages, finances, 
pilots, guides and develops research and technological innovation in the environmental 
field and on energy-related issues.
1041
 ADEME‘s capacity for neutral expert analysis 
makes it an ideal partner to involve in the coordination of research.
1042
 Moreover, the 
ADEME offers information, provides training, communication campaigns and 
awareness-raising initiatives to public authorities, companies, NGOs and the general 
public.
1043
 
The ADEME aims to play a central role in France (as well as Europe) in achieving a 
convergence of views between environmental actors, accelerating research and 
developments in order to find solutions and responses to the human pressure on the 
environment.
 1044
 Its main fields of activity are energy, transport, waste, air, soil, and 
environmental management, as well as climate change and sustainable development.
1045
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Importance  
The ADEME‘s role in France is that of being a ‗state instrument‘1046 as well as a partner 
and contact point for the public, companies and local authorities in order to promote and 
generalise good practices aiming to protect the environment and controlling the use of 
energy.
1047
 In its field of operation, the ADEME plays a central role in the government‘s 
environmental policy.
1048
 The state benefits from the ADEME‘s technical support and 
expertise as much as businesses. The ADEME‘s commitment to its work throughout 
France has been described as ‗indisputable and indispensable‘.1049  
 
Organizational structure 
The ADEME has three central departments (in Paris, Angers and Valbonne), 26 
regional branches, offices in France‘s overseas territories and a representative office in 
Brussels.
1050
 The role of regional offices is to provide further support and advice in the 
required proximity to local actors.
1051
  
The ADEME is structured around four core functional areas: the Executive 
Directorate for Strategy and Research (responsible for the analysis of development in 
areas in which the agency is involved and coordinating its research activities), the 
Executive Division for Operations (responsible for the implementation of the agency‘s 
policies in each field and guaranteeing their consistency), the Executive Directorate for 
Territorial Action (in charge of coordinating the different regions in which the ADEME 
is involved), and the Secretariat General (responsible for managing financial and human 
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resources).
1052
 In 2009/2010 a reorganization took place in order to ensure greater 
connection and cooperation between the agency‘s areas of activity.1053 In order to 
ensure this, thematic services were created, addressing issues such as climate change 
and agriculture across the different sectors of agency activity.
1054
  
In 2009 the agency employed more than 900 people (mainly engineers, managers, 
secretaries, and communications, training and documentation officials). The 2009 
budget was €638 million (of which €557 million were allocated to an action budget and 
€81 million for an operating budget), which is comparatively high (see the comparison 
in Chapter Seven).
1055
 The budget of the agency partially consists of money obtained 
through environmental taxes and governmental funds.
1056
 
 
5.1.3 Challenges and criticism 
The creation of two additional environmental institutions, (around the same time as the 
ADEME was founded in 1990/1991), were interpreted as a potential sign of the 
agency‘s weakness.1057 The newly created National Institute of Industrial Environment 
and Risks (Institut National de l’Environnement Industriel et des Risques, INERIS) and 
Ifen (see section 5.3 below) could potentially be competing with ADEME.
1058
 This was 
in addition to worries about the ADEME being a potential competitor to the 
Environment Ministry which led to some tension between the two institutions.
1059
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A senatorial review pointed out that the ADEME has encountered a number of crises 
since its creation.
1060
 The merger of the agencies making up the ADEME led to a 
―culture shock‖ and took some time to be absorbed, affecting the agency‘s internal order 
and efficiency.
1061
 This was followed by a change in the government‘s majorities (and 
priorities) in 1997, affecting the ADEME which was without a president (and 
administrative board) for more than one year.
1062
 Finally, the ADEME lost its financial 
autonomy in 1998 when a general tax on polluting activities (taxe générale sur les 
activités polluantes, TGAP) was introduced which combined those taxes previously 
earmarked to finance the ADEME and now had to be paid to the state instead of the 
ADEME.
1063
 Financing the ADEME through the allocation of a budget in order to make 
up for the loss of money through the introduction of the TGAP was badly executed.
1064
 
It resulted in the gross overvaluation of the agency‘s budget.1065 Thus in 2000, the 
ADEME only used 20 per cent of the funds which it had available.
1066
 Subsequent 
adjustments of the budget were too abrupt, leading to a shortage in agency funds.
1067
 
The agency‘s financial constraints have, on occasion, led to the need to restrict some of 
their programmes.
1068
 The financial crisis of the ADEME was not fully overcome until 
2007.
1069
 
Another criticism of the ADEME is the ongoing set-up of having offices in three 
locations, rather than a single site.
1070
 ADEME defends its existing organizational set-up 
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by pointing out that it functions well and caters for the agency‘s needs.1071 Having 
offices in different locations is regarded by the agency as the logical consequence of the 
merger of the agencies which preceded ADEME with work continuing at their former 
locations.
1072
  
 
5.1.4 Clients and partners 
ADEME provides support for companies addressing their environmental and energy 
needs and concerns (such as waste limitation, energy efficiency, emissions reductions 
and implementing environmental management systems, as well as providing technical 
and methodological aid for project implementation).
1073
 The ADEME also provides 
support for French businesses operating outside France.
1074
 
In order to provide information and advice for the public, the ADEME organizes 
communication campaigns, publishes and circulates brochures and educational material 
and makes available information and publications on its website.
1075
 By keeping the 
public informed of its research activities, the ADEME hopes to show people that they 
respond to their concerns and to facilitate the appropriation of new technologies by the 
public.
1076
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1071
 X. Lefort, Managing Director of ADEME, in: Sénat (2010) 
1072
 Ibid. 
1073
 ADEME (2009a) 
1074
 ADEME (2010b:3) 
1075
 ADEME (2009a) 
1076
 ADEME (2007a:23) 
188 
 
5.1.5 International activity 
Although some of its activity takes place at the European and international level, the 
ADEME is primarily a national agency.
1077
 This means that, in the financial context, 98 
per cent of the agency‘s budget is used nationally.1078 At the international level the 
agency is particularly active in the fields of energy management and waste (due to the 
former agencies making up the ADEME).
1079
 It aims to contribute to the development of 
best practice and knowledge at the European level and describes this task as ‗promoting 
French excellence in Europe‘,1080 aiming to upload their policies to the EU level. At the 
European level, the agency assists national representatives with the preparation of texts, 
monitors and leads programmes involved in the development of EU policies.
1081
 
The ADEME‘s Brussels office works to highlight the value of the agency‘s (and to 
some extent also France‘s) expertise and best practice.1082 Moreover, the Brussels office 
is watching events at the European level, determining which information, developments 
or upcoming legislation could be of interest nationally.
1083
 Within its responsibilities the 
agency contributes to the implementation of European policy. 
The ADEME is active internationally outside the EU as well. It aims to contribute to 
the strengthening of institutional capacity in environmental protection and energy 
management in countries applying for EU membership as well as developing countries 
(in particular the Mediterranean countries, Russia and China) by providing expert 
advice to public bodies on institutional and technical matters.
1084
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The ADEME aims to take global environmental concerns into account and to apply 
international agreements.
1085
 Moreover, the agency works with counterpart agencies in 
other countries (in and outside Europe) through bilateral cooperation agreements (e.g. 
with Germany or China) and takes part in a variety of European and international 
networks (although it is not a member of the EPA network, see Chapter Eight).
1086
 The 
ADEME further participates in the Sustainable Development Commission, the UNECE 
Transboundary Pollution Convention, and the Climate Change Convention, among 
others.
1087
  
 
EEA 
Apart from specific projects (such as energy efficiency indicators) the involvement of 
the ADEME with the EEA remains very limited.
1088
 This is due to the NFP not being 
hosted in the ADEME but another environmental institution, the Ifen (see 5.3 below). 
The ADEME focusses its international activity on energy matters (rather than 
environmental information). But to some extent it is probably also due to the perception 
within the ADEME of the role which the EEA should have had. In 2002, ADEME‘s 
then-president, Pierre Radanne, described the creation of the EEA as a huge failure, 
because of its focus on environmental information and state of the environment 
reporting, rather than an agency concerned with the coordination of national policies.
1089
 
This criticism, however, does not take into account that the coordination (at the 
European level) of national and/or sub-national policies is rarely the task of agencies. 
An EU agency dealing with the coordination of national policies would have been 
practically impossible to establish. It seems misguided to hold it against the EEA that it 
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is not something it was not supposed to be. This is not to say that the wish for more 
coordinated national (environmental) policies does not make sense, but merely that the 
EEA is not the institution which could achieve it.  
 
5.2 The ADEME in the national context 
French political and administrative institutions are characterized by a high degree of 
fluidity. This goes against historical institutionalist expectations of institutional change 
being rare and if it does take place, being gradual and slow. This high degree of change 
is especially prevalent in the environmental field. The reform, restructuring, division or 
fusion of entire ministries is commonly used in order to mirror both governmental and 
programme changes.
1090
 Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet describes this as a French 
characteristic, whereby each government tends to have their political priorities reflected 
by organizational changes which are quite common in the French political system.
1091
 
Larrue and Chabason further describe the complexity of French environmental policies 
and its administration (at all levels) as its main characteristic feature.
1092
 Buller points 
out that environmental policy is positioned uneasily in the French political system 
which remains highly centralised and administered vertically.
1093
 This leads to reform 
attempts taking place regularly. In addition to frequent changes at the ministerial level, 
the French environmental administrative system features quite independent technical 
agencies, such as the ADEME.
1094
 As previously mentioned, the ministry has the 
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legislative responsibility for making the rules, whereas the agencies take on the 
technical and financial functions.
1095
 
 
5.2.1 Environment Ministry 
In France, the first coherent programme for the environment was published by the 
government in 1970.
1096
 This was followed by the creation of the Ministry for the 
Protection of Nature and the Environment (Ministère chargé de la Protection de la 
Nature et de l’Environnement) in 1971.1097 However, the area of responsibilities 
included more problematic tasks such as promoting environmental awareness and 
measures among businesses the industrial field.
1098
 It also lacked important 
competences in areas such as infrastructure, water and energy.
1099
 Moreover, the 
creation of the new ministry did not lead to the creation of new administrative 
arrangements or even a restructuring of the existing ones.
1100
 The only change taking 
place was at the highest level, leading to ongoing commitment to industry, growth and 
infrastructure, rather than environmental concerns.
1101
 The ministry thus had to establish 
itself in the existing and unaccommodating French political system, which was 
especially challenging as, at that time, the creation of new ministries was practically 
unheard of in France and came as a surprise to the existing administration.
1102
 From the 
outset, the challenges of the new ministry were made clear by then-President Georges 
Pompidou who already pointed out the likely lack of resources, influence and the need 
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for long-term vision (to make up for the lack of immediate results).
1103
 Robert Poujade, 
the first environment minister referred to it as ‗the impossible ministry‘1104, which is 
what it was perceived to be at the time.
1105
 On the other hand, however, Poujade also 
pointed out the need for an environment ministry, as difficult as establishing it might 
have been, as environmental issues only began to matter in France after the creation of 
an independent ministry.
1106
 This is in marked contrast to Germany, where 
environmental policy was an important part of the Interior Ministry‘s work before the 
BMU was created. On the other hand, the early creation of the French Environment 
Ministry did not require environmental policy to be addressed by other ministries. Once 
the environment had become an issue at the political level, it began to enter the mind 
sets of the wider public, although the contribution of the Environment Ministry to this 
appears limited.
1107
 
To begin with, the ministry was established as a ministry of mission (ministère de 
mission), primarily aimed at influencing larger, more ―important‖ ministries (such as 
industry or agriculture, to consider pursuing environmental objectives, as well as 
coordinating inter-ministerial actions).
1108
 Having to rely on scientific and technical 
support rather than direct legislative powers, it was mainly concerned with the 
promotion of the environmental agenda within the government and its administrations, 
rather than being responsible for the environment as a distinct policy sector.
1109
 
Moreover, being part of the Prime Minister‘s Office and lacking executive powers, the 
ministry had no administrative capacity on its own to implement environmental policy 
but was dependent on other sectors‘ ministries for the implementation of environmental 
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policy.
1110
 It took about two years for the ministry to establish itself fully.
1111
 Over time 
the powers of the ministry increased in a piecemeal fashion.
1112
 This included gaining 
water pollution control and management functions, the introduction of a more unified 
legislative framework in the field of nature protection (which was introduced with the 
adoption of the Nature Protection Act) and a renewed legitimacy given to the ministry 
due to the increase in EU environmental legislation.
1113
 With the detachment of a 
number of sectors and secretariats from existing ministries, the Environment Ministry 
was given its own administrative branch, although it still had to rely on the local 
services of the ministries of agriculture and industry for local policy implementation.
1114
 
In France the early 1980s also led to a decline in environmental policy development 
due to the economic crisis in the aftermath of the second oil crisis and a lack of public 
support for environmental measures.
1115
 However, economic recovery and the aftermath 
of the 1986 Chernobyl incident led to the re-emergence of environmental consciousness 
and policy.
1116
 In this new political context, competencies of the Environment Ministry 
were increased (especially in the fields of nuclear plant safety, landscape policy, the 
building of infrastructure, coastal zones and mountain area management).  
It was only in the late 1980s that the Environment Ministry has been able to 
consolidate its position within government.
1117
 The position of the ministry was further 
strengthened in the 1990 National Environment Plan (Plan national pour 
l’environnement), which justified the strengthening of the ministry by pointing out the 
need for a properly established and working ministerial structure in the environmental 
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field, which, by then, had become an important area of EU activity as well.
1118
 The 
environment ministry was finally granted proper local services in each region in the 
early 1990s, the Regional Environment Directorates (Directions régionales de 
l’environnement, DIREN).1119  
In the first decade of its existence, the ministry changed its name (and often remit) no 
fewer than seven times, with only the period between 1981-97 offering some 
consistency, if only regarding its name.
1120
 During periods when the environment 
ministry was weak, there was – somewhat understandably – a lack of significant 
environmental policy initiatives.
1121
 The changing status of the minister and ministry of 
the environment reflected to a certain extent the degree and/or lack of importance 
assigned to environmental policy by the various French governments.
1122
 Developments 
in environmental policy at EU-level have had a significant impact on raising the 
ministry‘s profile nationally and increasing its authority.1123 It provided a more 
regulatory role for the ministry, due to its involvement in European environmental 
legislative processes.
1124
 
Moreover, the frequent changes in (name and) status of the ministry show that for a 
long time the environment had not become an established policy area in France.
1125
 On 
the other hand, due to its particular and often changing organization and structure, the 
ministry of the environment has at least been able to adapt to shifting priorities at the 
domestic and European level.
1126
 The Environment Ministry was initially only 
concerned with the environment and nature protection (perceived by its first minister as 
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the best solution for the French set-up), but eventually other policy areas were added, 
leading to the environment becoming one of many policy areas dealt with by the same 
ministry.
1127
 Other changes, taking place around the same time (such as the 
administrative restructuring measures) had only very limited impact.
1128
 In addition to 
working with and alongside other central ministries and being an active player at the 
European and international level, the environment ministry also had to adapt to sharing 
policy space with a number of semi-independent environmental agencies and regional 
levels of government.
1129
  
It is not uncommon for the ministry to argue – nationally and at the European level – 
against official French government views.
1130
 This was the case, for example, regarding 
genetically modified organisms or the initial French response so EU plans regarding the 
Kyoto agreement implementation.
1131
 Despite its importance, the resources directly 
available to the Environment Ministry are very limited (usually around 0.1 per cent of 
state spending).
1132
 Not only does the Environment Ministry occupy a relatively weak 
position when compared to other ministries, important environmental areas (such as 
nuclear power, agricultural pollution control or waste treatment) remain outside the 
ministry‘s remit and influence.1133 Szarka described French environmental policy as 
‗characterized by a mismatch between ambitions and means‘.1134 Although there 
appears to be a long list of Environment Ministry shortcomings, the problems it had to 
face need to be considered in the context of the increasing importance of the 
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environment as a policy area and the learning curve undergone by the ministry while 
experiencing the changes.
 1135
 
Since 2010 the ministry is concerned with the environment, sustainable development, 
transport and housing (Ministère de l'Écologie, du Développement durable, des 
Transports et du Logement). Although over time many different policy areas were 
represented, the overall power of the ministry is not very strong, with the environment 
still being considered a relatively weak area even within the ministry.
1136
 Ministerial 
restructuring does not appear to change the importance given to the environmental 
section of the ministry. 
 
ADEME and the Environment Ministry 
The ADEME takes on the role of advisor to the ministry.
1137
 Szarka described the 
Environment Ministry as having an ‗arm‘s length relation to the ADEME, which, in 
terms of resources and visibility was close to constituting a rival‘1138 during the 1990s. 
Because the Environment Ministry‘s budget was significantly smaller than those of the 
agencies it was feared the ministry‘s capacities would be affected when trying to 
introduce reforms which fall within the remit of the agencies.
1139
 The autonomy enjoyed 
by the ADEME and water agencies (which could levy charges and make use of their 
proceeds) from the ministry for a long time meant that a concentration of resources and 
power was prevented.
1140
 In order to avoid competition or even potential conflict, 
environment ministers tend to seek influence over the ADEME by nominating its chief 
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executives.
1141
 Therefore presidents of the agency tend to be close to government.
1142
 
Changes to ADEME‘s leadership appear to be less frequent than the changes in 
environment ministerial positions. However, ADEME‘s leadership tends to change 
more frequently than that of the UBA or even the EA. An environment ministry official 
described the relation between the ADEME, environment ministry and the decentralised 
services as a set up in which ‗the ministry is the head of the operation, the decentralised 
services are the arms, and the ADEME is their tool‘.1143 
 
 
5.2.2 Regions and local authorities 
In addition to the local services, the regional environment directorates were also given 
environmental protection responsibilities.
1144
 The regional environment directorates are 
located in each of the 22 regions to represent the Environment Ministry in the fields of 
nature conservation, town planning, architecture and (to some degree) water 
coordination.
1145
 These Regional Directorates for Industry, Research and the 
Environment (Directions régionales de l’industrie, de la recherche de l’environnement, 
DRIRE,) and their services were placed under co-jurisdiction of the Environment 
Ministry and the Industry Ministry.
1146
 Industrial pollution, for example is dealt with by 
the DRIRE, rather than the DIREN.
1147
 The ministry‘s field services operate by 
coordinating public and private actors (horizontally) and by collecting and 
disseminating planning information as well as implementing specific programmes 
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(vertically).
1148
 Expanding its institutional capacity was an important aspect of being 
able to enforce the increasing amount of European legislation.
1149
 The actual powers of 
the regional field services DIREN and DRIRE are, however, very limited, which in turn 
affects the ministry‘s ability to use command and control style intervention 
measures.
1150
 
Some of the additional responsibilities in the environmental field have been allocated 
to local, departmental and regional governments. Communes, the local governments 
have only limited involvement in environmental policy, although they do have certain 
duties regarding water delivery, waste-water collection and treatment or municipal 
waste disposal.
1151
 The départements‘ competencies allow little involvement in 
environmental policy.
1152
Although involved in the implementation of environmental 
policy, arrangements vary between regions.
1153
 With the increase of decentralisation 
measures, there is a potential for growing regional ecological disparities, as some local 
governments are heavily involved in environment protection measures, while there are 
others with little or no environmental awareness.
1154
 
 
5.2.3 Plan Vert Initiative 
In the early 1990s France began a process of reforming its institutional environmental 
policy structures referred to as the Plan Vert, (green programme, officially plan national 
pour l’environnement) in order to address its deficits, reactivate French environmental 
policy and raise it to an equal level of environmental policies in other industrialized 
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countries.
1155
 The plan defined objectives that need to be fulfilled, the means to be 
applied in each sector, and put together ambitious objectives and new means for 
national environmental policies.
1156
 This was partly the result of a wider institutional 
and administrative restructuring drive in France, but also due to initiatives to address 
administrations involved in all areas of environmental policy specifically.
1157
 State 
secretary for the environment Brice Lalonde, a former environmental activist, was the 
leading force behind the programme which aimed to improve the general efficiency of 
its environmental administration, whilst also addressing public pressure stemming from 
increased environmental awareness in France.
1158
 
Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet describes the creation and supervisory arrangements of 
the ADEME as the price which Lalonde had to pay in order to secure the introduction of 
other successful measures as part of the Plan Vert.
1159
 Inititally, the agency was placed 
under the joint supervision of the Environment Ministry and the significantly stronger 
Industry Ministry, leading to fears that industrial concerns, rather than environmental 
ones, would dominate the ADEME‘s agenda.1160 
The Plan Vert identified the severe lack of environmental information available as a 
major obstacle to environmental policy in France and French influence in Europe.
1161
 
The creation of ADEME and the Ifen was supposed to lead to the provision of better 
environmental information, thus allowing France to strengthen its position (e.g. in EU 
environmental policy-making).
1162
 The most important result of the Plan Vert was the 
creation of a field service of the Environment Ministry, the DIREN and the regional 
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environmental directorates, which although subordinate to the ministry, were allowed 
increased involvement in the implementation of environmental policy.
1163
 
 
5.2.4 France and EU environmental policy 
Environmental policy at the national level largely emerged around the same time that 
the EU adopted a common environmental policy in the early 1970s.
1164
 However, with 
environmental issues not being high on the domestic political agenda, no (powerful) 
environmental lobby and no well-established corpus of environmental legislation, 
France‘s often reserved involvement in EU environmental policy-making comes as no 
surprise.
1165
 In 2009, almost 80 per cent of environmental legislation in France derived 
from EU environmental laws.
 1166
 French environmental policy has been heavily 
influenced by developments at the EU level, which strengthened (domestic) regulatory 
pressure in favour of the environment.
1167
  
In the past, the French position with regards to EU environmental policy has 
frequently been described as friendly onlooker or coalitionist.
1168
 These descriptors refer 
to the French strategy of taking on a neutral or indifferent position, with the option of 
building coalitions with either the pace-setters or foot-draggers, depending on the 
environmental issue in question. Furthermore, countries in this position tend not to 
promote, initiate or veto specific policies.
1169
 France has acted as a pace-setter only on 
very few occasions while direct acts of defiance have also been rare.
1170
 On occasion 
France‘s position could, however, be seen as giving way to supporting proactive 
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environmental initiatives promoted by other countries.
1171
 In the French case, aiming to 
‗naturalize‘ European measures made them appear relatively easy to accommodate 
domestically, although often costly.
1172
 European measures therefore often required 
little legal and institutional adjustment. Moreover, the multitude of regulatory 
instruments used in France meant that there was no need to try to impose its own 
regulatory approach.
1173
 
In the long term, EU environmental policy had an impact domestically because of its 
substantive content, but also because of its procedural dimension (e.g. being part of 
wide policy networks involving many countries and a range of categories) and 
communicative dimension (e.g. the accumulation of scientific knowledge on the 
environment and its dissemination as institutionalized in specialist agencies, such as the 
EEA).
1174
 But it has also led to expectations for more openness in domestic 
environmental policy-making, as currently addressed in the Grenelle process, which is 
France‘s multi-party environmental forum.1175  
 
Administrative adaptation  
Changes to administrative structures (including ministerial set-ups) are quite common in 
France. The Europeanization of administrative structures in France is therefore harder to 
judge than in countries where administrative systems appear more stable and less prone 
to change such as in Germany. Buller points out that in France ‗internal considerations 
continue to drive the environmental policy agenda and structural and institutional 
adaptations to it‘.1176 Thus the majority of changes taking place within French 
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administrations appear to be the result of governmental preferences, rather than 
European influence. France‘s aim to influence EU developments or promoting French 
excellence in Europe seems to be hindered by the frequency of changes at the national 
level. As opposed to many other traditional sectoral ministries, the Environment 
Ministry‘s structure, policies and style are closer to the emerging European policy-
making model.
1177
 The use of European policy by the Environment Ministry has been 
described as a strategy for greater empowerment.
1178
 However, by the time the ADEME 
was created, EU environmental policy was already well-established. It was therefore 
taken into consideration when ADEME‘s areas of responsibilities were established. 
 
5.3 The Ifen and the Eionet 
Rather than locating the NFP in the (then recently created) ADEME or in the 
Environment Ministry, the creation of a new institution, the French Environment 
Institute, was decided upon.  
 
5.3.1 The creation of the Ifen 
As opposed to most developments which are often hard to attribute to any one 
influence, the creation of the Ifen took place in direct response to European level 
developments; Ifen was set up as the national equivalent to the newly created EEA. 
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Prior to the creation of the Ifen, observation of the environment took place infrequently 
and only in an unsystematic manner.
1179
 There were no coordinating networks and no 
ways of producing series of reliable statistical reports or geographical information.
1180
 
When the creation of the EEA was being discussed in 1989, a range of different 
committees (on environmental research, on the future of statistics, on natural sciences 
and on environmental statistics) decided that it was ‗absolutely necessary‘1181 to create a 
national institute similar to the structure of the EEA.
1182
 Thus the Environment Ministry 
decided to create a French equivalent to the EEA which could deal with the collection 
and dissemination of environmental information independently of the ministry (or DG 
Environment in the case of the EEA).
1183
 Thus, this EU level development had a major 
impact on domestic structures in France, a development contradicting historical 
institutionalist expectations. The Ifen was created in 1991 as part of the Plan Vert, as an 
administrative public agency (Établissement Public à Caractère Administratif) under 
the tutelage of the Environment Ministry for which it acts as its statistics service.
1184
 It 
was decided to locate the new institute outside the ministry, as the ministry did have a 
culture of regulation, rather than a culture of data production, and although the idea had 
been around for a while, it was not until the creation of the EEA that the opportunity to 
realise such an institution arose.
1185
 
The Ifen was located in Orléans. The Council of State (Conseil d’État) which is 
France‘s highest administrative court commented on the creation of the Ifen by 
describing it as an institution (distinguished from the regulatory functions of the 
ministry) appropriate for the production of environmental information and reports on 
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the state of the environment to evaluate policy efficiency.
1186
 As former Ifen director, 
Jacques Varet, pointed out:  
A public agency, where the scientific and financial independence is guaranteed via 
councils/committees offers some additional guarantees to the public that it will 
have a voice independent of the administration in the observation of the effect and 
efficiency of public policy.
1187
  
 
Another reason for setting up the Ifen as an independent agency was the wish to have an 
institution which not only had the ability to comment on the state of the environment, 
but was also equipped with a scientific committee which would ensure the accuracy of 
reports.
1188
 
 
5.3.2 Role of the Ifen 
Generally, the Ifen‘s mandate could be best described as conveying scientific 
publications to the state and the public.
1189
 The Ifen focused on the collection, 
processing and dissemination of environmental data and on information on natural risks 
and technology.
1190
 Its tasks included the assessment of economic costs and impacts of 
environmental developments as well as the costs of preventative, protective and 
restorative measures.
1191
 It further worked on environmental indicators and the 
optimisation of measuring and surveillance techniques.
1192
 In order to achieve this, it 
worked closely with a network of environmental information producers and users.
1193
  
It undertook studies and published summaries on the state of the environment, its 
development and indicators. Ifen also took part in the efforts to harmonize methods of 
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environmental data collection and data processing.
1194
 Its most well known publication 
was the monthly ―4 pages‖ (4 pages de l’Ifen) series which targeted a broad audience by 
describing and explaining environmental issues based on the latest scientific 
findings.
1195
 In addition, major reports on the state of the environment in France were 
published every four years.
1196
 The Ifen did not undertake research of its own.
1197
 
The Ifen proved its ability to produce environmental information independently, with 
the necessary scientific backing ensuring its credibility.
1198
 The scientific committee 
assessed the quality and coherence of Ifen‘s work and passed its opinions on to the 
director and the committees.
1199
 The Ifen also assisted the Environment Ministry with 
its preparations for the French EU presidencies.
1200
 In addition to its role as NFP in the 
EEA‘s Eionet, the Ifen also worked closely with European and international 
organizations (such as Eurostat, OECD and the UN) ensuring French representation in 
their working groups.
1201
 It also took part in international environmental conferences 
and summits as well as bilateral programmes and contributed to discussions on 
statistical regulatory issues in Brussels.
1202
 Moreover, the Ifen took part in programmes 
aimed at helping EU applicants with regard to data-related issues.
1203
 On certain topics, 
the Ifen took part in the technical preparations for national, European and international 
programmes or legislation (such as the EU‘s Infrastructure for Spatial Information in 
Europe, INSPIRE, directive).
1204
 The Ifen was in contact with the environment 
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ministry‘s regional environment directorates, the DIREN.1205 The Ifen‘s organizational 
structure was divided into the following three pillars: (1) general secretariat, (2) 
department of data methods and synthesis (which hosted the international relations unit 
and the NFP), and (3) department of environmental matters.
1206
 The Ifen also worked 
with the EEA on the translation of some publications for the French-speaking 
readership.
1207
 The Ifen provided environmental information via its homepage, where its 
publications could either be accessed online or paper versions could be ordered.
1208
 
From 1991 until 2004 the Ifen represented France in the EPA network (see Chapter 
Eight). 
 
5.3.3 From the Ifen to the SOeS 
The two most important changes to the Ifen were the changes to its statute in 2004 and 
finally its dissolution in 2008. The creation of the Ifen as an administrative public 
agency allowed it a certain degree of administrative and financial autonomy, although it 
was already under the Environment Ministry‘s supervision. Although the ministry 
wanted to be kept informed of planned Ifen publications in advance, it only very rarely 
opposed the publication of data on the grounds that it was considered incorrect or 
embarrassing.
1209
 
The suggested changes to Ifen of attaching it to the ministry (a move strongly 
supported by the Environment Ministry) were opposed by the State Council as well as a 
number of former environment ministers, who wrote to the French President to alert him 
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of the consequences of such a move.
1210
 Nevertheless in 2004 the Ifen‘s statute was 
changed from administrative public agency to that of national competency service 
(Service à Compétence Nationale) which resulted in the Ifen finding itself directly 
attached to the Environment Ministry and becoming part of the central 
administration.
1211
 The role of the Ifen changed massively and the international outlook 
of the agency was lost.
1212
 From an environmental point of view there was no new 
activity or innovation and the Ifen became purely administrative.
1213
 Officially, the 
move was supposed to facilitate the Ifen exercising its tasks and achieving its aims.
1214
 
This might be true for some tasks (such as its regional activity) which the Ifen had 
found hard to set up due to requiring the ministry‘s initiative and agreement for 
cooperation with the DIREN.
1215
 Another advantage was that from 2005 onwards the 
Ifen‘s budget could be solely used on running costs and investments, as personnel costs 
were carried by the ministry.
1216
 The general perception of the changes, however, was 
that of a total loss of independence, as well as significantly weakened links to the 
scientific community and the public.
1217
 Although the scientific committee continued to 
exist, its role had been reduced to that of a procedural council.
1218
 The move further saw 
the abolition of its user committee (consisting of journalists, businesses, consumer 
associations, environmental groups, as well as local representatives) and administration 
council, excluding large parts of civil society from getting involved in its activities.
1219
 
The administration council was replaced by an orientation committee consisting of 
administrative representatives, employee representatives and other qualified officials 
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from the field, giving their opinion on the Ifen‘s programmes.1220 Moreover, 
internationally the Ifen lost the ability to enter into contracts with the EU or the EEA, 
work with them on additional projects (outside the continuing NFP role) or establish 
contractual relations with other public scientific establishments.
1221
 The Ifen had been 
the only French organization set up to produce independent environmental 
evaluations.
1222
 The national environment syndicate describes the dissolution of the Ifen 
as contributing to the weakening of the awareness of environmental problems in 
France.
1223
  
From 2004 onwards, while the Ifen was further integrated into the central 
administration, its liberties have been slowly reduced.
 1224
 In 2008 it eventually became 
part of the Environment Ministry‘s statistical service, the SOeS. It could be argued that 
the creation of the Ifen was too large a departure from French administrative tradition, 
resulting in its de facto dissolution, and cannot be explained from a historical 
institutionalist perspective. The SOeS was created from the Ifen, an economic statistics 
service concerned with construction, housing and transport (Service économie, 
statistiques et prospective) and an energy observatory (Observatoire de l’énergie).1225 
However, on the other hand, one needs to be cautious in concluding that the creation, 
change in statute and demise of the Ifen cannot be explained from the historical 
institutionalism perspective as it does fit well the longstanding tradition in the French 
political system of high flexibility.  
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When asked about the time period it took the Ifen to become fully functional, one 
former Ifen official replied that ‗Ifen was never fully functional‘.1226 Problems had 
existed from the beginning relating to difficulties merging the different cultures 
(statisticians, scientists, technicians, etc.), frequent changes at the directorial level and 
risks taken with regards to the direction the institute was supposed to take.
1227
 Another 
official described the Ifen‘s existence as having had ‗a bad start and a despicable 
end‘.1228 Having a good reputation in the field was not enough to ensure its ongoing 
existence.
1229
 
Prior to the merger, the Environment Ministry was the only ministry with an 
independent statistics service, which is likely to have played a role in the restructuring 
and eventual dissolution of the Ifen.
1230
 Moreover, the central administration was 
opposed to the institute‘s independence and the reasons behind the changes that took 
place have been described as political, rather than practical.
1231
 One might even consider 
the 2004 change in Ifen‘s status and loss of a significant amount of autonomy as the first 
step towards the agency becoming integrated into the ministry.
1232
 
The decree passed in 2008 outlining the dissolution of the Ifen mainly states that the 
Ifen was to become part of the SOeS and the word ―Ifen‖ to be replaced with the 
Observation and Statistics Service of the Environment Ministry. The role of the Ifen‘s 
director was to be replaced by the head of the sustainable development 
commissariat.
1233
 Because the SOeS unites the statistical services of all areas which 
form part of the Environment Ministry, the environment will only be one component of 
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the new service (in addition to energy, transport, etc.).
1234
 While the part of the SOeS 
which used to be the Ifen is still located at Orléans, most of the SOeS is located in Paris, 
resulting in the still remaining culture of the Ifen being less affected by the merger and 
likely to remain present for a longer period due to the geographic distance.
1235
  
The Sustainable Development Commissariat of the Environment Ministry described 
the move from Ifen to SOeS as having less of an impact on the Ifen.
1236
 It considers the 
biggest change to be the move from public agency to national competency service 
which had already taken place four years earlier; it moved the Ifen closer to the 
ministry.
1237
 
 
Box 5.2: Stages in the Ifen‘s development 
 
Stages in the Ifen’s development: 
 
1991-2001: Setting up phase: setting up the Ifen, establishing itself, integrating the 
international dimension (independent) 
2001-2004: Reorganization phase: reorganization of Ifen as an independent agency 
2005-2008: Loss of independence phase: loss of some independence for the Ifen 
which became attached to the Environment Ministry 
Since 2009: Dissolution phase: Ifen became part of the SOeS (which forms part of 
the  Environment Ministry) 
 
Source: Based on interviews with French officials (2009 and 2010) 
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The commissariat also pointed out that the role of the Ifen had not changed.
1238
 
However, during the changes introduced in 2004 and 2008, the loss of independent 
evaluation of the environmental policy was most criticised and regretted.
1239
 Moreover, 
the decree establishing the central organization of the Environment Ministry describes 
the role of the SOeS as supporting and enhancing the general strategy of the ministry, 
managing statistical systems on environmental matters and sustainable development, as 
well as evaluating socio-economic instruments for use in environmental regulation.
1240
 
Although some elements of evaluating the effects of public and private decisions on the 
environment were included, being part of the ministry, such evaluations would not be 
independent. 
Loss of independence aside, becoming part of the SOeS meant that the focus of the 
Ifen on statistics was to be increased.
1241
 Another change was the target group of the 
publications, with the SOeS excluding the public (which the Ifen used to include).
1242
 
The main audience of the SOeS are public authorities and journalists.
1243
 During its 
existence, the Ifen was almost completely independent, but becoming part of a large 
administration (with its attachment to the ministry) in 2004 increased the number of 
stages of validation a potential publication has to go through before it is finally 
published.
1244
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5.3.4 Working of the NFP   
Due to the Ifen having been created as France‘s counterpart to the EEA, it was clear 
from the beginning that it would also be the location of the NFP.
1245
 The Ifen‘s 
international activity is mainly centred around the functions of the NFP, Eionet 
activities and the EEA.
1246
 About 80 per cent of the time, the French NFP official is 
used on the actual NFP work, with a tendency for it to increase.
1247
  
Since 2000, France‘s performance in the Eionet‘s priority data flow has improved 
each year, from 47 per cent in 2000 to 96 per cent in 2009.
1248
 The change from the Ifen 
to the SOeS had no direct impact on France‘s performance in the priority data flow 
which might be due to the same officials still undertaking the work, only within a 
different institutional framework.
1249
 It is also the NFP‘s responsibility to coordinate the 
presence of French representatives at meetings dealing with different environmental 
topics and the preparation of the MB member for the meetings.
1250
 
Prior to becoming part of the SOeS, all the principal contact points were located within 
the Ifen, in order to facilitate the Eionet‘s management.1251 This however, did not work 
out as intended, as the PCPs had major problems in fulfilling their tasks.
1252
 With 
regards to the choice of PCPs the integration into the central administration means that 
people can be chosen from a wider range of officials.
1253
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NRCs 
However, finding the right locations for the NRCs to begin with was slightly more 
complicated and their designations were discussed at length in a special committee in 
the Prime Minister‘s European Affairs Office.1254 Some organizations were keen to 
become NRCs, considering it as prestigious, others were designated by the Environment 
Ministry.
1255
  
While some of the NRCs were located within the Ifen, the majority of NRCs were 
positioned in a range of institutions. The main data providers supporting the Ifen‘s work 
were the ADEME, the water agencies, Ifremer (French Research Institute for 
Exploration of the Sea, l'Institut Francais de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer), 
Citepa (Centre for Interprofessional Study Techniques on Atmospheric Pollution, 
Centre Interprofessionel Technique d’Etudes de la Pollution Atmospherique), BRGM 
(Office for Geological Research and Mining, Bureau de recherches géologiques et 
minières) and MNHN (National Natural History Museum, Muséum national d'histoire 
naturelle).
1256
 While there are some NRCs located in the ADEME (in areas such as air 
and waste), this appeared to have been the only contact point between the Ifen and the 
ADEME.
1257
 
The French part of the Eionet network is somewhat informal, with the participants 
often contributing when they find the time, rather than when their contributions are 
required.
1258
 Apart from being professionally qualified, the people taking on the role of 
NRCs need to want to participate.
1259
 Seeing the data produced being published or 
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contributing to publications is one way of adding value to their work, which means data 
producers were usually interested in providing the information that was required.
1260
 
With the Ifen initially not being part of the central administration, it lacked the 
political weight to allocate the work and demand the results.
1261
 Initially, the NRCs 
were very keen to be involved, which is important as the Eionet functions without legal 
obligations (as opposed to Eurostat which can obtain their results through regulation 
which is binding in the member states).
1262
 But the EEA‘s system of distributing overall 
percentages (in the annual priority data flow  performance publications) worked quite 
well in the French Eionet set-up, as bad performances would lead to questions about the 
NFP‘s/NRCs‘ work from the Environment Ministry.1263 
 
ETCs 
A former Ifen official described the French position with regards to the distribution of 
ETCs as ‗too ambitious‘,1264 referring to the number of ETCs France was aiming for 
when the EEA set up the Eionet. The Environment Ministry wanted the MNHN to be 
the ETC for Nature. Ifen officials involved with the CORINE landcover programme 
were also keen on getting the ETC for land cover, although there was only a limited 
number of ETCs to be allocated among all the member countries.
1265
 Finally there was 
strong lobbying from the powerful French water companies to the director of the Prime 
Minister‘s Cabinet, who wanted the ETC for water to be located in France as well, 
despite not knowing what exactly was involved in the work of the ETCs, let alone the 
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Eionet.
1266
 Although the ETC for Nature had been allocated to France already, French 
officials were expected to try and get the one for water as well, simply because they had 
political instructions to get it.
1267
 Eventually the ETC for water was located in the UK, 
while offering a leading position to a French official, whose post was financed by the 
French water agencies.
1268
 
 
The NFP and the management board member 
While the Ifen considered the contact to the EEA and other members of its networks as 
important and valuable, there appeared to be a certain disinterest on behalf of the 
ministry with regards to the work of the EEA.
1269
 This was reflected in the poor working 
relationship between the NFP and the French MB member.
1270
 This was related to a 
general difficulty in France to create and maintain structures managing and coordinating 
more technical relations at an international level.
1271
 
 
Challenges 
To begin, with the organization of the Eionet‘s data flows caused some problems, not 
just on Ifen‘s part but also from the EEA‘s perspective, regarding the speed of setting up 
its own database.
1272
 The loss of the link to the scientific community after the 
dissolution of the Ifen led to a perceived need to re-connect the SOeS with the scientific 
research community.
1273
 However, this connection does not appear to be part of the 
ministry‘s intentions for the service. 
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Outside the Ifen and specific departments in the ministry, the EEA is not well-known 
in France and within the French administration.
1274
 One problem likely to play a role in 
the lack of knowledge about the EEA is the language barrier, and the EEA‘s 
publications often being published in English only, which can often prove to be an 
issue.
1275
 While this might to some degree affect the general public, it is also of 
importance for the participants of the Eionet in France.  
 
Effect of changes on NFP work  
In the past, one of the challenges faced by the Ifen was how it was perceived by other 
institutions.
1276
 It was not considered to be a part of the central administration, which 
complicated the work of the NFP in particular.
1277
 The closeness and – at least in theory 
– facilitated access to statisticians from other areas (such as transport and water) has 
been perceived as an advantage of becoming part of the ministry.
1278
 But the 24 
different topics the Eionet deals with were almost entirely represented at the Ifen, 
whereas some areas now require cooperation within different units of the ministry.
1279
 
With the SOeS (and therefore NFP) being located relatively far down in the 
administrative hierarchy, contacting other services, departments or units from which 
data might be needed, often requires going via the Sustainable Development 
Commissariat of the central administration.
1280
 While in reality short cuts are being used 
frequently, and there is also the option of creating some sort of network within the 
administration facilitating NFP work, it has led to the suggestion that being located 
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higher up the administrative hierarchy might facilitate the NFP‘s work.1281 The extent to 
which the NFP needs to follow procedures is related to how much responsibility and 
freedom it will be attributed.
1282
 Moreover, the overall position of the SOeS within the 
ministry gives the NFP very little political weight, or at least not as much as would be 
required.
1283
 On the other hand, the location within the statistical service is perceived as 
ideal for the fulfilment of the NFP tasks.
1284
 
It is still too early to tell whether the new location of the NFP allows it to function 
more efficiently. However, first impressions indicate improvements.
1285
 This is 
supported by the ongoing improvement of France‘s performance in the Eionet‘s priority 
data flow (89 per cent in 2007, 94 per cent in 2008, and 96 per cent in 2009) despite the 
above mentioned rearrangements.
1286
 
 
5.3.5 Effects of Eionet participation on the French administrative system 
Technological innovations rather than the creation of the EEA have been identified as 
the main driver for change to the reporting of environmental data in France.
1287
 This 
was partly due to general technological advances as well as those introduced by the 
EEA which were required to be used by Eionet members. 
While the effects of the creation of the EEA and the participation in the Eionet on the 
French Environment Ministry and the ADEME are somewhat limited, it had nonetheless 
a significant impact on institutional structures in the environmental field in France. Of 
the three case countries assessed in this dissertation, the French case is the only one in 
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which the creation of the EEA at the European level directly resulted in the creation of a 
new national institution. It is difficult to establish to what extent the creation of the EEA 
and the requirements for participation in the Eionet have been the reason or catalyst for 
national developments, as the need for better environmental information in France had 
previously been identified and administrative structures (including those of the 
ministries) appear more readily changeable than in other countries. 
Due to not being well-known, the EEA has little impact or influence on the work of 
the Ifen and now the SOeS and even less on the central administration in France.
1288
 
There is ongoing interest from the scientific community regarding the work of the EEA, 
however, and increasingly from journalists as well.
1289
 Among the general public the 
EEA is not well-known at all.
1290
 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
When looking at the literature addressing EU environmental policy-making, France is 
rarely mentioned as a significant actor. Instead it is often seen but as taking on a role of 
an actor somewhere in the middle between environmental leader and laggard states. 
This is in contrast to the importance EU environmental policy occupies in 
environmental institutions and administrations in France, which are keen to play an 
important role on both the EU and international levels. The ADEME‘s decision to have 
a (small) European office in Brussels further underlines the importance it ascribes to 
EU-level environmental policy developments. However, despite the best efforts within 
environmental institutions, the lack of importance often assigned to environmental 
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issues by past French governments is reflected by the role France has traditionally taken 
at the EU level.  
The impact of EU environmental policy on French environmental policy is 
undeniably high and the Europeanization of environmental policy has been significant. 
The impact on the French institutional landscape (with the exception of the Ifen) is less 
obvious, mainly because the French readiness and openness for institutional change 
makes less obvious changes within domestic institutions harder, if not impossible, to 
trace and to attribute to particular causes. Buller points out that 
accounts of the political development of the environment within France still pay 
scant attention to the direct or indirect influence of the EU, though this tendency is 
not limited to the environmental policy domain.
1291
  
 
The impact of the EU on French environmental policy is far easier to assess than the 
effect of European developments on national institutions. Moreover, the 
Europeanization of French environmental policy had a significant strengthening impact 
on the role which the Environment Ministry was able to play domestically. This does 
not appear to be the case for ADEME and Ifen. 
When considering the first hypothesis stating that the creation of the EEA has only 
had a limited impact on national environment agencies in relation to the two French 
environmental agencies addressed in this chapter, stark differences become apparent. 
Although having been affected by Europeanization, the ADEME has been unaffected by 
the creation of the EEA and the Eionet. Cooperation between the ADEME and EEA is 
very limited, despite some of the Eionet‘s NRCs being located in ADEME. The Ifen, on 
the other hand, owes its existence to the creation of the EEA, to which it was supposed 
to be the counterpart at the national level.  
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When applying Bulmer and Burch‘s conceptual dimensions for establishing 
institutional change,
1292
 it can be concluded that the creation of the EEA has not resulted 
in significant changes to the overall French political system. However, in contrast to the 
other two countries considered in this thesis, the EEA‘s creation has, in the French case, 
led to changes in organizations by leading to the creation of a whole new institution. It 
has also triggered changes to processes (such as accommodating the Ifen) and regulation 
(such as the regulation establishing the Ifen). This impact is even more surprising, as the 
legislation creating the EEA and the participation in its Eionet does not require such 
actions from its member countries. As long as the roles within the network are allocated 
nationally and the reporting obligations are being met through whichever arrangement 
established in the member countries, they have fulfilled their duty. 
Applying Börzel and Risse‘s classification1293, some transformation did take place, 
not of the whole political system, but of the environmental institutional landscape. 
When looking at the vertical level, the creation of the EEA initially added an extra 
dimension to the existing institutions through the creation of the Ifen. Already by 
changing the Ifen‘s statute, this extra dimension was reduced as it was under closer 
control of the Environment Ministry, lost its independence and was completely removed 
from the institutional landscape four years later with the Ifen becoming part of the 
SOeS. Horizontally, as with the other EEA member countries, the Eionet linked national 
experts internationally and nationally through their participation as NRCs in the Eionet.  
A change as significant as the creation of a whole new institution as a response to the 
creation of the EEA disproves the hypothesis expecting the EEA‘s creation to have had 
only a limited impact on the member countries. Thus the theoretical literature from 
which the hypothesis is derived might require modification or the hypothesis might 
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require combining with a different theory. This will be further discussed in the 
comparative chapter (Chapter Seven) and the conclusion (Chapter Nine). 
Moreover, displaying a higher degree of fluidity regarding administrative structures 
suggests that requirements resulting from EU membership or developments such as the 
creation of the EEA are more easily accommodated, even if they require significant 
changes to existing domestic structures. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet points out that the 
creation of new structures, such as the ADEME, Ifen and INERIS is a typically French 
reaction to a new challenge, which responds to a newly emerging problem with 
institutional differentiation.
1294
 However, the creation of new public bodies appeared to 
be some sort of compromise, which does nothing to remove the environment from its 
subordinate position.
1295
 
The creation of the Ifen represents a significant impact on the French administrative 
system as it was the creation of the EEA which led to the creation of the Ifen in the first 
place. The changes taking place to the Ifen‘s status and its eventual dissolution, 
however, are due to national developments and preferences. The openness to 
institutional change not only allowed the Ifen‘s creation but also facilitated the change 
of its statute and dissolution and absorption into the Environment Ministry‘s statistical 
services.  
It is still too early to assess how the move from Ifen to SOeS will affect the work of 
the NFP overall. When simply looking at the performance in the priority data flow, 
French performance continues to improve. 
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Chapter 6: The Environment Agency of England and Wales 
 
6.1 The Environment Agency 
This chapter looks at the role of the Environment Agency of England and Wales and the 
British set-up for participation in the Eionet at Defra. It therefore does not include a 
focus on the SEPA. 
 
6.1.1 Pre-creation 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of new organizations were created, which 
would eventually be combined to form the core of the EA. With the focus of this 
chapter being on the EA, only the immediate predecessors (some of which go back as 
far as the nineteenth century) eventually making up this agency will be considered.
1296
 
The relatively late creation of a unified EA of England and Wales needs to be 
considered in the context of previously existing environmental protection bodies, 
namely the NRA, HMIP and WRAs. 
 
HMIP 
In 1987, HMIP was created by combining previously separate inspectorates for 
industrial air pollution, radiochemical, hazardous waste and water pollution.
1297
 HMIP 
was part of the DoE.
1298
 It was responsible for the regulation of polluting discharges to 
air, water and land.
1299
 Integrating pollution control responsibilities in a single body had 
been called for by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) since the 
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mid-1970s.
1300
 However, it took many more years, inter-departmental disputes, pressure 
resulting from embarrassing pollution incidents and the European Commission before 
HMIP was established.
1301
  By 1987, new issues had arrived on the environmental 
regulation agenda and some of the traditional operating assumptions had become 
outdated, leading to HMIP struggling to define its role and mode of operation in the first 
five years of its existence.
1302
 The increasing importance of EU environmental policy 
had also not been anticipated during the design and creation of the inspectorate.
1303
 
The principle employed by HMIP to address pollution discharges into the whole of 
the environment was the principle of best practicable environmental option (BPEO) 
which replaced the previously used principle of best practicable means (BPM).
1304
 
Although prosecution of offenders was an option for HMIP, it was only used as a last 
resort.
1305
 Difficulties faced by the inspectorate included problems regarding the 
coordination of its inherited operation practice traditions and underfunding.
1306
 As a 
result HMIP‘s regulatory record was considered patchy.1307 
 
NRA  
The NRA was created under the 1989 Water Act following criticism by the European 
Commission (amongst others) of the decision to privatise of the water industry as it was 
argued this would lead to problems in the implementation of EU legislation.
1308
 In 
contrast to HMIP, the NRA‘s size was described as ‗enormous‘1309 and it was created as 
a non-departmental body with its own board, although it was still accountable to 
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Parliament via the DoE.
1310
 Additionally, the NRA was also independent from the water 
companies, which it had to regulate and was keen to display its regulatory 
independence.
1311
 The NRA‘s implementation style was more adversarial than those of 
its predecessors.
1312
 Prior to the NRA‘s creation, the water authorities were responsible 
for protecting the water environment, but they were also major polluters (e.g. through 
sewerage), with the NRA separating operational and regulatory functions.
1313
 The NRA 
also addressed the previously uneven system of consent discharges and policy 
implementation across England and Wales.
1314
  
The NRA‘s main functions were flood defence, coastal protection, water resource 
management, pollution control, fisheries, navigation on certain rivers, as well as 
recreation and conservation.
1315
 The NRA managed to establish itself through having a 
powerful presence and being highly influential in the emerging pattern of pollution 
control.
1316
 Although pollution control was its main function, the NRA became 
renowned for its readiness to prosecute polluters with, often substantial, fines following 
pollution incidents.
1317
 The NRA was not only significantly larger than HMIP, it also 
had a much higher public profile.
1318
 
 
WRAs 
WRAs were responsible for the safe treatment and disposal of controlled waste 
(including household waste and waste produced by agriculture, mines and quarries).
1319
 
The 1990 Environmental Protection Act further established Waste Collection 
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Authorities and Waste Disposal Authorities, which remained part of local government, 
authorities or local contractors.
1320
 The creation of the EA has been described as ‗a 
merger of 83 organizations‘1321 due to the 81 WRAs (which were combined with the 
NRA and HMIP) all functioning very differently from each other, further complicating 
the shaping of the EA into a single organization.
1322
 
Calls for reform in general and a unified agency in particular were supported by 
shortcomings in the then existing set-ups, which included the duplication of some 
powers (resulting in unnecessary administrative costs for regulators and the regulated), 
considerable room for regulatory discretion leading to uncertainties regarding the 
behaviour of the enforcer, competition between regulatory bodies (resulting in a lack of 
agreement on regulatory priorities), diminished supply of employees and loopholes 
(allowing the polluters to play regulators off against each other).
1323
 An internal dispute 
between the NRA, DoE and MAFF (the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) 
was largely responsible for the delay in the setting up of a single environment 
agency.
1324
 
 
6.1.2 Creation of the EA 
There had been demands for a single unified environment agency since the mid-1970s, 
when the existing RCEP called for the integration of functions then carried out by a 
number of disparate organizations and the House of Commons Select Committee on the 
Environment also proposed the setting up of an environment agency in 1976.
1325
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In 1990, the Conservative government issued a White Paper on the Environment 
entitled This Common Inheritance, which was followed by policy documents from the 
opposition parties (An Earthly Chance by Labour and What Price Our Planet? by the 
Liberal Democrats), which outlined their commitment to major institutional reforms.
1326
 
This led to a change of the government‘s position, with John Major in his first speech 
on the environment as Prime Minister in July 1991 arguing that ‗it is right that the 
integrity and indivisibility of the environment should now be reflected in a unified 
agency‘.1327 He also announced that the government was intending ‗to create a new 
agency for environmental protection and enhancement‘.1328 
However, once the creation of such an agency had been decided, the appropriate 
institutional structure had to be determined.
1329
 The 1991 Green Paper on Improving 
Environmental Quality: The Government’s Proposal for a New, Independent 
Environment Agency listed four possible options for the design of the agency to be 
considered
1330
:  The first option suggested the combination of HMIP and waste 
regulation to create an environmental agency catering for air and land, with a separate 
NRA, which would be allocated HMIP‘s water responsibilities. The second option was 
the creation of an umbrella organization with a common board which would oversee the 
functions of the otherwise separate NRA and HMIP, with waste management becoming 
the responsibility of the latter. The third – and chosen – option was the creation of a 
fully integrated agency which included operational, regulatory and enforcement 
activities of HMIP, NRA and WRAs. The fourth and final option was the combination 
of HMIP, WRAs and the NRA‘s regulatory and enforcement activities, with the NRA 
continuing to exist, but focussing on its operational activities. Moreover, the role of 
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local government in environmental matters and whether or not the NRA was going to be 
divided were important debates which took place at the time.
1331
 
Proponents of the creation of a single unified environment agency stressed the need 
for greater consistency in regulation, the improved ability of a high profile organization 
to ensure its independence, having a single environmental regulator or one-stop shop 
and the need to look at the sum of companies‘ pollutants.1332 The opponents of a single 
unified environment agency, on the other hand, stressed the higher flexibility of small 
specialist bodies to adapt; they considered cross-sectoral regulation as too complex for a 
single body and wanted to shift the focus on integrating the environment into sectoral 
policies.
1333
 When creating the EA, the government described its main purpose was ‗to 
enable the functions vested in it to be carried out in a way which brought greater overall 
benefit for the environment as a whole‘.1334 The 1995 Environment Act established the 
EA of England and Wales and the SEPA. It describes the principal aim and objectives 
of the EA as  
to protect or enhance the environment, taken as a whole, as to make the 
contribution towards attaining the objective of achieving sustainable 
development.
1335
  
 
The act further lists the areas of agency responsibilities. 
The EA was created as a non-departmental public body and began its work in April 
1996. Although it is considered as independent, some dependencies remain such as the 
accountability to Parliament or depending on Defra (its overseeing department) for the 
allocation of its budget.
1336
 The EA is located in Bristol, although some headquarter 
functions (such as the parliamentary and media relations work) are located in 
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London.
1337
 The EA also has a main office in Cardiff (EA Wales) and seven regional 
offices in England.
1338
 
 
6.1.3 Role of the EA 
The 2006 Report on the EA by the House of Commons‘ Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs Committee states that ‗the Environment Agency is the leading public body 
protecting and improving the environment in England and Wales‘.1339 The agency‘s 
main aims are the protection and improvement of the environment while promoting 
sustainable development.
1340
 It describes its vision as creating ‗a better place for people 
and wildlife, for present and for future generations‘.1341 The EA‘s work is largely based 
on the delivery of environmental priorities set out by the central government and the 
Welsh Assembly.
1342
 It acts as environmental regulator and operator, monitors the state 
of the environment, and advises on the development of environmental policy.
1343
  
A former EA chairman, Sir John Harman, pointed out that regulation protects the 
environment and health.
1344
 Additionally, environmental regulation should also aim to 
shape economic developments to increase resource efficiency, and thus be involved in 
economic processes as well.
1345
 The agency takes part in an ongoing effort to improve 
regulation.
1346
 In the draft of its corporate strategy for 2010-2015, the EA states that its 
principal aims are ‗to protect and improve the environment, and to promote sustainable 
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development‘.1347 The EA thus aims to consider environmental protection and 
improvement in relation to the social and economic impact of its decisions.
1348
 The EA 
considers these aims to be its primary purpose.
1349
 The draft corporate strategy further 
highlights the central role played by the agency in delivering the environmental 
priorities of the central government and the Welsh Assembly.
1350
  
 
Box 6.1: The EA‘s roles and responsibilities 
 
The EA’s roles and responsibilities:  
 Modern regulator: Risk-based, proportionate approach, driving for 
improvements and taking action when acceptable standards are not being 
met. 
 Efficient operator: Taking local action to improve and protect the 
environment. 
 Influential advisor: Advising government at all levels (EU, national, 
regional and local) on development and implementation of environmental 
strategy and policy.  
 Active communicator: Promoting environmental information, reporting 
on the state of the environment, participating in public debate, engaging 
with local authorities and communities, regional bodies, industry and other 
stakeholders. 
 Champion of the environment: Promotion of the safeguarding and 
improvement of the environment. 
 
Source: The Environment Agency’s Corporate Strategy 2002-2007: Making it happen 1351 
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The functions and duties of the agency as set out in the management statements, which 
are issued to the EA by Defra and the Welsh Assembly, have been categorized as flood 
defence, water resources, water quality, waste management, process industry regulation, 
fisheries, radioactive substances, land contamination, navigation, recreation, and 
conservation.
1352
 In its environmental vision, published in 2000, the EA further lists its 
areas of activity as: a better quality of life, enhancing the environment for wildlife, 
improving air quality, protecting and improving inland and coastal waters, improving 
soil quality, greening the business world, promoting sustainable use of natural 
resources, trying to limit and adapt to climate change.
1353
 The EA also plays an 
important role with regards to environmental information. It has statutory 
responsibilities involving assembling and disseminating environmental data, 
communicating on the general state of the environment, assessing the impacts of 
pollution, and promoting an understanding of methods for environmental protection.
1354
 
In its role as environmental advisor, the agency takes an independent knowledge-
based approach.
1355
 The EA not only advises businesses on environmental issues, it also 
offers expert advice to the government for which it is one of the main sources of 
information when developing new environmental policies and strategies.
1356
 Apart from 
cooperating with Defra and the Welsh Assembly, the EA is also expected to work 
closely with other government departments and statutory agencies as well as a wide 
range of partners in the public, private and voluntary sectors.
1357
 Defra suggests that the 
EA ‗should strive to maintain itself as a recognised centre of knowledge and expertise 
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within its areas of responsibility‘.1358 Moreover, the inclusion of the EA as an advisor in 
the early stages of policy-making is important, as due to its involvement in the 
implementation process, the EA cannot afford to give impractical advice.
1359
 While it 
might seem straightforward to judge the agency‘s work and efficiency based on the 
numbers of prosecutions it makes, it has been suggested that the EA should be assessed 
based on trends in environmental quality (in addition to the number of notices it 
serves).
1360
 
The simultaneously created SEPA was allocated additional powers (such as local 
authority environmental health officers dealing with air pollution) due to political 
factors and the wish to avoid party-internal opposition from local authorities.
1361
 The 
EA works a lot with SEPA and practical collaboration, particularly in the border region 
has been described as very good.
1362
 
 
Importance  
Not only is the EA – according to its own statement – the biggest organization 
protecting and improving the environment in England and Wales, it is also the largest 
agency of this type in Europe and the second largest in the world.
1363
 In 2000, a report 
on the EA by the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee highlighted 
the central importance of the agency‘s role:  
the extreme importance of the role which the Agency has to play. Environmental 
protection and enhancement are at the heart of sustainable development: as the 
Government recognised in its Sustainable Development Strategy, a damaged 
environment impairs quality of life and, at worst, may threaten long term economic 
growth. The Agency, placed as it is at the point where business and the 
environment meet, should be at the forefront of the move towards sustainable 
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development. We look forward to seeing an Environment Agency which takes its 
place as the leading organization in the process of attaining that goal.
1364
   
 
The agency‘s strength and size further reduces the risk of it being broken up in the 
future.
1365
 Moreover, as former EA chairman Sir John Harman points out, the length of 
time it took for the EA to become a unified agency and fully integrate all of the 
processes leads to a situation where, in the near future, ‗breaking up the EA is unlikely 
to happen for reasons of cost and purpose‘.1366 
 
Organizational structure 
When the EA was created, a matrix structure was introduced, organized around nine 
over-arching themes, involving regional and area actors aiming for a more integrated 
approach to regulation.
1367
 In 2002, EA management restructured the agency into a 
policy setting unit and a policy translation unit giving instructions to the regions and the 
science department.
1368
 
The EA is run by an appointed board consisting of the chairman, the deputy 
chairman and between eight and 15 members (14 in 2009), all appointed by the 
Secretary of State (with the exception of one board member who is appointed by the 
Welsh Assembly).
1369
 The board‘s collective responsibility includes taking decisions on 
the EA‘s overall strategic direction, shaping its policies, promoting its policies to 
external audiences, ensuring that agency activities and policies are consistent with 
existing legislation, and approving annual reports and accounts.
1370
 The agency‘s 
chairman is appointed by the Secretary of State and is responsible for the EA‘s overall 
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direction and management, as well as ensuring the effectiveness of the board.
1371
 The 
agency‘s matrix management structure does provide consistency, although it has been 
criticised for lacking flexibility.
1372
 
The EA‘s chief executive is responsible for the overall organization, management 
and staffing of the agency, advising the board, acting as the agency‘s accounting officer 
(answerable to Parliament and Defra), and developing the agency‘s five-year corporate 
strategies.
1373
 The chief executive and the agency‘s directors are responsible for 
ensuring that the EA‘s policies are carried out across the country.1374 
In 2008, the EA had around 12,500 staff and an annual budget of around £1.1 billion, 
making it the largest (in addition to also being the most powerful) environment agency 
in Europe.
1375
 As a public body, the EA receives most of its funding from Defra (around 
60 per cent), with the rest mainly coming from various charging schemes.
1376
 However, 
cuts to the Defra‘s budget are highly likely also to affect the EA to a certain extent. 
 
6.1.4 Changes and challenges 
The EA appears to be restructuring frequently, particularly during the first decade of its 
existence.
1377
 One British official interviewed pointed out that it took roughly until 2000 
to shape the EA into a single organization and that the agency changed beyond 
recognition between 1996 and 2010.
1378
 A lot of the changes undertaken were 
restructuring measures in order to create a unified agency, able to fulfil its role.
1379
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Box 6.2: Stages in the EA‘s development 
 
Stages in the Environment Agency’s development: 
1996-1998: organizational amalgamation: bringing the NRA, HMIP and WRAs 
together 
1999-2001: real integration of different policy areas, separating authorisation 
and enforcement functions 
2002-2004: EA‘s Better Regulation Improving The Environment (BRITE) 
Programme (restructuring the headquarters into three strands to 
ensure consistency), acquiring of new policy functions 
Since 2005: work on making national processes consistent, greater involvement 
at EU level 
 
Sources: Interview British official (2010b), Zito (2009a:32), ENDS Report 372 (2006a:51) 
 
Although the EA was never ‗supposed to look beyond these shores‘1380, eventually it 
became obvious that the EA needed to be more involved in the early stages of EU 
environmental policy-making. The need to include practitioners from the beginning of 
the procedures was eventually recognized about ten years after the EA‘s creation.1381  
Because the creation of the EA involved the merging of two major and a large 
number of smaller well-established organizations, a number of difficulties were 
encountered in getting the agency up and running (according to its remit as set out in the 
1995 Environment Act). Zito points out that officials in each of the organizations 
making up the EA were hoping that the new agency would reflect the main 
organizational characteristics of their respective institution.
1382
 Due to the differences in 
size of the organizations which were combined to form the EA, it comes as no surprise 
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that the new agency (and its board) were dominated by ex-NRA officials.
1383
 The 
resulting concerns raised by former HMIP and WRAs employees about being swamped 
by the NRA‘s culture were comprehensible.1384 
Although it has taken longer than originally expected for the combined bodies to 
form a cohesive agency, it has to be pointed out that expectations were very high, to the 
point of being unrealistic.
1385
 Some review processes took place very early, perhaps not 
giving the agency sufficient time and failing to take into account its relatively young 
age. On the other hand, it might be an advantage to identify early on those areas where 
the agency was seen to be falling behind expectations or failing altogether, so that 
improvements could be made before ineffective procedures became established. The 
report of the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee on the EA, 
published in 2000, criticises the agency in a number of areas, most notably for lacking a 
coherent vision, failures as regulator, a low public profile and lack of accountability.
1386
 
McMahon suggests that the lack of a sense of mission in the EA can be traced back to 
its creation which was seen as necessary to increase administrative efficiency rather 
than create an agency for the environment.
1387
 
However, as Bell and Gray point out, many of these criticisms do not take into 
account all the circumstances surrounding the agency‘s ―failures‖.1388 Thus the EA, 
suffering from a lack of an integrated vision, does not sufficiently take into account the 
diverse nature of the agency and the background of its staff.
1389
 It also ignores the 
impact of trying to incorporate the (changing and complex) concept of sustainable 
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development.
1390
 Bell and Gray further point out that environmental protection is not the 
same as the promotion of sustainable development and that, while the agency might be 
able to contribute to both, tensions between these two continue to exist.
1391
  The EA‘s 
low public profile can be attributed to the attitudes of both the agency‘s first chairman 
and chief executive and its dependence on Defra, from which it received large parts of 
its budget (although the Welsh Assembly also made some budget contributions).
1392
 
With regards to the claim that the EA failed as a regulator, Bell and Gray point out that 
in addition to an inappropriate management system, poor management and a flawed pay 
system, some of the reasons for the EA‘s performance are external (including 
underfunding, ring-fenced funding and inadequate legislation).
1393
 Finally, the EA was 
accused of lacking accountability, particularly regarding its lack of transparency and the 
way it deals with its stakeholders, who tend not to feel involved and informed 
enough.
1394
 Bell and Gray have pointed out that the causes for the agency‘s 
shortcomings and the changes it was implementing in order to improve its performance 
were not sufficiently taken into account in the review.
1395
  
Another major challenge the agency faces in its work is that of combining its role as 
regulator with that of ‗Champion of the Environment‘. In reviews of the EA, some of its 
stakeholders expressed the view that the agency struggles to combine both roles and that 
a clearer distinction between its functions would be desirable.
1396
 Moreover, the 
difficulty of a single body combining the role of advisor and prosecutor has been 
pointed out.
1397
 Enterprises occasionally refrain from accessing EA out of fear of 
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prosecution when trying to comply with existing legislation or following the 
introduction of new legislative measures.
1398
  
The EA has almost continuously found itself facing significant budgetary constraints, 
resulting in the agency having to change its priorities, outlook and in some cases abolish 
certain organizational levels (such as national centres).
1399
 Its financial position was 
worsened by external events (such as the 2007 floods) and budgetary constraints faced 
by Defra which have a knock-on effect on the agency‘s budget.1400 
Another problem faced by the EA is the difficulty it has been experiencing in 
recruiting specialist staff.
1401
 This is due not only to a technical skills shortage in the 
areas needed (mainly flood risk engineering, hydrology or geomorphology), but also the 
insufficient reflection of the importance of these positions in the agency‘s pay 
structure.
1402
 Contributions to the 2006 EA review considered the lack of specialist staff 
as ‗one of the agency‘s most significant drawbacks‘.1403 It has often been pointed out 
that although the level of pay is high enough to attract university graduates, it is not 
sufficient to attract (and retain) experienced professionals, who would be required in 
order to maintain the quality of its services.
1404
 
These issues might be resolved over time as the creation of the EA took place during 
unprecedented organizational reforms in Britain.
1405
 The EA has to find its own way as 
it does not fit as well into Britain‘s traditional administrative culture as its 
predecessors.
1406
 
 
                                                 
1398
 House of Commons (2006a:13) 
1399
 Zito (2009a:33) 
1400
 Ibid.:33 
1401
 House of Commons (2006a:19)  
1402
 Ibid.:19 
1403
 Ibid.:19 
1404
 ENDS Report 257 (1996:3) 
1405
 Flynn (2007:750) 
1406
 Ibid.:750 
238 
 
6.1.5 Partners and clients 
Business and industry 
The EA generally attempts to take on the role of educator to business (a tradition 
followed on from the working style of HMIP).
1407
 However, this approach is not 
successful in all cases and the agency also (often in parallel to issuing fines and 
prosecution) produces its annual Spotlight on Business report which is a high profile 
name and shame campaign publicising major polluters.
1408
 Since it was first published 
in 1999, the Spotlight reports have developed into an assessment of business 
performance, companies‘ environmental management, pollution incidents and 
information on prosecutions.
1409
 Evaluations of the Spotlight reports point to steady 
improvements in business performance.
1410
 Flynn points out that most businesses will 
not have noticed differences in the way in which they are regulated since the move from 
the EA‘s predecessors to the agency.1411 
While many small and medium enterprises would welcome working more closely 
with the EA, the agency points out that it is impossible to give tailored advice to every 
single business on every environmental issue, taking on the role of a consultant, when it 
is up to the businesses themselves to understand and fulfil their environmental 
responsibilities.
1412
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The public 
A 2001 Defra survey of public environmental attitudes revealed that environmental 
issues remain a major concern for the public in England and Wales.
1413
 Looking at 
earlier reviews and statements of the EA, a shift appears to have taken place from a 
mainly regulatory approach to a larger focus on working with the public. The agency is 
supposed to act as a citizen‘s friend through its actions to protect the environment.1414 
However, although its actions usually automatically fulfil that role, the EA does not 
always appear to be perceived like this by the public.  
The area the agency appears to have had most success in raising its public profile is 
its flood defence work.
1415
 In addition, the EA constantly works on the development of 
information and education programmes on its website and through its annual State of 
the Environment Reports (which, however, do not exclusively target the public as their 
main audience).
1416
 In the first years of its existence, the EA was criticised for not 
targeting the public enough and the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs 
Committee stated in its 2000 review that it 
would like to see the Agency engage more vigorously in public debate and raise its 
profile on matters of importance where protection and enhancement of the 
environment and sustainable development are concerned.
1417
  
 
It is, however, important to bear in mind that the EA is first and foremost a regulatory 
agency. This is not to say that its role in informing the public is less important nor that it 
should not be one of the agency‘s main concerns. Dr. Paul Leinster, the Agency‘s Chief 
Executive wanted the EA to more actively engage with the public, creating partnerships 
through dialogue with communities.
1418
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6.1.6 International activity 
Part of the work of the EA‘s EU and international relations team is concerned with the 
facilitation of the EA‘s relationships outside England and Wales, often in the form of 
participation in networking projects, bilateral relations with other European countries 
(mainly on the technical level such as inspection issues with France or the Netherlands), 
assistance to developing countries on environmental issues and sharing good practice 
with, for example, the USA, Canada and Australia.
1419
 Moreover, the EU and 
international relations team are also in contact with the Commission‘s DG Environment 
and some MEPs.
1420
 Lowe and Ward criticise British environment agencies for often 
focussing their contacts too narrowly on DG Environment.
1421
 However, environment 
agencies tend to play a very marginal role in the EU policy-making process and are very 
rarely involved in the agenda-setting legislative stages.
1422
 This is not necessarily the 
role the agencies want to play at the EU level, but often they do not have a choice. 
The EA is heavily involved in the EPA network and the IMPEL network.
1423
 The 
IMPEL network was created following Dutch and British initiatives to improve the 
implementation of EU environmental law.
1424
 Its first meeting took place in Chester in 
1992 after which the network changed its name from Chester network to IMPEL 
network in 1993.
1425
 Most of the British contacts with the EEA take place through 
Defra, with the EA only having occasional and limited contact with the EEA.
1426
 The 
EA‘s contacts with the EEA are mainly through the EPA network (although some links 
were established between the EA‘s data and monitoring department and the EEA).1427  
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6.2 The EA in the national context 
6.2.1 Defra 
The DoE was set up in 1970. It incorporated elements of different ministries concerned 
with housing, local government, public building and transport.
1428
 Although it was 
hoped that the existence of a DoE would promote the integration of environmental 
concerns in other policy areas, the organizational reform was not sufficient to deal with 
environmental problems.
1429
 This was due to several reasons, including the DoE mainly 
consisting of previously created branches of government, it not having been given any 
new powers and key environmental responsibilities remaining with other departments 
(such as agriculture or energy).
1430
 Thus, contrary to what its name suggests, the DoE‘s 
primary purpose was not the protection of the environment.
1431
 Instead it was mainly 
concerned with local government, although it did also have responsibilities for pollution 
control (which it shared with the ministries for agriculture, fisheries and food), 
countryside and nature protection.
1432
 
After a change of government (from Conservatives to Labour), the DoE was merged 
with transport and regional planning, creating DETR, a super-ministry.
1433
 Within 
DETR, environmental regulation remained a separate function, but as previously with 
the DoE, some environmental responsibilities were still held by other ministries (e.g. 
MAFF).
1434
 With DETR not gaining significant new powers in the environmental field, 
there were doubts about whether it would be able to deliver a better performance than 
its predecessor.
1435
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In 2001 (following a general election), another reorganization took place resulting in 
the creation of Defra which merged the environment section of DETR with the former 
MAFF (whose performance had not been considered satisfactory).
1436
 In addition, Defra 
was also assigned responsibilities for sustainable development, environmental 
protection and water, rural development and countryside, as well as energy 
efficiency.
1437
 It was hoped that Defra would be able to lead to a greening of agricultural 
policies; however, environmental policy was expected to be disadvantaged by the 
transfer of one of its key tools, planning, to the office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
1438
 
Flynn describes the development of environmental protection institutions as a story of 
integration and fragmentation aimed at addressing political priorities or problems.
1439
 
However, changes might not necessarily aid integrated policy-making and tensions 
between sectors remain, even if they are combined to a single department.
1440
 
Although responsible to Defra, the EA works closely also with the DECC which was 
created in 2008.
1441
 Although it involves major environmental issues, transport was 
eventually assigned its own department, the Department of Transport.
1442
 This was 
undertaken due to its political prominence, removing it from the only one-year old 
Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions.
1443
  
 
6.2.2 The EA, Defra and the Welsh Assembly 
The 1995 Environment Act outlines that  
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the Ministers shall from time to time give guidance to the Agency with respect to 
objectives which they consider it appropriate for the Agency to pursue in the 
discharge of its functions.
1444
  
 
The importance of the EA establishing itself as independent from Defra was recognized 
from the beginning and the agency was allowed to exercise a significant degree of 
independence.
1445
 
The 2002 Management Statement issued to the EA describes the roles of Defra and 
the Welsh Assembly in England and Wales respectively as setting up the policy 
framework for the EA, allocating resources for its activities, monitoring its performance 
in relation to agreed objectives and targets, and issuing general guidance or specific 
directions, among others.
1446
 
When the EA acquired new policy functions in 2002, tensions between the agency 
and Defra over roles and responsibilities in developing policies increased.
1447
 
Eventually the agency began to play a bigger role in consultations and early stages of 
the policy-making process with Defra.
1448
  However, this approach is not 
uncontroversial. It has been criticised by business representatives who are concerned 
about the agency getting too involved.
1449
 Despite the EA being an independent, non-
departmental body, Defra has control over policy decisions, the agency‘s budget and in 
many cases over the agency‘s access to the EU (at least involvement in the decision-
making process).
1450
 In order for the EA to be able to get involved at an earlier stage in 
EU decision-making, the agency and Defra have signed a Concordat on EU and 
International Relations.
1451
 This agreement contained Defra‘s acceptance that the EA 
has a role in all stages of the EU policy-making process and outlined its 
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involvement.
1452
 Nonetheless, the EA‘s role in EU policy-making remains restricted by 
Defra and despite now being part of Council negotiations, the EA would not be able to 
be the UK‘s sole representative.1453 The concordat can be considered more a 
manifestation of the emerged changes than a turning point in the EA‘s involvement in 
EU and international relations.
1454
 Overall, the relationship between the EA and Defra 
has been described as good, and the ongoing improvement of the relationship has also 
led to better results as a consequence of their cooperation.
1455
 
 
6.2.3 Regions and local authorities  
The devolution process has had a significant impact in Wales and particularly Scotland 
on environmental policy and its implementation.
1456
 This is because the Scottish 
Parliament is equipped with significantly more powers than Wales‘ National 
Assembly.
1457
 Apart from the agency set-up differentiating along national lines between 
Scotland, Northern Ireland as well as England and Wales, the EA of England and Wales 
is further divided into regions. In 2006, the EA‘s area of activity consisted of seven 
English regions (Southern, Thames, South West, Midlands, Anglian, North West and 
North East) and of Wales.
1458
 The regional offices support the 22 area offices and 
coordinate their activities, which include the management of the area, meeting the needs 
of the local community and responding to emergencies and incidents.
1459
 
The 1995 Environment Act requires the EA to establish a number of Regional 
Environment Protection Advisory Committees for different English regions and 
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Wales.
1460
 It also points out the agency‘s duty of consulting them on matters affecting 
the regions and taking their positions into account.
1461
 In addition, each region has a 
Regional Flood Defence Committee and a Regional Fisheries, Ecology and Recreation 
Advisory Committee. The committees advise on regional issues of concern, the way 
regions are affected by national policy proposals and the operational performance of the 
EA in general. The EA further works with regional bodies (such as regional 
development agencies), regional chambers and other relevant bodies within the regions 
to produce sustainable development frameworks.
1462
 Traditionally, local authorities 
were highly involved in environmental regulation.
1463
 They are the EA‘s key partners on 
flood defence, planning, air pollution control and waste issues and cooperate on 
developing community strategies and local sustainable development strategies.
1464
 
The agency has been criticised (particularly by regulated firms) for allowing 
regulatory inconsistencies to persist between areas and within the same regions.
1465
 Its 
work aims to improve the consistency of regulation in different areas and regions to 
create a level playing field for businesses.
1466
 
 
6.2.4 Britain and EU environmental policy 
When joining the then EEC in 1973, Britain had already established a number of 
environmental rules but underestimated how far-reaching EU environmental policy 
would turn out to be.
1467
 Not only was the perception of EU environmental policy in 
Britain affected by widespread antipathy to the EU as a whole, the environment was 
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considered as already sufficiently protected.
1468
 Environmental measures originating 
from the EU were therefore considered of little benefit.
1469
 With regards to the impact of 
EU membership on environmental policy in the UK, Budge and colleagues state that  
from the beginning of the 1980s the EU has been one of the principal forces 
operating on the British system of environmental protection, reshaping many of its 
characteristics. Indeed, there is no other area apart from agriculture where the EU 
has been so influential in changing the assumptions and standard operating 
procedures of UK policy.
1470
 
 
At the time of joining the EU, Britain considered itself to be an environmental pioneer, 
although national measures were largely conservation-related and environmental policy 
only occupied a niche position on the political agenda.
1471
 In the mid-1980s the UK 
could often be found opposing the introduction of strict environmental measures and 
higher environmental standards the EU sought to introduce and eventually became 
known as the ―dirty man of Europe‖.1472 Thus while Britain often occupied a laggard 
position in EU environmental policy-making it was also the case that on some important 
decisions Britain was pushing for new common environmental legislation (such as 
wildlife protection and integrated pollution control).
1473
  
Eventually, with environmental degradation becoming more apparent, Britain‘s 
reluctance to embrace EU environmental initiatives gradually gave way to a greater 
willingness to get involved in environmental debates at the European level, moving 
from the margin of EU environmental policy to the mainstream.
1474
 The early 1990s saw 
the first signs of change emerging with the environment department beginning to try to 
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influence EU environmental policy at an early state in order to ensure its interests were 
not neglected.
1475
 
While the EA‘s predecessors had European officers, they lacked a strategic 
perspective on EU developments.
1476
 This reactive approach limited their direct 
involvement in environmental committees at the EU level.
1477
 After recognizing the 
EA‘s competence in the implementation of EU regulations, Defra had no real choice but 
to allow the agency to be more involved in discussions about new EU environmental 
policy measures.
1478
 With Defra involving the EA in its EU policy-making role (for 
example, by involving the agency in Council negotiations), the agency became more 
visible and active internationally.
1479
 However, this kind of involvement tends to require 
the EA to maintain the ministerial line.
1480
  
In 2003, the agency proposed a closer working relationship with Defra on how EU 
environmental legislation should be implemented.
1481
 The EA wanted to be assigned the 
task of producing the first draft of regulations in the process of transposing EU 
directives into UK law, later formalized by the signing of the Concordat on EU and 
International Relations (see above).
1482
 The EA‘s chief executive stressed the agency‘s 
special interest in legislative processes and becoming involved as the final 
implementation would later become the EA‘s job.1483 
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Administrative adaptation 
Having evolved over centuries with little overall planning, administrative structures in 
Britain tend to be complex and often lack coherence.
1484
 Due to this lack of structural 
coherence and hierarchical control, administrative authorities and agencies at all levels 
tend to enjoy a high level of discretion, with often the only control exercised over them 
being through the provision of a broad legal, operational and financial framework.
1485
 
At the core of British administrative tradition is the pursuit of a mediating 
administrative style.
1486
 Focus on the consensual approach began to change with the 
creation of the NRA and continued with the work of the EA.
1487
 
Under the condition of governmental commitment, large-scale reforms and 
developments in Britain‘s public administration are possible and have taken place.1488 
New public management reforms and the resulting Next Steps initiative heavily 
influenced the creation of semi-autonomous agencies concerned with operational 
management.
1489
 While the structural potential and the capacity for the reform of 
national administrative structures in Britain is high, this does not mean that such 
reforms occur frequently.
1490
 Administrative changes and reforms, however, appear to 
be largely unrelated to developments at the European level. With regards to EU 
environmental policy Knill points out that  
administrative reforms occurring independently of European influence reduced the 
institutional incompatibility of European and domestic arrangements, hence 
opening up new opportunities for sectoral adjustment.
1491
  
 
Moreover, Knill states that administrative flexibility within a system not only facilitates 
compliance with supranational requirements, it might ultimately increase opportunities 
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for administrative persistence within national systems.
1492
 EU environmental policy has 
impacted on environmental policy in the UK in a number of ways. However, impact and 
influence do not automatically result in administrative adaptation.  
 
6.3 Defra and the Eionet  
6.3.1 Setting up the NFP  
When the EEA was created, the UK initially wanted a body, which was independent 
from the Commission and responsible for environmental monitoring and reporting.
1493
 
Although complete independence from the Commission was not granted and the actual 
remit of the EEA was quite limited, its creation was still perceived as positive and the 
UK expected to be required to fulfil only limited additional reporting obligations.
1494
  
As part of the national arrangement for UK participation in the Eionet, the NFP is 
located in Defra‘s environmental statistics unit. The initial focus of the Eionet was 
mainly on data reporting obligations and the creation of links with the data providers. 
The statistics unit, which was already involved in similar reporting procedures, linked 
with Eurostat and overseeing environmental reporting procedures was considered to be 
the ideal NFP location.
1495
 As one Defra official pointed out: ‗I‘m not sure whether it 
was really a long-term strategic decision or whether it was just a matter of 
consequence‘.1496 Due to initially being primarily occupied with data flows and the 
notion that data is best dealt with by statisticians, the NFP location defaulted to the 
statistics division in Defra, rather than the European division or the environmental 
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strategies unit.
1497
 The EA was not an option (for the location of the NFP) because it did 
not yet exist. 
Since the EEA was set up, the role of the NFP has expanded significantly, going 
beyond pure data reporting obligations. In this context it has been pointed out by a 
British official that ‗there is no real 100 per cent fool-proof way of hosting the NFP‘.1498 
This is being dealt with by considering the NFP as a point of contact which can draw 
upon other resources should an issue arise that it cannot address on its own.
1499
 With 
statistics being their field of expertise, the individual taking on the role of NFP is 
required to acquire a broader understanding of policy implications, environmental 
monitoring, EU policy processes and so on.
1500
 On the data provision side, the UK was 
in the fortunate position that much of the data required by the EEA was already 
available.
1501
 The UK tends to occupy a high position in the priority data flow rankings, 
the exception being 2008 (when it dropped from 94 per cent in 2007 to 65 per cent).
1502
 
The reason for this was that reporting procedures were affected by changes in the 
monitoring networks following the introduction of the EU water framework 
directive.
1503
  
The NRCs are located within Defra and in external organizations (including private 
companies and actors involved in environmental monitoring and implementation) which 
are not contractually obliged to participate in the Eionet but do so on a voluntary 
basis.
1504
 With no budget available within Defra for the work of the NRCs, they are not 
being paid.
1505
 As one British official pointed out (somewhat ironically), NRCs are 
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fulfilling their role in the Eionet ‗out of the goodness of their hearts‘.1506 This makes it 
even more important for the NFP to be able to motivate (existing and/or potential) 
NRCs by pointing out ways in which they can benefit from participating (such as 
contact with experts in their field of work from other countries).
1507
 The UK is one of a 
few countries where private institutions take on the role of NRCs, which is due to the 
high degree of outsourcing taking place.
1508
 The main challenge at the time of creating 
the EEA was to deal with the agency establishing itself, setting up the Eionet and 
finding out what exactly it wanted the countries to do.
1509
 This process took longer than 
expected.
1510
 
 
6.3.2 Working of the NFP 
The main role of the British NFP, as is the case for all the NFPs in every country, is the 
coordination of the Eionet network and ensuring that at the national level the right 
connections and networks are in place to respond to requests from the EEA (such as 
contributions to the EEA‘s SOERs and fulfilling the UK‘s reporting obligations).1511  
In contrast to many other countries, the British set-up of Eionet structures in the case 
of the NRCs is less rigid and takes place in a more cooperative approach.
1512
 Bearing in 
mind designated NRCs are not contractually obliged to fulfil the UK‘s reporting 
obligations, the comparatively good British results in the Eionet‘s priority data flow are 
somewhat surprising. While this approach increases flexibility, it can also lead to 
difficulties in generating input from people for whom the participation in the Eionet is 
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not a priority because it is not part of their job description.
1513
 This approach can make 
it difficult to get responses from the people involved.
1514
 There is no overall trend 
among the NRCs.
1515
 Some find it easy to contribute and participation does not involve 
much extra work or it can be the case that their NRC work is of particular interest to 
them.
1516
 Moreover, there is a constant need for the NFP to ensure the functioning of the 
network; that the best possible people are involved through being NRCs, that changing 
positions and officials are being taken into account and NRCs are being replaced, if 
required.
1517
 For some organizations, being designated an NRC is a major motivation, as 
it leads to them having a relationship with the EEA, greater involvement with its work 
and European-level developments.
1518
 As a by-product there can therefore be benefits 
from being an NRC.
1519
 Moreover, being nominated an NRC can be considered 
prestigious in terms of being recognized as a body occupying a leading role in a certain 
policy area in the country.
1520
 
Another task is the circulation of EEA reports and publications within Defra, and 
other departments with policy contact, although the often highly detailed and technical 
nature of these reports requires motivation and commitment from the recipients to work 
through them, which they are not always willing to provide.
1521
 This work is often in 
relation to specific topics or part of the general drive to try to increase or maintain the 
EEA‘s profile. 
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Moreover, there is a need to take the UK‘s devolved administrations into account.1522 
There had been a conspicuous lack of NRCs in the devolved administrations until 
2009.
1523
 However, this does not pose a problem in all cases because in some areas 
(such as air quality) the monitoring still takes places at the UK level, despite the policies 
being devolved.
1524
 An ongoing aim is to increase the devolved administrations‘ input 
into the Eionet.
1525
 In addition it is the NFP‘s responsibility to manage relationships 
within the network in Britain and to ensure that there is a unified UK position which is 
being heard and considered when it needs to.
1526
 
The individual characteristics of the person taking on the role of NFP is also crucial 
as well, not only in terms of personal commitment, but also the length of time spent 
working in this role. NFPs who have been working in their role for a long time acquire 
valuable knowledge and important connections.
1527
 The lack of the UK‘s influence in 
the network is partly due to the frequent changes of NFPs.
1528
 On the one hand, Defra‘s 
attempts to discourage the concentration of information among a limited number of 
officials is understandable.
1529
 It does, however, potentially lead to a loss of continuity 
and knowledge, as the expertise required by an NFP in order to maximise efficiency in 
the network can only be built up gradually and experience in fulfilling the role cannot 
be easily replaced.
1530
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The NFP and the management board member 
The British MB member tends to be the head of the environment statistics unit.
1531
 MB 
members in other countries tend to be more senior than the UK representative.
1532
 Like 
the NFP, the MB member representing the UK is located in the statistics unit in 
Defra.
1533
 The NFP and the MB member therefore can be expected to have a closer 
working relationship and better understanding of what each other‘s work entails than if 
they were located in different units in Defra or even in different departments. 
 
6.3.3 Effects on Defra 
The creation of the EEA and the involvement of the department in the Eionet has not 
had any measurable impact on Defra.
1534
 This might be due to the already existing data 
flow and reporting mechanisms, which did not require much alteration in order to 
become part of the Eionet‘s priority data flow. The tasks related to the NFP‘s work form 
only a minute part of Defra‘s overall work. Regarding the NFP position, Eionet-related 
work is supposed to only make up about one fifth of the work of that official. However, 
while Defra as an institution is considered to have been unaffected, the people involved 
in the network (either as NRCs or participants in workshops, etc.) will have felt some 
effect.
1535
 The limited impact of the creation of the EEA and the Eionet is hardly 
surprising, with the NRCs not being contractually bound and the national continuation 
of the Eionet structure appearing not to have been institutionalized throughout Defra 
and other possible or designated NRC locations. Although the voluntary basis of 
participation in the Eionet for British NRCs makes it harder to get people to agree to 
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become NRCs, those that do agree might possibly be more motivated to participate and 
contribute than if they were simply obliged to do so as part of their job description. 
The work of the British NFP has mainly been described as reactive to EEA demands, 
but also as collaborative, in the sense that NFPs really try to work together with the 
agency.
1536
 While this could in some instances be related to the individual(s) fulfilling 
the NFP role, it is mainly due to the allocation of priorities by Defra, which allocates the 
time its officials may spend on their NFP work. What is more, Defra‘s priorities need to 
be balanced against European priorities.
1537
 One interviewee described the perception of 
Defra‘s attitude towards the EEA as being ‗less of a sense that the agency has a massive 
influence on the UK and UK policy‘.1538 Another British official described the creation 
of the EEA and the setting up of the Eionet even as having had no impact on Defra at 
all.
1539
 
As the EEA‘s demands on its networks have grown, the attitudes towards its work 
appear to have hardened somewhat and NRCs have on occasion become less 
enthusiastic about their involvement.
1540
 One interviewee noted that ‗it is one thing to 
sign up to it and another to do the work‘.1541 The UK perspective has also been 
criticised for not evolving alongside Eionet, for not using the potential in the network 
and for not incorporating enough the richness of expertise available in Britain.
1542
 It is 
therefore perhaps not surprising that since 2000, Britain has lost the influential role it 
occupied during the 1990s in the Eionet and EEA.
1543
 Thus the finding that used to 
apply to the British agencies regarding their lack of involvement and/or fulfilment of 
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potential when participating in European networks can in this case be extended to 
Defra.
1544
 Moreover, the position of Defra and Britain as a whole has been criticised for 
aiming to control processes within the EEA and its networks, rather than aiming to 
influence them, and that this control perspective undermines its influence.
1545
 This 
appears to be a common issue when looking at the UK‘s relationship with the EU in the 
past.
1546
 On the other hand, the drive for control is not mirrored by the seniority of the 
Defra official chosen to represent the UK in the EEA‘s MB. Aiming for control within 
the EEA framework would not only affect Defra‘s willingness to compromise, but also 
its openness to developments at the European level, which it could potentially influence. 
Finally, the big advantage British officials have in an international environment by 
speaking English is not being recognized and capitalized upon enough.
1547
 While almost 
every other country has to bear the language issue in mind when setting up their 
national structures, this has not been the case for the UK. 
 
6.3.4 Moving the NFP? 
Another reason for locating the British NFP in Defra was that unified environment 
agencies as they can now be found simply did not exist in Britain.
1548
 The tasks now 
carried out by the environment agencies were highly fragmented and sectoralised. The 
issue of whether or not the EA would be a better location for the NFP has occasionally 
surfaced, particularly during phases of departmental restructuring at Defra.
1549
 However, 
with the NFP work not taking up a significant amount of the department‘s resources in 
terms of time and personnel, moving the NFP is not considered a major issue within 
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Defra.
1550
 It has therefore never seriously been looked at.
1551
 Thus the discussions about 
the possibility of the EA taking on the role of NFP have never gone very far.
1552
 The EA 
has always considered the Eionet to be Defra‘s business.1553 This also has to do with the 
EA‘s role being mainly regulatory although it does have the role of an information 
provider which, however, often appears to be a secondary role when compared to its 
regulation functions.
1554
 Thus the EEA‘s and the Eionet‘s existence unsurprisingly did 
not have a significant impact on the EA.
1555
 
Expressing his personal opinion, a former British NFP suggested that it would be 
best to ‗take the NFP out of Defra and put it in the environment agencies and let them 
arrange themselves‘.1556 This would complicate things further, as there would have to be 
a number of NFPs at the different environment agencies in England/Wales, Northern 
Ireland and Scotland. However, this would not be an impossible or even unique set-up, 
as other countries have resolved it by setting up NFP teams so that different regions 
with independent institutions can be covered (e.g. in Belgium). Most importantly, 
however, the agency has never seriously lobbied for the NFP to be relocated in the 
EA.
1557
 There appears to be no political momentum behind moving the NFP to the 
EA.
1558
 Maybe this would be different if the performance of NFPs in Defra was 
unsatisfactory.  
Until 2009, the EA did not participate in the Eionet as an NRC, although it has come 
to be considered a useful addition to the existing NRCs (due to its expertise in the areas 
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of water and waste).
1559
  Ideally, all of the UK‘s environment agencies would be 
involved in the Eionet in some way.
1560
 However, such an involvement would require 
time (on top of the already extensive list of NFP tasks) to identify the correct divisions 
and officials who would then need to be persuaded to participate. In theory, the relevant 
people in the environment agencies should be at least updated by the existing NRCs in 
their policy area. However, in areas where the NRC is occupied by just one person or 
institution, it can have an effect if it is not linked to other relevant institutions in the 
field, which has led to the strategy of including as many relevant institutions as possible 
as NRCs for each area.
1561
 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
Despite a general – and displayed – willingness to reform and restructure existing 
institutional set-ups, changes in the environmental institutions in British politics are 
almost exclusively internally motivated, rather than a result of EU membership. 
National institutions (such as Defra and the EA) have been Europeanized, but this 
Europeanization process took place independently from the comparatively recent 
creation of the EEA. Europeanization has led more to a change in the outlook of British 
institutions which are now taking into account the European dimension, rather than a 
full scale change at the institutional level. 
After its creation, the EA understandably required some time to amalgamate and 
work efficiently. The main characteristics of the EA‘s predecessors‘ regulatory styles 
were continued by the new agency. While the creation of a unified EA was a new 
development in the UK, it did not, in fact, represent as big an institutional overhaul as 
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the creation of such an agency might at first sight suggest due to previous experience in 
carrying out a combination of related tasks in a number of bodies. Although the EA is 
active at the EU level and involved in European networks, its involvement with the 
EEA and the Eionet remains very limited. Due to the EA‘s and EEA‘s very different 
roles this is not generally perceived as regrettable. Moreover, the creation of the EEA 
could not have had an impact on the EA which was set up several years later. Two years 
after the creation of the EA, Lowe and Ward suggested, that the continual 
administrative changes may disrupt strategic thinking about Europe due to (in this case) 
the agency being preoccupied with internal administrative and domestic matters.
1562
  
When applying hypothesis I (regarding the limited impact of the EEA‘s creation on 
other involved national administrations) to Defra, the impact of the EEA on the 
department has indeed been minimal. Although Europeanization of both Defra and the 
EA has taken place, the impact of the EEA on both institutions can best be described as 
absorption (as used by Börzel and Risse
1563). Applying Bulmer and Burch‘s dimensions 
of institutional change
1564
 in relation to the impact of the EEA‘s creation on Defra as the 
host of the NFP, the only detectable change was with regards to the processes involved. 
The work required fitted well into the statistics division within Defra. In applying 
Bulmer and Burch‘s classification there has been no impact on the system, 
organizations or regulation in Britain can be identified. The involved actors interviewed 
for this thesis all stated that the creation of the EEA had no significant impact on Defra 
despite the fact that it hosts the NFP. The possibility of administrative adaptation due to 
the EEA‘s (and the Eionet‘s) creations must therefore be excluded, as the minor 
procedural adjustments that have taken place do not appear significant enough (nor are 
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they perceived internally at Defra as significant enough) to speak of an impact on the 
department as a whole. 
Moreover, with the MB member also being an official (although in a slightly higher 
position) at Defra‘s statistics department, no additional vertical link was established 
through the cooperation of the NFP with the MB member. A Defra official pointed out: 
‗the story of the UK and the EEA and Eionet is a story of unrealized potential‘.1565 This 
refers mainly to the degree of involvement Britain has had (with the EEA and the 
Eionet) as well as its reactive stance. However, with only a small amount of time 
allocated to the NFP work, greater, more pro-active, involvement is not always possible. 
When simply looking at the results of UK participation in the EEA‘s main network, the 
Eionet, it appears to be complying with its major reporting obligations. Looking beyond 
the priority data flows, it appears that the UK‘s approach to the EEA‘s work often 
concentrates on reacting to certain requests, rather than a more active involvement. 
When such involvement took place in the past, the UK often seemed to have used the 
wrong approach aimed at controlling procedures rather than seeking to exert an 
influence on them. This might simply be due to the EEA‘s work and therefore also the 
NFP‘s work not being attributed much significance, rather than a reflection on the UK‘s 
position on EU environmental policy as a whole. Since 2009, the status of the UK‘s side 
of the Eionet has been described as improving by a Defra official.
1566
 This can largely 
be attributed to a personnel change of the NFP, highlighting the importance of the 
person fulfilling this role.
1567
 
Due to the Eionet‘s NFP being located in Defra, and the EA not participating in the 
Eionet as an NRC for a long time, the agency‘s contact with the EEA is limited. It 
largely takes place through the EPA network (see Chapter Eight). Similar to Defra 
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controlling the EA‘s access to EU-level decision-making processes, it has also been 
described by Zito as ‗prevent[ing] the EA from being the main interlocutor in the EEA 
network‘.1568 However, this needs to be considered in the context of (1) the EA not yet 
existing at the time the EEA was created and the Eionet was set up, (2) the satisfactory 
performance of the NFP at Defra, and (3) the EA‘s acceptance of the NFP being located 
in Defra and lack of momentum to change its location (at both Defra and the EA). Due 
to the EA‘s and EEA‘s very different roles, this outcome (of limited contact between the 
agencies) was not entirely unexpected and the EA‘s involvement in other European 
networks shows that the willingness for cooperation and networking at the European 
level exists: the EEA itself might just not provide the arena to suit best the EA‘s remit 
and needs. With the EEA‘s work being information-based and the EA‘s work being 
mainly of a regulatory nature, the impact of the existence of the EEA (rather than its 
creation considering it took place earlier) on the EA‘s work appears not only limited but 
practically non-existent.  
Despite administrative changes, restructuring measures and reforms that involved 
environmental administrations, arguably none of these have been undertaken as a result, 
or even been influenced by, the creation of the EEA or Eionet participation by the UK.  
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Chapter 7: Comparative Chapter 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters Three to Six of this thesis assessed the environment agencies of the EU, 
Germany, France and Britain as well as the national participation arrangements in the 
EEA‘s main network, the Eionet. This chapter aims to highlight in a comparative 
manner the main similarities and differences between the national agencies discussed. It 
will also explain the reasons behind the locations of the NFPs within the national 
agencies. The focus will primarily be on the Europeanizing impact of the EEA on its 
member countries and their (different) national responses. Chapter Seven will also 
discuss hypotheses I and II (which were explained in chapter two), while drawing on the 
empirical findings put forward in Chapters Three to Six in a cross-country comparative 
manner.  
 
7.2 Reassessing hypotheses I and II in a cross-country comparative manner 
This chapter will assess hypotheses I and II. Hypothesis III, which put forward the 
proposition that differences in national administrative traditions lead to different 
motivations for the participation of national environmental agencies in European 
networks will be addressed in Chapter Eight. 
Hypothesis I postulates that the creation of the EEA had only a limited impact on 
national environment agencies and the wider national environmental administrations 
within which these agencies operate. When looking at the empirical evidence presented 
in Chapters Four to Six, it becomes clear that the impact of the creation of the EEA on 
national environment agencies (and other national administrations involved) was very 
limited indeed. The only exception constitutes the French case. At first sight the validity 
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of hypothesis I therefore seems to be largely confirmed although the picture is more 
complex as will be discussed below. 
The identified changes to the institutional set-ups of national environment agencies 
appear to have been driven almost exclusively by national level developments. 
Examples include internal restructuring processes and the decisions (in the case of the 
ADEME and the EA) to combine existing bodies to form more unified ones. This helps 
to explain why differences in national environment agencies have (at least so far) 
prevailed as predicted by hypothesis II.  
Although the UBA is relatively small (when compared to the EA), it is an important 
player in German (and EU) environmental policy. The UBA‘s size is therefore 
deceptive. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that the UBA‘s budget and staff 
numbers do not include the staff and budgets of the Länder agencies which form a 
second tier of environmental agencies in the German federal system. In contrast to the 
EA, where the staff numbers and budget include those of its regional offices as well, in 
the German case the Länder environment agencies are independent.  
The UBA‘s national and international influence has not been diminished by the 
creation and existence of the EEA. The UBA has remained the main contact point for 
environmental information for the government, interest groups, the media and the 
general public in Germany. The need for the UBA‘s expertise in international 
agreements and conferences as well as EU committees remains high. The strength of the 
EEA‘s work lies in producing comparable environmental information on a wide range 
of issues. When taking into account the differences in size (measured in staff resources) 
and financial resources, the EEA is significantly smaller than the UBA which helps to 
explain the former‘s limited impact on environmental institutions in its member 
countries. 
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At first sight, the creation of the EEA has had a significant impact on France. 
However, when the fluidity of the French national environmental administrative 
institutions (and in particular the Environment Ministry) is taken into consideration then 
the significance of the impact of the EEA‘s creation on the French environmental 
agencies seems much reduced. There had to have been a perceived need at the national 
level beforehand in order for the EEA‘s creation to result in the setting up of a new 
national institution. Compared to Germany, changes to France‘s environmental 
administrative institutional set-up have taken place much more frequently. The 
relatively frequent changes in France are not only linked to changes in national 
governments as can be seen from several changes in ministerial positions in between 
elections. The French environment ministry has changed its scope and areas of 
responsibility almost as often as the people who occupied the post of environment 
minister have changed. On average, an environment minister in France stays in office 
for about two years (with some ministers serving as little as a few months).  This can 
lead to a lack of continuity within the ministry which, in turn, can affect the 
environmental administrative bodies under its supervision. Although it is not 
uncommon for British Secretaries of State to be replaced by the same government, it 
does not take place as frequently as in France. The creation of the EEA did not 
constitute a critical juncture for France, despite the fact that it triggered the setting up of 
a new domestic institution in the environmental policy field.  
In terms of its set-up and functions, France‘s Ifen is similar to the EEA but different 
compared to the German UBA and the British EA. On the other hand, the ADEME, 
which fulfils a special role also very different to the UBA and EA, has not been 
significantly affected by EU level developments. While the institutional landscape in 
France has been altered, EU level developments have only had a very limited impact on 
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the ADEME because of the limited involvement of this agency with the EEA and the 
Eionet; only a few of the Eionet‘s NRCs are located at the ADEME. 
Although the influence of the EU on UK environmental institutions has been 
identified as important by Jordan, he does not treat it as the only or even primary factor 
for the creation of the EA.
1569
 The EA and SEPA officials (including a former SEPA 
chairperson who had also been the chair of the EP environment committee when the 
EEA was set up) interviewed for this thesis were not able to identify a definite link 
between EU level developments and the setting up of the EA and/or SEPA. There were 
also no other primary documents which would suggest such a link. The EU‘s impact on 
the creation of the EA (i.e. the EU as one of the main reasons for the agency‘s creation), 
which is significantly different from the EEA and many other European national 
environment agencies, is therefore arguably only a minor one. Most notable in this 
context is the EA‘s involvement in the (monitoring of the) implementation of policies 
and its regulatory and licensing authority, which all result in its work being directly 
affected by EU (and domestic) environmental legislation.  
Although the EA was established only in 1996, its institutional set-up involved the 
amalgamation of a range of pre-existing bodies (that dealt with environmental issues on 
the domestic level long before the EEA came into existence) upon which the creation of 
the EEA had no impact. Considering the EA‘s very limited involvement with the EEA 
and the Eionet (see Chapter Six), the lack of impact on the EA is perhaps not surprising.  
Changes to the responsibilities and policy areas of governmental departments are not 
uncommon in the UK. This is particularly true for the environmental field as can 
already be seen, for example, from the permutations of the Environment Ministry which 
changed its name (from DoE to DETR, and to DEFRA) and responsibilities (e.g. when 
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an independent DECC was set up). In British environmental policy there nevertheless 
appears to have been more stability than in the French environmental policy system. 
Changes to the structures of the national environmental administrative institutions in 
Britain have been almost always motivated by domestic developments (rather than EU 
level developments).  
In France and the UK an effort was made to create more unified national 
environment agencies in the early 1990s. The new French and British environmental 
institutions combined the structures of agencies, institutes and authorities which, in 
most cases, had existed long before the EEA was created. The new agencies (such as the 
EA and ADEME) were created in the 1990s when EU environmental policy had 
reached a mature phase. Top-down Europeanization has not led to dramatic 
environmental institutional changes at the national level. The first wave of European 
agencies, which was created in the early 1990s, can be considered as an important EU 
level development. Because the majority of these European agencies generally lacked 
significant powers, their creation cannot be considered as constituting drastic change; 
instead they constituted a step in a new direction. From a historical institutionalist 
perspective (see Chapter Two), it would be reasonable to expect that such a 
development is unlikely to affect significantly the member countries‘ institutional set-
ups in the short to medium term. Thus, out of Bulmer and Burch‘s dimensions for 
establishing institutional change
1570
 (see Chapter Two) only minor changes, mostly 
focused on procedural arrangements, would be expected.   
The UBA had existed for nearly twenty years by the time the EEA started its work in 
Copenhagen. It therefore constitutes an important case study for an assessment of the 
impact (or lack of impact) which the supranational EEA had on national environment 
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agencies. Even though the ADEME, Ifen and EA were all created at around the same 
time as the EEA, they were affected differently by EU level developments. The 
ADEME and EA were not as strongly affected as the Ifen which was created with its 
role in the Eionet in mind. Ifen‘s governance structures therefore matched closely those 
of the EEA. The ADEME and EA were both made up of other institutions which had 
existed prior to the EEA‘s creation and therefore had no experience in cooperating with 
the latter. 
Moreover it took the EEA a few years to establish itself properly and get its networks 
up and running. The EEA‘s slow start was mainly due to the fact that it existed merely 
as an EEA task force located within the Commission, until it was able to move to its 
headquarters following the decision to locate the agency in Copenhagen in October 
1993. Like many other EU agencies, the EEA relies on the cooperation of national 
institutions. For this reason the EEA set up the Eionet, as set out in its founding 
legislation. The ability to network allows the EEA to fulfil its roles despite its relatively 
small size and budget.  
Leaving aside the strength of national institutions and the importance of national 
path-dependencies, the main reasons for the EEA‘s lack of significant impact on the 
structures of national environmental agencies include (1) the relatively late creation of 
the EEA compared to national environment agencies or their predecessors; (2) the lack 
of powers of the EEA (especially the lack of enforcement powers which meant that the 
EEA had to rely heavily on member countries‘ cooperation); (3) the freedom given to 
member countries to set up the nodes of the network (as stipulated in the EEA‘s 
founding regulation); and, finally, (4) the widely different competencies of the agencies 
at the national level leading to different degrees of involvement by them (with some 
national environment agencies not participating in the Eionet at all). 
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7.3 Country comparison of agencies in the light of the EEA’s creation 
7.3.1 Main roles and functions 
The national environment agencies assessed in this thesis are very similar in relation to 
whom they are answerable (usually the environment ministry or a combination of 
environment ministry and other body) and who their main clients are (i.e. mainly the 
national government, regional authorities, public and NGOs).  
The main roles and functions of national environmental agencies (and 
administrations) developed out of the national political context. Due to its size and very 
specific role (i.e. focusing on environmental information, data collection, data analysis 
and harmonization efforts), the Ifen will only be included in some of the direct 
comparisons.  
The UBA, ADEME and EA all have advisory roles to their national governments to 
which they must provide expert scientific support. The fact that the UBA is more 
distinct from its regional counterparts (i.e. the Länder environment agencies) in terms of 
its responsibilities, is also reflected in its smaller budget compared to the EA and 
ADEME. The latter two agencies both have regional departments. The UBA is first and 
foremost active at the national level although it closely cooperates with the Länder 
environment agencies which are all independent entities. The monitoring of national air 
pollution is one of the few monitoring responsibilities carried out by the UBA at the 
federal level.  
The ADEME‘s main focus is on the supervision of environmental research and 
innovation, with special attention to energy and climate issues. It provides funding for 
research projects and government initiatives such as the Grenelle which it also finances. 
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Table 7.1: National environment agencies (and the EEA) in comparison 
  
EEA 
 
 
UBA 
 
ADEME 
 
IFEN 
 
EA 
 
Created in 
 
1990 
 
1974 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1995 
 
Location 
 
 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
 
Initially Berlin. 
Since 2005  
Dessau and 
Berlin, 
Germany 
 
Paris, Angers 
and Valbonne, 
France 
 
Orléans, 
France 
 
London and 
Bristol, UK 
 
Budget  
 
 
approx. € 
50,000,000 
(2010) 
 
approx. € 
103,000,000 
(2009) 
 
approx. € 
638,000,000 
(2009) 
 
approx. € 
2,850,000 
(2007, excl. 
staff costs) 
 
approx. € 
1,200,000,000 
(2010)  
 
Staff  
 
 
approx. 200 
(2010) 
 
approx. 1430 
(2010) 
 
approx. 930 
(2009) 
 
approx. 70 
(2007) 
 
approx. 12,000 
(2010) 
 
Main roles 
and 
functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collection and 
provision of 
sound 
independent 
environmental 
information; 
coordination of 
the Eionet; 
integration of 
environmentall 
considerations 
in the context 
of sustainable 
development  
 
Scientific 
support for the 
federal 
government, 
including the 
Environment 
Ministry; 
Implementation 
of 
environmental 
laws (e.g. 
emissions 
trading, 
authorisation of 
chemicals, 
etc.); informing 
the public 
about 
environmental 
protection 
 
Research and 
innovation; 
developing 
practical tools; 
information, 
raising 
awareness; 
encouraging, 
supervising, 
coordinating, 
facilitating 
and 
undertaking 
operations 
with the aim 
of protecting 
the 
environment 
and managing 
energy 
 
Data collection 
and 
assessment; 
provision of 
reliable 
environmental 
information 
and statistics; 
improve 
knowledge on 
the state of the 
environment; 
environmental 
indicators and 
scenarios 
development; 
environmental 
analysis and 
data 
harmonization  
 
Specialist 
advice to the 
government; 
flood and 
coastal risk 
management; 
regulator of 
discharges to 
air, water, and 
land; 
environmental 
protection and 
conservation, 
promotion of 
sustainable 
development; 
champion of 
the 
environment 
 
 
Answerable 
to 
 
 
Commission 
 
Federal 
Environment 
Ministry 
 
Environment/ 
Higher 
Education and 
Research 
Ministry 
 
Environment 
Ministry 
 
Defra and (in 
parts) the 
National 
Assembly for 
Wales 
 
Clients 
 
 
Commission, 
EP, Council, 
countries, 
businesses, 
academia, civil 
society, NGOs 
 
BMU, state and 
municipal 
institutions, 
businesses, 
NGOs, the 
public, 
 
 
Government, 
business,  
local /regional 
authorities, 
NGOs, the 
public 
 
Environment 
Ministry, 
scientific 
community, 
the public 
 
Government, 
local 
government, 
businesses, 
NGOs, the 
public 
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In contrast to the UBA and ADEME, the EA is responsible for monitoring and 
regulating industry and for the implementation of (national and EU) environmental 
legislation in its field of responsibility. A huge part of the EA‘s budget is spent on flood 
defences as well as flood and coastal risk management. The EA is the largest agency of 
its kind in Europe and the second-largest in the world (after the USEPA).
1571
  
EU legislation and EEA networking requirements are flexible enough to 
accommodate the different national structures of environmental agencies or ministries 
which are, however, expected to have in place the right mechanisms to fulfil their tasks 
which may include the implementation of policy and cooperation in agency networks. 
The EEA‘s work relies on national environment agencies (and ministries) but it does not 
try to interfere with their work. The EEA‘s focus is on the functioning of the Eionet and 
the timely provision of data in the required formats. It does not get involved in the 
particular national structures and procedures which are set up for achieving this 
objective (unless the member countries ask for assistance). Not much is requested from 
the national environment agencies (and ministries) which host the NFPs, apart from 
putting in place the right people and mechanisms for the provision of the required 
environmental data. Therefore the creation of the EEA has not impacted significantly on 
national environment agencies‘ main roles and functions, with the exception of the 
setting up of the Ifen (for a more detailed assessment of the EEA/Eionet see part 7.4 of 
this chapter).   
 
7.3.2 Relations with environment ministries 
An agency‘s degree of independence from its supervising ministry (or ministries) can be 
affected in a variety of ways including (1) the agency‘s budget, (2) the ability to set its 
                                                 
1571
 House of Commons: Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (2006a:3) 
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own research agenda and (3) the freedom to speak out, even if its views clash with those 
of the government. 
The UBA, ADEME and EA find themselves in similar positions as regards their 
supervising ministries. They somewhat compete with the ministries for staff and 
budgets. Importantly, the UBA was created twelve years before an independent 
Environment Ministry was set up in Germany in 1986. Previously, most environmental 
competences had been allocated to the environmental protection unit of the BMI. Thus, 
the setting up of an independent BMU constitutes a major change to the German 
environmental policy system but has had less of an impact on the UBA. Although the 
UBA‘s budget is decided by the ministry, the majority of its activities are chosen by the 
agency itself. Only roughly 20 per cent of the UBA‘s activities are initiated by the 
ministry, while 80 per cent require merely ministerial agreement.
1572
 From its early 
beginnings, the UBA has defended its informational role as set out in its founding 
legislation. It does not unquestioningly support ministerial positions. On occasion the 
UBA has even publicly opposed the environment ministry‘s and/or government‘s 
position on environmental issues.   
Due to its larger size and budget, the ADEME was initially regarded as a possible 
rival by the Environment Ministry. The ministry sought to ensure its influence over the 
agency (without officially reducing its autonomy) by trying to champion officials close 
to the government for the position of ADEME‘s chief executive. ADEME‘s position as 
an agency under joint supervision of the Environment Ministry and Ministry for Higher 
Education and Research has strengthened its position slightly, because the Environment 
Ministry is comparatively weak. Although ADEME enjoys some degree of 
independence, closeness to the government of the day appears to be an important 
                                                 
1572
 Interview German official (2010) 
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selection factor in the appointment process of the chief executives of ADEME. Ifen‘s 
case appears to be clearer. Its independence from the ministry was retracted four years 
before it was finally dissolved and integrated into the ministry‘s statistical service in 
2008. This move allowed the ministry not only to assert greater control over the institute 
but also its publications.   
It has been suggested that the EA is too big for Defra, whose environmental staff is 
quite small.
1573
 Defra‘s total staff amounts to approximately 11,000 while the EA has 
about an additional 1,000 employees. The EA‘s budget makes up a large part of Defra‘s 
budget allocated to the environment.
1574
 Moreover, the environmental part of Defra 
became even smaller when the DECC was created in 2008. The EA successfully 
managed to assert its independence from Defra, which it considered as important for 
establishing and maintaining its credibility. 
Although a certain degree of independence from their supervising ministries is set 
out in the founding legislations of all environment agencies assessed in this thesis, it is 
also up to the agencies themselves to assert their independence whereby their structures 
and procedures might facilitate such endeavours. For example, the fact that the office of 
UBA president is a position for life makes it easier for the office holder to defend 
publicly positions which are unpopular and/or not in line with the BMU because 
considerations about the renewal of his/her term in office do not come into play. This, 
however, is not the case for the ADEME‘s director. The EA was allowed to exercise a 
significant degree of independence but it also worked hard to gain recognition of its 
independence from the ministry. However, the EA – like the other environment 
agencies assessed in this thesis – is highly dependent on the ministry for its budget. 
                                                 
1573
 Interview British official (2010b) 
1574
 Ibid., Defra (2009: 228) 
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Both the UBA and ADEME act as advisors to their governments but the involvement 
of the EA in consultations and early stages of the decision making-process was initially 
frowned upon by Defra as well as businesses. However, the EA has now become more 
included in the early stages of EU level decision-making processes. This is because 
Defra eventually began to recognize the added value of the practical advice given by the 
EA which is responsible for ensuring the implementation of environmental 
legislation.
1575
 
 
7.3.3 Europeanization 
Anderson described Germany‘s relationship to Europe as ‗a portrait of motion within 
stability‘.1576 This characterization also holds true for the UBA and the effect which the 
EEA‘s creation has had on Germany. Bulmer has pointed out that ‗German interests, 
institutions, and identity have a strikingly good fit with the character of the EU‘1577 
(despite the fact that German environmental policy has come under pressure since the 
early 1990s because of some degree of misfit between its domestic and EU 
environmental policy).
1578
 This observation can be extended to the UBA which has a 
position somewhat superior to the environment agencies of the Länder, due to being a 
federal institution. But, similar to the EEA and its member countries, the Länder 
agencies are not directly responsible to the UBA, which instead depends on voluntary 
cooperation in its dealings with these agencies. Following reunification in 1990, the 
UBA extended its activities to the Länder in the former East Germany which also set up 
their own new environment agencies. Roughly ten years later, the EEA went through a 
somewhat similar process when Central and Eastern European countries became 
                                                 
1575
 Interview British official (2010b) 
1576
 Anderson (2005:93) 
1577
 Bulmer (1997:76) 
1578
 Héritier et al. (1996) 
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members of the EEA. Despite some important changes (such as the UBA expanding its 
work to the former East Germany), the agency has overall remained a remarkably stable 
institution. Since its creation in 1974, the UBA‘s roles and scope have overall remained 
remarkably similar. As was explained earlier, in Chapter Four, former UBA president 
Troge (1995-2009) identified the following as the three most important factors which 
triggered changes to the UBA: first, German unification; second, the integration of the 
Institute for Water, Soil and Air Hygiene; and third, the move of the UBA‘s seat from 
Berlin to Dessau.
 1579
 Importantly, none of these three changes were caused or 
influenced by EU-level developments. The impact of EU environmental policy-making 
on the UBA has been widely acknowledged, and the participation of the agency‘s 
officials in a wide range of EU committees has led to an internal awareness of the EU‘s 
importance in environmental matters.
1580
 
There is stronger empirical evidence for institutional changes triggered by 
Europeanization at the national level in France (see Chapter Five). However, these 
changes to French environment agencies were not exclusively motivated by the need to 
adapt to external EU constraints.
1581
 Moreover, while the Ifen owed its existence to EU 
level developments (i.e. the creation of the EEA), the impact on the ADEME was less 
significant. Balme and Woll stated that rather than considering France to be adapting to 
Europe, it is modernizing through Europe.
1582
 Thus while the setting up of the Ifen was 
not necessary for the fulfilment of France‘s reporting obligations to the EEA, the 
creation of such an institute was considered a beneficial addition to the environmental 
institutional landscape not only by being a national counterpart to the EEA but also by 
                                                 
1579
 Interview German official (2010) 
1580
 Ibid., Interview German official (2008b) 
1581
 Balme and Woll (2005:115) 
1582
 Ibid.:116 
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providing an important link between the scientific community and a governmental 
institution. 
Because the Ifen was created with the EEA and wider European dimension of its 
work in mind, it can be argued that its creation was partly the result of Europeanization. 
The ADEME, on the other hand, appears to be more removed from a European impact 
because the bulk of its work deals with issues at the national level. However, the fact 
that ADEME also has an office in Brussels in order to be both better informed about EU 
developments and able to participate more effectively in European initiatives, proves 
that the agency‘s outlook goes beyond the national level. Moreover, out of the national 
environment agencies assessed in this thesis, the ADEME is the only agency which has 
its own office in Brussels. 
David Allen pointed out the contradiction of the British case which exhibits a 
‗Europeanized government operating in a still non-Europeanized polity‘.1583 British 
government departments had no choice but to become Europeanized. However, 
although the impact of Europeanization was widely recognized, there still appears to be 
a lack of commitment in some areas and a significant amount of Euroscepticism within 
many departments as well as the government itself. In relation to this research this 
might be reflected by the importance given (i.e. the time and staff resources allocated) 
to the NFP work.
1584
 After initial teething problems, the EA has become a well-
established unified agency. The EA‘s involvement in the early stages of the (domestic 
and EU) decision-making and implementation process has become established practice 
due to the agency‘s practical knowledge and expertise. The EA is more directly affected 
by EU legislation because (unlike the ADEME and UBA) it is directly involved in 
                                                 
1583
 Allen (2005:139) 
1584
 Interview British official (2009d) 
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implementation. The EA‘s best strategy was to try getting involved as early as possible 
in the decision-making process at all levels, which explains its European outlook. 
Horizontal cooperation between national environmental agencies does take place, but 
it tends to be sporadic and issue specific (e.g. through contacts between NRCs across 
countries). The main effect of the Eionet at the NRC level was the creation of contacts 
at various different levels (addressing different environmental policy issues) to facilitate 
potential cooperation. This is unlikely to have had an effect on the involved institutions 
as a whole.   
All environmental ministries and agencies have been subject to the Europeanization 
process, although to varying degrees. In an area as affected by EU policy developments 
as the environment, it would be impossible for the national agencies (and ministries) not 
to have felt an impact. The degree to which agencies have been Europeanized largely 
depends on the agencies‘ remits. Therefore an agency such as the EA which is 
responsible for a lot of the implementation of EU environmental legislation is likely to 
be more affected than, for example, the ADEME which focuses on environmental 
technologies and research rather than policy implementation. On the other hand, the 
UBA‘s involvement in EU committees also allows for participation which has a 
Europeanizing influence on the agency. Arguably the more contact points a national 
environment agency has with the supranational level through its involvement in the 
EU‘s legislative processes, the more likely it is to be affected by Europeanization. The 
biggest impact is likely to stem from EU environmental legislation leading to an 
altogether more European outlook, although interaction with EU institutions also plays a 
role. 
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7.3.4 Involvement of national agencies at the EU level (non-EEA related activities) 
Although the exact impact of the increased importance of EU-level developments is 
hard to measure, the empirical findings presented in this thesis clearly show that it is 
most significant on individual actors within institutions (i.e. national environment 
agencies). It is these individual actors, who experience a ‗double-hattedness‘1585 due to 
their greater involvement at the EU-level (e.g. in committees or through advisory and 
networking activities). Egeberg refers to agencies (and their employees) as serving two 
masters simultaneously: their national governments and the Commission.
1586
 Again, the 
degree to which this takes place and the amount of people in the institutions affected 
depends on the agencies‘/ministries‘ involvement and focus on the European level. A 
detailed assessment of the effects of Europeanization on a representative sample of the 
individuals employed by the national environmental institutions goes beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. Instead, the focus of this thesis is on the institutional structures, 
procedures and rules. However, this dissertation will draw on the findings gathered from 
national environmental agency and ministry officials whose work has been affected by 
the setting up of the EEA.
1587
 
The creation of a Brussels office of ADEME indicates the importance given to 
European-level developments. However, lack of such an office does not signify that an 
agency pays less attention to European issues or attributes less importance to them. It 
constitutes merely a different strategy of coping with Europeanization pressures. The 
creation of a Brussels office simply makes an agency‘s expanded EU focus more 
obvious. But its mere existence cannot be used as a measure for the importance 
attributed to European issues by the respective agency and even less so as a measure for 
the quality of relations it has established at the EU level. Although the ADEME 
                                                 
1585
 Egeberg (2006b:9-11) 
1586
 Ibid.:9-11 
1587
 The findings relate to interviews with eighteen national officials from the three case countries. 
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underwent several restructuring processes, its Brussels office remains in place and is 
still considered as valuable for its work. 
It was thought that the EA did not require an office in Brussels, because (at least 
initially) it was perceived by the ministry as ‗not working the Brussels circuit‘.1588 The 
EA also did not push for the creation of such an office. Defra therefore did not have to 
oppose the creation of a Brussels office for the EA although it probably would have 
done so.
1589
 Although the UBA does not have an office in Brussels, it can be considered 
as a Europeanized agency. The UBA‘s work is both strongly oriented towards and 
affected by EU developments. As an advisor to the German government, the UBA is 
highly involved in environmental policy discussions at the EU level. It also directly 
participates in the Commission‘s committees. The EA, on the other hand, initially felt 
left out of the EU decision-making process. It had to convince Defra that in addition to 
participating in committees, it needed to take part in EU negotiations right from the 
beginning.
1590
 Thus despite having no office in Brussels, both the EA and the UBA have 
played an important role in the EU decision-making process. Importantly, their 
technical expertise enriches EU policies and provides a (potential) further means of 
promoting country-specific positions. Most environmental laws in Germany are 
implemented and enforced by the Länder (although some further delegate these tasks to 
the local authorities). This might be one important reason why it is easier for the UBA 
to have a more European outlook, compared to the EA and ADEME which are both 
more centralised agencies that focus a lot more of their resources on dealing with 
operational issues, businesses and specific problems. 
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 Interview British official (2010b) 
1589
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7.4 Assessment of the EEA’s impact 
The assessment of the EEA‘s impact on national environment agencies in Germany, 
France and Britain will analyse the different ways in which these three countries have 
been affected and changed. Differences in changes will then be considered in relation to 
the drivers (for change) involved at the national and EU level. 
 
7.4.1 Moderate change 
Developments at the national level before and since the creation of the EEA involve 
changes made to the set-up regarding environment ministries and agencies. These 
include internal reforms and restructuring. They appear to be almost exclusively 
internally motivated. 
As already pointed out above, the creation of the EEA did have some impact on all 
three member countries. As a minimum requirement, EEA member countries have to 
put in place the processes which ensure that reporting obligations to the Eionet are 
fulfilled. This is ensured by the designation of a NFP within the information-providing 
institution as well as the allocation of the positions of NRCs which forward the data 
from the different subject areas to the NFP and the EEA. Arguably the biggest impact 
the creation of the EEA can have on member countries is to affect significantly their 
institutional landscape, as is the case in France.  
Membership of the EEA and its networks allows for a high degree of flexibility at the 
national level (e.g. allocating network positions and putting in place the structures and 
procedures). It is therefore highly improbable that the EEA‘s creation constituted a 
critical juncture leading to changes in the institutional landscape in its member 
countries. And although such change has taken place in the French case, the creation of 
the Ifen was not the result of a critical juncture. 
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7.4.2 Persistence of national differences 
The EEA‘s impact on its member countries varies as the national level still remains the 
main frame of reference for the national environment agencies. In the German case, the 
management board member is located in the BMU and the NFP in the UBA. Being an 
EEA member country has resulted in the establishment of an additional link between the 
environment ministry and the agency. No such additional link was created in the case of 
the UK where the MB member is located within the same division (i.e. the statistics 
division) of Defra as the NFP. Having the NFP and MB member within the same 
institution can be an advantage regarding the closeness of their working relationship. 
However, having the head of the statistics division as the management board member 
reduces the Eionet‘s visibility within Defra (because Eionet-related work is largely 
contained in one division). In Germany, on the other hand, the work of the Eionet is 
given greater visibility and additional support due to the MB member occupying a 
senior position in the BMU. The need to ensure that the MB member is fully briefed on 
Eionet and EEA-related developments has created an additional link between the 
ministry and the agency which would not have existed otherwise. After initial 
difficulties, the cooperation now works well.
1591
 
That the creation of the EEA did not constitute a critical juncture for any of the three 
case countries in this thesis seems to confirm hypothesis I (see Chapter Two). It is 
perhaps not a surprising finding when the EEA‘s lack of regulatory powers is 
considered. The EEA did not set out to try and change institutional arrangements at the 
national level. Instead, all the EEA could ask from its member countries was that they 
put in place the required procedures and fulfil their reporting obligations. Even in this 
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 Interview German official (2008a) 
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regard, the EEA relies on the member countries‘ willingness to supply the necessary 
information. The EEA cannot force the member countries to supply the information on 
time. The setting up of a system which lists the percentages of fulfilled requirements in 
the priority data flow constitutes an attempt by the EEA to achieve its targets. 
Additionally, there is the implicit agreement by the member countries to comply due to 
the passing of the EEA‘s founding regulation and the commitment of national officials 
in the MB. The EEA‘s lack of powers coupled with the continued independence of its 
member countries helps to explain why there has not been a significant Europeanization 
of national environment agencies in terms of significant structural changes. The impact 
of the EEA‘s creation on its member countries is simply not big enough to lead to 
changes at the national level which go beyond changes in procedures and regulation. 
While using Bulmer and Burch‘s dimensions of institutional change1592 (for more 
details see Chapter Two), it can be argued that the creation of the EEA has not affected 
organizations or political systems except in the case of the Ifen. This makes it necessary 
to explain the French case and the creation of the Ifen which is the odd one out. 
In France, changes to the Environment Ministry‘s competences, names, ministers and 
its subordinate institutions have been frequent. But in France it is not uncommon for 
changes in government to affect institutional set-ups at all levels. Transferring the 
environmental-data reporting side from the ministry to an independent institution is less 
remarkable within a political system which is as fluid and used to a high degree of 
change as the French one. 
Significant institutional changes in Germany are reflected in the creation of the UBA 
in 1974 and the setting up of an independent Environment Ministry in 1986. Although 
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the main locations of and policy issues covered by these two institutions changed over 
time, overall, their roles and responsibilities have remained largely the same. 
Changes to the British departmental landscape are also not uncommon. They have 
had an effect on the Environment Ministry which was been combined with food and 
rural affairs in 2001 to form Defra. The creation of a unified environment agency in 
1996 saw the amalgamation of HMIP, the NRA and a large number of WRAs. Although 
there has been a long tradition of agencies (or other institutions) dealing with 
pollution/environmental issues and health aspects in the UK, these tended to be 
specialised and often lacked overall coordination. Newly created institutions, were often 
formed out of existing bodies. Thus one of the component parts of HMIP can be traced 
to the 1863 Alkali Inspectorate (which later became the Industrial Air Pollution 
Inspectorate).
1593
 
Considering all these national developments, one would expect the EEA‘s impact to 
be the largest in France and lowest in Germany with the UK being somewhere in the 
middle. However, the empirical findings presented in Chapters Four to Six suggest a 
role reversal in the classification of UK and Germany. The EEA has caused only minor 
changes to processes in the UK while in Germany, new legislation was required to 
introduce changes in procedures. This is in line with broader trends in EU 
environmental policy which have required procedural changes in Germany since the 
1990s due to some member states (such as the UK) successfully uploading their 
domestic procedural measures to the EU level (which in turn triggered adaptation 
pressures in Germany and other member states because the EU procedures led to a 
misfit at the national level).
1594
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The change in Germany which is characterized by relatively high institutional 
stability is somewhat surprising. One possible explanation is that Germany‘s stability is 
also a result of its inflexibility. While the British system was flexible enough to adapt 
and accommodate the required elements for cooperation without major impacts on 
domestic institutions, in Germany these EU developments required new regulation to 
fulfil reporting obligations to the EEA. But, as the French example demonstrates, less 
stability and/or more flexibility does not automatically lessen the impact of international 
developments such as the creation of the EEA.  
The creation of the EEA had the biggest impact on France, resulting in the creation 
of the Ifen, an institution which was meant to mirror the EEA‘s work and set-up. 
However, this development has to be assessed within the context of frequently changing 
institutions in France including even ministry level changes (as nicely demonstrated by 
the frequent changes to the ministry‘s scope and name). 
 
Table 7.2: National stability and EU impact 
 
 
 
 
 
Country ranking  
according to the  
degree of national  
stability 
 
 
Country ranking  
according to the  
degree of the  
EU’s impact 
 
 
 highest* 
 
 
 
 lowest* 
 
 
 Germany 
 
 UK 
 
 France 
 
 France 
 
 Germany 
 
 UK 
*Out of the three countries considered 
 
 
While changes (at departmental/ministerial level) are by no means unheard of in the 
British political system, they appear less frequent and more strategic than in the French 
case. In Germany, the federal system and institutionalized procedures reduce the overall 
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flexibility of the administrative system and thus limit the scope for frequent institutional 
changes. This is due to the existence of more veto points and/or veto players in federal 
systems (compared to unitary systems) which therefore find it more difficult to reach 
consensus on the introduction of changes (as, for example, required by 
Europeanization).
1595
 Börzel and Risse go so far as to suggest that Europeanization has 
even strengthened German federalism.
1596
 Thus by needing to establish a system which 
includes the Länder in the EU decision-making process and in the implementation of 
EU legislation, their involvement has become institutionalized. This in turn has made 
the German environmental policy system arguably less open to top-down change from 
the EU level. Moreover, a unified national environment agency was created very early 
in Germany (when compared to many other EU member states). The creation of unified 
agencies in France and Britain did not take place until a later date (as was the case for 
the ADEME and EA which were created in the 1990s). The UBA‘s age and high 
reputation also offered protection from externally driven changes to its set-up and 
responsibilities. This is not to say that the UBA is immune to external pressures or 
opposed to change. However, overall the UBA has been a remarkably stable institution. 
This could be partly due to the fact that the UBA was created at a time when the 
environment became a distinct policy field. It was therefore able to evolve 
incrementally while environmental policy matured as a policy field. More importantly, 
this incremental change fits well the argument that German environmental structures 
have experienced very little overall change since the early 1970s (despite the creation of 
an independent Environment Ministry in 1986).
1597
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7.4.3 Explaining change through national and EU factors 
The drivers for and barriers to change assessed in this section are those observed in the 
three case countries in relation to the creation of the EEA. Developments leading to 
institutional change can take place at various levels ranging from the institution itself 
(institution-internal) to pressures from the national or EU level. 
The stability of the national political system can play an important role for the impact 
of Europeanization. A flexible political system might be more open to change while a 
more stable political system is likely to be more reluctant to create new national 
administrative structures as a result of EU-level developments and will often do so only 
when absolutely necessary (e.g. if EU legislation demands it). Empirical examples 
which confirm this assumption are the flexible French political system, which allowed 
for the creation of a new environmental administrative body as the direct result of the 
setting up of the EEA, and the stable German political system which passed new 
legislation regarding the exchange of information, but undertook no significant 
institutional changes within the domestic environmental administration.  
As regards a country‘s (or government‘s) attitude to European integration, it is likely 
that in more pro-European countries, EU-level developments are considered less 
sceptically and embraced more willingly compared to more Euro-sceptic countries. 
Although the empirical findings of this thesis appear to confirm this assumption, at least 
for the British and German cases, there are also reasons unrelated to a 
country‘s/government‘s attitude towards European integration which help to explain the 
country-specific outcomes. 
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Table 7.3: Drivers for and barriers to change 
 
 
 
 
 
Drivers 
 
Barriers 
 
Institution- 
internal 
 
 
Lack of flexibility 
 
High degree of independence 
 
 
Flexibility  
 
Lack of independence 
 
National level 
 
 
 
Flexible political system 
 
Positive attitude to European  
integration 
 
High salience of the issue 
 
 
Stable political system  
 
Negative attitude to European 
integration 
 
Low salience of the issue 
 
EU level 
 
 
The need to put new structures into  
Place 
 
Allowing set-ups for network 
participation to be decided at  
the national level 
 
 
 
Another possible driver for change is the high salience of a particular political issue. A 
highly salient issue might increase political or even public pressure for change while 
low salience can be a barrier to change (because change requires political and/or public 
support). This issue is probably most significant in the French case, where the 
government and wider ‗political mood‘ at the time very much called for progress in 
environmental politics at the national and the EU level. This enabled the creation of the 
Ifen in 1991, something which might not have taken place at that particular point in time 
had the EEA been created five years earlier or later. The opening up of a policy window 
at that particular period of time allowed for the creation of the Ifen. 
The decision to allow member countries to allocate nodes of the EEA‘s network 
according to the location best suited for their work can be considered as the main barrier 
to change from the European level (because it enabled continuity). Most countries did 
not introduce significant changes unless they were obliged to do so. Obviously, leaving 
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the decision of where to locate NFPs and NRCs up to the member countries was not 
intended as a barrier to change. Instead it was a move to facilitate the passing of the 
legislation which created the EEA and an acknowledgement of the different national 
set-ups requiring individual arrangements for their participation in the Eionet. On the 
other hand, the need to put new structures in place on whatever scale is likely to involve 
an assessment of whether the existing structures are suitable for the newly required 
tasks. Such an assessment might give the impetus for internal institutional reforms if 
existing structures are found to be unsatisfactory for the new tasks. 
These drivers for and barriers to change need to be considered in the context of the 
already existing institutional structures at the national level. For example, had Defra not 
already been highly advanced in its environmental data collection, the outcome might 
have been very different irrespective of the drivers and barriers listed in Table 7.3. 
Similarly, had there already been an established arrangement between the federal level 
and the Länder in Germany regarding the exchange of environmental data, new 
legislation would not have been required and the effects would possibly have been as 
limited as they were in the British case. Thus Table 7.3 ought to be seen as a list of 
possible explanatory factors which help to identify the drivers for and barriers to change 
rather than an ultimate checklist for explaining (or even predicting) change in a 
deterministic manner. 
In some cases, factors can be either drivers or barriers to change depending on the 
situation. If an institution‘s flexibility is low, this could mean it is less open to change. 
On the other hand, this lack of flexibility can also result in the agency having no other 
choice than to change. The specific circumstances are therefore important. Due to the 
national environment agency‘s reliance on information from the Länder agencies and its 
inability to change the national set-up in a way which would have allowed meeting the 
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reporting obligations, the government was required to pass new legislation outlining the 
information exchange between the UBA and the Land level. However, a higher degree 
of flexibility of the institutions involved in the networks appears to facilitate their 
participation without having significant effects on the institutions themselves. For 
example Defra, was not affected significantly as an institution with the exception of a 
few staff who were directly involved in the Eionet.  
 
7.5 EEA-related comparison 
7.5.1 National choice of NFP locations  
According to the revised EEA regulation (no 401/2009)  
Member States may in particular designate from among the institutions [...] or 
other organizations established in their territory a ―national focal point‖ for 
coordinating and/or transmitting the information to be supplied at national level to 
the Agency and to the institutions or bodies forming part of the Network [...].
1598
  
 
The decision to locate the German NFP in the UBA had similar reasons as it did in the 
British case: the UBA was the logical place to locate the NFP in order to best fulfil its 
reporting obligations. As the UBA constituted the main source of environmental 
information for the German government (and to some degree also the public), it was 
chosen to host the NFP. 
Initially, France‘s set-up was the exception to the rule as regards the national 
arrangements with the Eionet. In France there was a perceived need for a new 
environmental body and its institutional set-up and remit was modelled on the EEA‘s 
set up and remit. Initially the position of NFP was located at the directorial level of the 
Ifen. However, with the change in status and loss of independence, the NFP was 
assigned to a lower level.  
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The reason behind locating the British NFP in Defra was that the required 
information which had to be reported through the Eionet was dealt with by the 
department‘s statistics division, making it a comparatively easy choice for hosting the 
NFP. Moreover, there was no real alternative for the location of the British NFP 
available at the time because the creation of a unified environment agency did not take 
place until 1996. The issue of relocating the NFP to the EA was brought up from time to 
time, for example by a former British NFP who felt the NFP work would be given 
higher priority in the EA than in Defra.
1599
 But moving the NFP to the EA has never 
been seriously discussed and the satisfactory performance of the Defra location does not 
make this a pressing issue. 
Another issue relating to the NFP is continuity and the degree to which an effort to 
ensure such continuity is made. This is especially important when considering that the 
person who takes on a certain role can make a crucial difference. While it is not possible 
to assess in detail in this thesis the various degrees to which an individual can affect the 
job which s/he carries out in a network such as the Eionet, continuity in terms of staff 
for the NFP role can be an advantage. Whatever the professional background of the 
NFP – German NFPs tend to be generalists, French NFPs tend to be former 
environmental experts while British NFPs tend to be statisticians – the person who 
carries out the job has to acquire additional skills. The generalist will have to learn more 
about the data provision whereas the statistician will have to learn about the EU and 
environmental policy aspects. However, because the country position in the priority data 
flow does not depend solely on the abilities of the individuals working as NFPs, it does 
not serve as a reliable indicator for the quality of their work.  
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In the German case, the NFP work is supposed to take up about 90 per cent of the 
time allocated to the job, with the other 10 per cent dedicated to the work relating to the 
EPA network. The situation is similar in the French case where the official taking on the 
role as NFP – first at the Ifen and now at the SOeS – spends all his/her time on work 
related to participation in the Eionet. For the French and German NFP, their NFP work 
takes up the largest part of their work and is considered (by them and their superiors) as 
their priority. In the UK, on the other hand, NFP work is supposed to take up only about 
20 per cent, partly due to the comparatively easy data reporting in the British case 
(where most of the required data was already available prior to the creation of the EEA 
and probably needed only some minor changes to the reporting format). However, the 
comparatively little amount of time allocated to the NFP work in Britain also appears 
symptomatic of the relatively low importance allocated to the EEA and its work within 
the ministry. While the British NFP is able to fulfil the reporting obligations, there is 
little room for participation in specific working groups or additional Eionet-related 
projects. 
 
7.5.2 National choice of NRC locations 
Due to the flexibility granted to the member countries when choosing the (ideal) 
location for their NFPs, it is almost impossible to interpret these choices beyond stating 
that the locations where chosen because they seemed the most suitable and effective 
setting at the time. Thus in Germany, the NRCs are located almost exclusively within 
the UBA. The French Eionet set-up had most of the NRCs in Ifen, which were relocated 
to the SOeS after its creation, while a few are located with ADEME and other bodies. In 
the UK, most NRCs are located at Defra, although some other bodies are used and since 
2009, the EA has taken on some NRC-related roles. NRC locations differ, simply 
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because each member country has to find the most appropriate location for them. 
Whether this is within the same institution as the NFP or a different one appears to be 
insignificant with regards to the (degree of) impact which the EEA has on the member 
countries.  
The fact that the majority of NRCs are located in one institution (usually the same 
one as the NFP) could indicate that the size and set-up of the agency is sufficient to 
fulfil the network‘s needs without much outside help. However, it is also possible that 
NRCs are allocated within an organization not because they are able to fulfil all 
reporting requirements by themselves, but because (by allocating the NRC position 
internally) it may make it easier for the NFP to manage Eionet-related work. In return, 
the NRC is then responsible for maintaining contacts outside the institution and for 
ensuring that reporting requirements are met.  
 
7.5.3 Effect of EEA creation on the institutions involved in the Eionet 
In this section, the focus is on involvement in the Eionet by the UBA and Ifen, as the 
ADEME only hosts a small number of NRCs and the EA has only taken on NRC-
related tasks since 2009. In the French case, the Ifen was created to be a national 
equivalent of the EEA whose organizational set-up it mirrors. The setting up of the EEA 
has had the effect of leading to the creation of Ifen. This is possibly the biggest effect 
the creation of the EEA could realistically have had on any member country. On the 
other hand, since the Ifen‘s creation, the impact of the EEA has declined.  Because the 
Ifen was created with the EEA‘s work and the role of Ifen in that work in mind, the 
required processes have been accommodated in its institutional design. Changes to the 
Ifen‘s independence at a later date were due to national political motives, rather than the 
result of developments related to the EEA. 
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The UBA, on the other hand, was a well established agency, whose cooperation with 
the Länder level had to be altered so that it could fulfil its reporting obligations within 
the Eionet framework. This was easily done by passing legislation outlining the 
reporting obligations of the Land to the federal level. The UBA‘s reliance on the 
cooperation with Land agencies is not the result of the creation of the EEA. However, 
the EEA‘s Eionet participation has forced the cooperation to become more structured 
while adhering to the timetables of the NFP and NRCs. It appears that this could only be 
achieved through regulation. In a political system as stable as Germany, the EEA‘s 
creation has thus resulted in a new piece of legislation. 
The creation of the EEA and the location of the NFP in Defra has had no impact at 
all on the ministry. However, the importance allocated to NFP and EEA activities is 
lowest in the UK compared to Germany and France. The British NFP has the least time 
available to focus on Eionet-related work. While the reporting obligations are fulfilled 
(see priority data flow), there are many other ways in which the NFPs can get involved 
(working groups being one of them) for which there is no time allocated in the British 
case.  
It could therefore be argued that the less important the work of the NFP (or the 
Eionet and the EEA as a whole) is considered by the government, the less likely it is for 
that work to have an impact on that particular member country. Another possible reason 
for the comparable lack of importance attributed to the NFP work could be that the UK 
already had a strong domestic tradition of collecting environmental data which 
facilitated the fulfilment of the Eionet‘s reporting obligations. Moreover, the data 
collected was already held in a single place. It thus did not require much additional 
effort from Defra apart from ensuring that the data was forwarded to the EEA. 
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7.5.4 Effect of EEA creation on agencies which are not part of the Eionet  
The ADEME and EA only have limited involvement with the EEA. They were therefore 
less affected by its creation and the reporting obligations to the Eionet. 
In the French case even an increased focus on European issues and/or the existence 
of an agency‘s office in Brussels did not automatically lead to an increased involvement 
with the EEA by those agencies which were not involved in the Eionet network. In the 
case of the EA there was some contact through participation in the EPA network. 
However, there is currently no French representation in the network. This appears an 
unusual and unexpected outcome, especially when bearing in mind the reasons behind 
the creation of the Ifen. The reasons for the lack of French participation in the EPA 
network, which will be discussed further in Chapter Eight, include Ifen-internal 
changes, the dissolution of the Ifen and lack of apparent replacement. 
The fact that EU agencies which work through networks like the Eionet (such as the 
EEA) depend on the participation and cooperation of their member countries, does not 
automatically mean that national environment agencies are required to be involved. The 
EEA‘s creation had overall relatively little impact on the national administrations it is 
involved with (with the partial exception of France). It would therefore be logical to 
expect that the EEA has had even less or no influence on those national environment 
agencies which are not involved in its networks. This certainly seems to be the case for 
the EA and the ADEME. Generally the EEA appears to be open to working with other 
agencies outside its networks. However, the national agencies may not share a 
willingness to cooperate or their budgets might not allow for it. Moreover, the more 
national environment agencies‘ remit differs from that of the EEA, the less likely 
cooperation is perceived as beneficial for both of them. 
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7.6 Conclusions 
All three case countries have been subject to the Europeanization process as a 
consequence of EU membership. Each country has dealt with the Europeanization 
process in its unique way (which was in line with its national environmental policy 
system). It is nevertheless possible to make some generalizations regarding the impact 
on each country. In Germany, Europeanization resulted in some changes in an otherwise 
stable framework (‗motion within stability‘1600). The developments in France can be 
described as modernization through EU membership. In the British case, 
Europeanization has taken place within a political system which exhibits an overall lack 
of commitment to deeper European integration. Looking more closely at the impact of 
the EEA, the developments in the three case countries tend to fit the above mentioned 
broad generalizations. The participation in the Eionet has required the introduction of 
some changes to procedures in Germany, but it has not led to significant changes to the 
institutional structures or the political system as a whole. In France the creation of an 
environmental information agency similar to the EEA was perceived as necessary at the 
time. The discussions in France, which preceded the creation of the EEA, provided the 
trigger for the Ifen‘s creation. In the British case, the impact of the EEA‘s creation is 
inconspicuous and limited to minor procedural adjustments, although Defra has been 
Europeanized unrelated to the EEA.  
The EEA has had some impact on all of its member countries. It facilitated and 
enabled contacts and exchanges between environmental experts from different member 
countries in all areas of environmental policy. The degree to which such links exist 
depends on factors such as the individuals in place (for the NRC) and their willingness 
to cooperate beyond official reporting obligations.  It also depends on the specific policy 
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area, its salience and degree of activity. An event as minor as a change of NRC staff in 
one position in one country can mean that previously established connections are lost 
due to their informality and lack of institutionalisation. However, it is very hard to 
measure exactly the effects of such changes. 
The German NFP faced the challenge of gathering information from the Länder. This 
proved to be cumbersome and required the introduction of new specific legislation. 
Apart from the new legislation and procedural changes, the UBA appears not to have 
been affected by the creation of the EEA. Its creation was certainly nowhere near the 
extent to which it had become Europeanized as a result of Germany‘s EU membership 
prior to the setting up of the EEA. This fits in with the overall stability of the German 
political system in which the environmental structures in particular remained largely 
unchanged, despite the fact that policy content was heavily influenced by EU 
environmental legislation. As was mentioned above, in an interview conducted for this 
thesis a former UBA president pointed out that it is nearly impossible to differentiate 
between national, international and global environmental issues. He argued that 
whatever topic UBA officials work on, the European (and/or international) perspective 
always also plays an important role.
1601
 This European outlook of the UBA (and BMU) 
enabled the co-evolution of national and EU environmental policy despite occasional 
friction between the two levels of environmental policy-making.  
Finally, Germany very much favoured the creation of the EEA. For Germany (like 
France), the adoption of the legislation which created the EEA became a high priority 
issue during the French EU presidency in 1989. The enthusiasm of French 
environmental policy actors for the setting up of the EEA also created the political 
momentum which allowed for the creation of the Ifen to take place. The creation of the 
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Ifen resulted out of the perceived need for an independent institution which could deal 
with environmental data required by the EEA. It also fitted the ‗political mood‘ at a time 
when France was very ambitious regarding developments in the environmental field at 
the national and the EU level. France strongly supported the creation of the EEA and 
became actively involved in the setting up of the Eionet, aiming for no less than two out 
of the five ETCs.
1602
 France set up the Ifen to mirror the EEA in order to ensure that its 
national interests were well represented. However, these developments in France show 
that there are discrepancies between the predictions made in my first hypothesis which 
predicted only a limited impact of the EEA on national environment agencies and what 
actually took place in the French case. Does hypothesis I therefore require modification 
in the light of my empirical findings about the creation of the Ifen in France? Compared 
to the other two case countries (i.e. Germany and Britain), France appears to be the 
exception to the rule. In order to assess the French exceptionalism, the significance of 
the Ifen in France‘s political system and institutional landscape needs to be considered. 
While the new agency was considered an important addition to the environmental 
institutional landscape at the time, the momentum behind its creation was lost soon after 
it was set up. While an independent evaluation of the environment and environmental 
policy was welcomed (although more by the scientific community and environmental 
NGOs than the government), the Ifen remained relatively small and was unable to 
prevent its loss of independence and eventual dissolution. Possible amendments to 
hypothesis I to accommodate the particularity of the French situation will be considered 
in the concluding chapter (Chapter Nine). 
Moreover, the Ifen‘s creation was initiated by a minister, whose successor already no 
longer saw the need for it. It is therefore not surprising that Ifen was abolished in 2008. 
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Hayward describes as ―heroic‖ France‘s typical decision-making style which is 
characterised by a large capacity for policy initiatives and the propensity of political 
leaders to impose their will, often resulting in a reactive short-term and piecemeal 
approach to problem-solving.
1603
 The variety of different roles and powers allocated to 
the French Environment Ministry (and its numerous changes) by different governments 
and/or ministers seems to provide empirical support for Hayward‘s classification of the 
typical French policy style which explains well the ease with which new institutions 
were created and disappeared within the French political system. 
The impact on existing French agencies and the ministry was minimal, especially 
with the ADEME not being closely involved with the Eionet. The creation of the Ifen 
took place because neither the French Environment Ministry nor the existing 
environmental institutions were considered as the ideal location to fulfil the reporting 
role required for the Eionet. On the other hand, this would not have required a 
completely new institution, as the Eionet-related tasks could have been allocated to one 
of the existing institutions or the ministry itself. The political momentum at the time 
was in favour of creating a new institute which could fulfil the reporting obligations vis-
à-vis the EEA and also be in charge of evaluating environmental policy developments. 
For the latter task it was considered important to have an independent body with close 
links to the scientific community. However, over time the political climate changed 
which led to the loss of independence and eventual dissolution of the Ifen.  
Due to an overall lack of institutional ‗stickiness‘ in the French environmental 
institutional landscape, the change that took place due to the EEA‘s creation only had an 
impact on the French institutional landscape for seventeen years. Neither does the 
creation of the Ifen nor its dissolution less than two decades later seem to fit historical 
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institutionalist expectations. On the other hand, the aspect of historical institutionalism 
which is particularly important for the French case is the focus on and consideration of 
processes over time. With rapid institutional set-ups and reforms in France which 
contradicted even the policy goals of its own governments, the contradiction in 
hypothesis I is hardly surprising, as it appears not to be applicable to environmental 
institutions in the French political system. Thus, what Hall uses as a suitable framework 
for assessing economic policy in France and Britain
1604
 does not necessarily work when 
applied to French environmental institutions. The reduction of independence and 
eventual dissolution of the Ifen was widely considered a great loss in France, not only 
by the scientific community. Evaluation of the state of the environment by the same 
body responsible for the adoption of environmental legislation leaves room for doubt 
about the independence and reliability of environmental assessments and publications 
on the effectiveness of its policies. This goes against what the French government 
claimed it was trying to achieve through environmental initiatives such as the Grenelle. 
Such a regressive step invites questions about the government‘s and ministry‘s 
motivation behind the changes to and eventual dissolution of the Ifen. 
The main reason for a lack of impact which the creation of the EEA had on Defra as 
NFP host stems from the ministry‘s ability to provide the required information without 
the need to implement significant changes. However, in addition to the reporting 
obligations, NFPs can get involved in working groups and/or projects which can be 
beneficial for both the EEA and the participating NFPs. But in Britain there is often 
(apparent) reluctance to get sucked deeper into the EU and its decision-making 
processes. Even if a British NFP would like to increase his/her engagement beyond 
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what is legally required there are severe time constraints on his/her ability to take on 
additional tasks.  
The creation of the EEA has not resulted in administrative or institutional 
convergence in Germany, France and the UK. But there is also no indication of existing 
differences at the national level having become more pronounced. While 
Europeanization can, on occasion, lead to changes at the national level leading to 
increased convergence, such developments are less likely to affect national 
environmental institutions themselves. The setting up of the EEA and the participation 
of the member countries in the Eionet has not made a significant contribution towards 
the emergence of an EAS among EEA member countries and is unlikely to do so in the 
near future. EU efforts to bring about the creation of an EAS are likely to generate great 
resistance and possibly also protests on the national level where EU member states are 
unlikely to change (well-functioning) national administrative structures and traditions. It 
is hard to imagine member states moving towards administrative convergence 
voluntarily. The EEA‘s main impact on national environment administrations was 
therefore the harmonization of environmental data reporting. 
 
Counterfactual: 
It is worth pausing for a moment to contemplate the counterfactual that the EEA had not 
been created. In the German case, the new legislation outlining the exchange of 
environmental data between the federal and the Länder levels was required to ensure 
that the German NFP was able to meet its reporting obligations to the EEA. Although 
this was a direct result of the UBA‘s Eionet participation, it is possible that such an 
administrative agreement (or a similar one) would have been passed eventually on the 
national level without any EEA/Eionet involvement. However, without the EEA such an 
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agreement between the federal government and the Länder would probably not have 
come about as early as 1996.  
In the French case, the non-existence of the EEA is likely to have had a much more 
obvious impact as the Ifen would almost definitely not have been set up. Ifen‘s creation 
was a direct response to the creation of the EEA. At the time, the setting up of Ifen was 
considered to be the best possible solution to ensure France would be able to meet its 
reporting obligations. Without the EEA, environmental reporting is more likely to have 
been included eventually into the main statistical services or the Environment Ministry 
(as it currently is) rather than an independent agency. The creation of a separate body 
(i.e. the Ifen) appears to have been highly unlikely without the existence of the EEA. 
The political momentum in France which fostered the creation of the Ifen, only lasted a 
few years. An Ifen-type agency without the existence of the EEA would almost 
definitely not have been allocated the management board and scientific committee of 
the Ifen. As the ADEME‘s interaction with the EEA is limited, the non-existence of the 
EEA would be unlikely to affect this agency in any significant way. 
The British case is probably the most straightforward as the perceived lack of impact 
of the EEA on Defra means that the outcome would have been the same or very similar 
without the EEA. It is true that there were some small procedural changes as a result of 
the NFP being placed in Defra. But they were minor and the lack of importance given to 
the EEA and its work within Defra makes it highly unlikely that the EEA‘s non-
existence would have triggered significantly different outcomes. 
Finally, what would have happened to environmental reporting in the EU had the 
EEA not been created? The EEA was created at a time when the reporting of 
environmental data became increasingly important at the EU-level. However, the 
reporting of environmental data within the EU initially lacked the features which 
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became some of the EEA‘s main tasks (including making available timely, relevant and 
comparable environmental data which requires some sort of harmonization of reporting 
formats). One interviewee pointed out that something similar to the EEA would have 
had to be created, otherwise the Commission‘s work would have suffered because of its 
growing need for better environmental data in order to make well informed 
decisions.
1605
 Eventually, the Commission would have had to come to some sort of 
arrangement (with national environment agencies and/or ministries) to address the lack 
of comparable environmental data across the EU. Theoretically it could have led to an 
expansion of Eurostat to include more up-to-date environmental data.
1606
 Since its 
beginning, the role of the EEA has expanded significantly. By 2010, it included 
activities such as interpretation of the data received by the EEA, the development of 
environmental indicators and the conceptualisation of different environmental scenarios. 
The EEA does not simply reproduce the data it receives from its member countries. It 
puts such data into context providing it with additional value which Eurostat (as it 
currently exists) would not be able to do. Although the creation of the EEA took place 
as part of a wave of European agency creation, there was a real need for the services of 
an independent European environment agency. The creation of the EEA should 
therefore not be seen merely as the result of an expanding list of European agencies, 
some of which might not be essential for the (functioning of the) EU. 
With the help of the counterfactual it is possible to conclude that the EEA did indeed 
have an impact on two out of the three case countries assessed in this thesis (even if it 
was only small in one of them). In the German case it resulted in the speeding up of 
processes which may have been put in place at a later date, while in the French case, 
there would not have been an Ifen-style environment agency without the EEA. 
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Chapter 8: Case Study: The EPA network  
        
 
8.1 Introduction 
The Network of Heads of European Environment Protection Agencies describes itself as 
an informal grouping bringing together the heads of environment protection 
agencies and similar bodies across Europe to exchange views and experiences on 
issues of common interest to organizations involved in the practical day-to-day 
implementation of environmental policy.
1607
  
 
This chapter aims to analyse the creation of the network, its functions, organization and 
role before addressing the membership of the EEA, Germany, France and Britain. It 
provides an important insight into a network which exists alongside the EEA‘s Eionet, 
aiming to bring together national environment agencies. The chapter ends with an 
analysis of the (case study-specific) hypothesis III which stated that differences in 
national administrative traditions lead to different motivations for the participation of 
national environmental agencies in European networks (see Chapter Two). 
 
Historical background 
The idea for the creation of the EPA network came about following a similar (but 
unrelated) initiative in the early 2000s by Sir Ken Collins (then-chair of the SEPA and 
former leader of the EP‘s Environment Committee), Barbara Young and John Harman 
from the EA (chief executive and chairman at the time), the director of the EEA, 
Domingo Jiménez Beltrán, as well as the directors of the Danish and Italian 
environment protection agencies. They all agreed that in addition to regular meetings of 
environment ministers at the European level, it would be a good idea to arrange regular 
conferences for national parliamentary environment committees to discuss their 
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different perspectives.1608 Following this conference, which took place in the offices of 
the EEA, the same people thought of arranging something similar for the heads of 
environment agencies in Europe.1609 Being aware of (some of) the national differences 
between environment agencies, it was thought that regular exchanges to discuss the 
different perspectives of the various national environmental agencies could be very 
beneficial.1610 Initially, the main driver for the creation of the EPA network was to get a 
better understanding of how and why things (such as the enforcement of environmental 
policy) are done differently in different countries.1611 
The EEA‘s director was entrusted with the task of setting up the network‘s first 
meeting.1612 However, a change of director delayed the setting up of the network. 
Jiménez Beltrán was not immediately followed by Jacqueline McGlade, and in the 
meantime, the EEA‘s deputy director had been fulfilling the duties of director, although 
new activities (such as the creation of the EPA network) were put on hold while the 
search for the EEA‘s new permanent director continued.1613 Another motivation for 
setting up the EPA network through the EEA was the large number of potential network 
members.1614 At the time of setting up the EPA network (i.e. prior to 2004), the EU only 
had 15 member states, whereas the EEA had significantly more member countries, 
including all of the new Central and Eastern European countries which were about to 
join the EU in 2004 and 2007.1615 From its beginning, the EPA network was aiming to 
be as inclusive as possible. Just like the EEA, it restricts potential membership to 
geographical factors rather than EU membership. It has been suggested that there might 
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be a greater benefit for non-EU countries to be members of the EPA network than for 
EU countries.1616 
Moreover, there was a general consensus that something like the EPA network was 
needed to create a forum in which environment agency directors would have a space to 
get together for informal discussions.1617 One EEA official pointed out the network‘s  
added value to every director, but not only the directors but also hopefully to the 
whole organization […] [in the sense] that you learn more in depth about another 
country and another country‘s way of dealing with environment protection and also 
what actually every environment protection agency is looking at because they are 
so diverse.
1618
 
 
The first meeting of the EPA network, which took place in November 2003, was hosted 
and organized by the EEA. Although the member agencies had different expectations of 
the EPA network, overall it was perceived as a useful network from a very early stage 
onwards.1619  
 
8.2 The EPA network 
8.2.1 Aims and role of the EPA network 
The main aim of the EPA network is to strengthen environmental protection in Europe 
through enhancing cooperation between its members.1620 In order to achieve this aim, 
EPA network meetings provide a forum for the directors to be in contact with each other 
thus facilitating exchanges about common problems, possible solutions and national 
practice. In addition to the creation of ‗interest groups‘ in the EPA network framework, 
the contacts also facilitated bilateral or multilateral cooperation on specific 
(environmental) issues. ‗Interest groups‘ within the context of the EPA network refer to 
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network internal groupings of environment agencies on specific issues of shared 
interest.1621 Moreover, the EPA network provided the opportunity of developing 
common positions, which can then be passed on to the Commission.1622 One EPA 
member described the network as an opportunity for the directors to see their agencies 
through other people‘s eyes.1623 A special effort is made to keep meetings informal. In 
its internal guidelines, the EPA network is described as providing  
a forum for exchange of information on policy and implementation developments 
and for identifying, managing and giving resources to possible areas of 
cooperation, ranging from policy to organizational issues.
1624
  
 
The network considers itself to be working in the interests of the European people by 
having efficient agencies active in the environmental field in European countries.1625 
 
Box 8.1: Aims of the EPA network 
 
The Network of Heads of European Environment Protection Agencies aims to: 
 
 provide a forum for leadership on critical issues of environmental policy and   
implementation across the policy cycle 
 
 provide a forum for high level dialogue and exchange of information on 
matters of mutual concern 
 
 promote and support bilateral/multilateral cooperation between its members 
through sharing experiences, approaches, problems and solutions 
 
 provide support to the network‘s members through exchange of information,  
organization of mutual support and the organization of topical cooperation 
 
 serve as a place for discussion with regard to policy implementation proposals 
and/or developments 
 
 devise and deliver practical solutions to common problems 
 
 provide a mechanism for communicating the views of environment protection 
and nature conservation agencies to third parties and the wider public 
 
Source: EPA Network (2010) 
                                                 
1621
 Interview EEA official (2008a) 
1622
 UBA (2008) 
1623
 Interview British official (2010b) 
1624
 EPA Network (2006a) 
1625
 Ibid. 
306 
 
 
It is also important for the EPA network to ensure that it is not duplicating the activities 
of other networks, such as the Eionet, the IMPEL network or the European Network of 
Heads of Nature Conservation Agencies (ENCA).1626 Although the IMPEL network was 
created already in the early 1990s, it has not been the main influence for the creation of 
the EPA network. Moreover, IMPEL members tend to be the ministries in many 
member countries although there are some exceptions (such as the UK where the EA 
participates in IMPEL). Moreover, due to the EEA‘s lack of involvement in the 
implementation process, the EEA is not a member of the IMPEL network. Another 
major difference between the networks is that IMPEL network membership requires a 
membership fee, whereas the costs for participating in the EPA network are met by each 
member agency (with some additional financial support from the EEA for the EPA 
network secretariat). The differences in their roles and membership mean that the two 
networks are not competing but complement each other, although there is an occasional 
overlap in topics of interest (such as better regulation). A significantly higher degree of 
overlap exists between the ENCA network and the EPA network, the latter of which 
includes nature protection agencies.1627 This is not only because nature conservation is 
considered part of environmental protection, but also because a large number of 
environment agencies also cover nature conservation.1628 
 
8.2.2 Organization and functioning of the EPA network 
For most EPA network decisions (such as publications or the creation of ‗interest 
groups‘) reaching consensus is not necessary, as member agencies can decide whether 
                                                 
1626
 UBA (2008) 
1627
 Interview EEA official (2010b) 
1628
 Ibid. 
307 
 
or not they want to be involved. However, internal guidelines can be changed with 
unanimity voting only.1629 Following the initial adaptation of the network‘s guidelines in 
2006, a review was needed in order to establish whether any changes were required. 
Overall, there was a high level of satisfaction with the network‘s 2006 guidelines.1630 
The 2010 evaluation therefore resulted only in relatively minor changes of the 
guidelines, mostly to improve their clarity.1631 Changes to the guidelines include the 
option of ministry participation in countries where government structures would make 
the ministry the logical member of the network, cooperation with the recently 
established ENCA network, and the availability of network publications to the public.1632 
Although it was already possible for ministries to attend the EPA network (in those 
countries where the governance structures made them the most appropriate member), it 
was decided to make this possibility more explicit by stating it in the guidelines.1633 In 
the case of Germany and Britain (where prominent agencies such as the UBA and the 
EA exist) there was no question of the ministry taking part. No French institution (i.e. 
neither the ministry nor environment agency) is currently a member of the network (see 
also below). 
 
Membership 
In 2010 the network had more than 30 member agencies. Members of the EPA network 
are the heads of environment protection agencies (or similar bodies).1634 Generally, the 
network should consist of one to two environment protection agencies from each 
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country across Europe, in addition to the EEA.1635 One of the criteria for qualifying as an 
agency which can participate in the EPA network is that the core business of the agency 
needs to be environment protection and nature conservation (the latter also being 
currently addressed by the ENCA network).1636 Another condition is that they should 
fulfil either major executive or advisory tasks for their governments within a European 
context.1637 Member agencies are also expected to contribute to the promotion of the 
EPA network‘s aims and be capable and willing to play an active, long term role within 
the network.1638 Most of the agencies involved in the EPA network gather and assess 
environmental information and advise the authorities and public.1639 A smaller number 
of environment agencies also have regulatory functions and enforcement powers.1640 
The agencies which the EPA network is mainly aimed at are those which operate at 
the national level. Although the network aims to be inclusive, due to some practical 
restrictions (i.e. its size) it is unable to include regional agencies (which can play a very 
important role in supporting the national-level agencies in some member countries).1641 
Ensuring the existence and upkeep of appropriate links with other agencies or 
institutions (including the regional level) in the respective countries is the responsibility 
of each member agency.1642 
 
Troika, chairperson and organizing committee  
The troika refers to the system of agencies which make up the organizing committee for 
the plenary meetings.1643 Similar to the troika system used for the rotating EU Council 
                                                 
1635
 EPA Network (2006a) 
1636
 Ibid.. EPA Network (2010) 
1637
 EPA Network (2006a) 
1638
 Ibid. 
1639
 Interview EEA official (2010b)  
1640
 Ibid. 
1641
 Interview EEA official (2008a)  
1642
 EPA Network (2006a) 
1643
 Ibid. 
309 
 
presidencies up until the Amsterdam Treaty, the troika for the EPA network is made up 
of the chairperson, the incoming and the outgoing chair.1644 The member who has hosted 
the last meeting shares its experiences with the incumbent and the member who is due 
to host the next meeting. According to one EEA official, the members involved in the 
troika are usually very active and the rotation system works well.1645 One of the troika 
members serves as the EPA network‘s chairperson for the period between plenary 
meetings.1646 After the plenary meeting the chairperson‘s term ends.1647 The chairperson 
is responsible for the coordination of activities between meetings and the agenda of the 
meeting s/he has to chair.1648 The troika and EEA form the organizing committee, which 
plans the agenda for the upcoming plenary meeting and invites external participants.1649 
The organizing committee further recommends the national expert for the role of 
secretariat leader, who will then be appointed by the network.1650 
 
‘Interest groups’ 
‗Interest groups‘ within the EPA network can be set up with a minimum of two or more 
member agencies cooperating on issues of common interest (or on the monitoring of 
such issues) on a longer term basis.1651 The ‗interest groups‘ are under the lead of one of 
its member agencies, which also provide secretarial support.1652 ‗Interest groups‘ are set 
up by the plenary; they are required to regularly inform the plenary of their progress.1653 
The formation of ‗interest groups‘ is usually the result of one or more members 
announcing an interest in a certain topic on which they give a presentation to see if other 
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members are also interested in taking part in the group.1654 The work programme and 
time frame (as well as the appointment of group members at their respective agencies) is 
decided by the ‗interest groups‘ themselves.1655 There is no limit on the number of 
‗interest groups‘ that might be set up at any one time.1656 Although ‗interest groups‘ are 
generally concerned with environmental issues, they can also be set up to address 
internal network and/or organizational issues.1657 In addition to ‗interest groups‘, which 
tend to be active over a longer period of time, there is the possibility of creating task 
teams which work on common interest issues for a short term.1658 
 
8.2.3 The secretariat 
Initially, EEA staff ran the EPA network without a formal secretariat.1659 However, 
because it was just one of many tasks which they had to fulfil, it was impossible to do it 
justice.1660 In order to be successful, the network has to be fostered and member agencies 
made to feel that they are getting something beneficial out of their participation.1661 At 
the sixth meeting of the network in 2006, a proposal was put forward by 
England/Wales, Italy and Austria to create staff support solely dedicated to the 
network.1662 The most workable suggestion was that the secretariat should be provided 
by a national expert at the EEA where the secretariat was also going to be hosted.1663 At 
the eighth meeting in spring 2007 the former director of the Icelandic Environment 
                                                 
1654
 Interview EEA official (2008a)  
1655
 EPA Network (2006a) 
1656
 Interview EEA official (2010b) 
1657
 EPA Network (2006a) 
1658
 EPA Network (2010) 
1659
 Interview EEA official (2008b) 
1660
 Ibid. 
1661
 Interview EEA official (2008a) 
1662
 Interview EEA official (2010b) 
1663
 Ibid. 
311 
 
Protection Agency was chosen to run the secretariat for the EPA network.1664 The 
allocation of this national expert seconded to the EEA has allowed the secretariat to be 
more proactively involved in the running of the network.1665 
The main role of the secretariat is to support the network. This takes place through 
the support of non-‗interest group‘ activities, the preparation of draft conclusions of the 
plenary meetings and the support of member agencies willing to join existing ‗interest 
groups‘.1666 The secretariat further supports the chairperson and the troika between the 
plenary meetings and acts as an information-broker and ‗issue-spotter‘, helping the 
network to identify issues of common interest, strategic, scientific and/or technological 
nature.1667 The secretariat leader further works on the development and coordination of 
the network‘s work plan and the maintenance of web functions.1668 Moreover, the 
secretariat leader is also responsible for liaising with the network-related EEA contact 
persons by providing content and process coordination as well as secretarial and 
webpage support.1669  
In 2009, the role of the secretariat was reviewed through the distribution of 
questionnaires. The overall result of the review was that all participants were either 
content or very content with the service it was providing.1670 One criticism brought to 
light by the review was that the EEA occupies a more influential role than the other 
member agencies, a situation exacerbated by the fact that the secretariat is located in the 
EEA‘s premises in Copenhagen.1671 One EEA official pointed out that the advantage of 
locating the EPA network‘s secretariat in the EEA compared to one of the member 
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agencies or even a secretarial office in Brussels, was that the network‘s activity began in 
and partly through the EEA, thus keeping in one place the history and memory of the 
network.1672 
Similar to points mentioned in the previous chapters with regard to key positions in 
the Eionet, work in the EPA network is also affected by the individuals who take on 
particular roles. Whether it be the directors of the agencies or the secretariat leader of 
the network, ‗personalities matter‘.1673 In order to ensure regular change in personnel, 
the position of EPA network secretariat leader is restricted to four years, consisting of 
an initial two-year period which is renewable once.1674 The review stated that until other 
arrangements are made, the EEA will continue to host the secretariat.1675  
 
8.2.4 Meetings, publications, financing and informality of the EPA network 
Meetings 
The EPA network meets twice a year with meetings hosted by member agencies on a 
voluntary, rotational basis.1676 Meeting are used to set up the framework and allocate 
resources for achieving the network‘s aims, for example, through setting up ‗interest 
groups‘, informing members of ‗interest group‘ activities or delegating tasks to the 
network‘s secretariat, network members or groups of members.1677 The plenary meetings 
of the heads of agencies act as the highest decision-making body of the network.1678 
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Member agency representatives may be accompanied by national experts or 
coordinators.1679 
The network invites the European Commission as a permanent guest to attend its 
meetings.1680 It is not only beneficial for heads of agencies to have the Commission 
there, but it can also be useful for the latter to be able to find out at an early stage about, 
for example, potential problems regarding the implementation of EU environmental 
policy in the member states.1681 Other networks (such as IMPEL and ENCA) can be 
invited to attend where useful or appropriate, depending on the issues under 
discussion.1682 On occasion, EP representatives have been invited to attend meetings.1683 
Plenary meetings are documented by short communications (including a summary 
record of the major outcomes or issues discussed) which can be used for the member 
agencies‘ communication activities in their respective countries.1684 It is up to the 
agencies to agree with and/or sign up to agreements and decisions taken by other 
network members. This is done in order to avoid any agency being bound by a decision 
with which it does not agree.1685 
 
Publications 
Publications of the EPA network and its ‗interest groups‘ are published in the name of 
the network members who have given their agreement. At least two agencies have to 
support a position in order to be able to publish it in the name of the network. Network 
publications include a list of the supporters or members of a particular ‗interest group‘. 
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Publications receiving unanimous endorsement are published in the name of the 
network.1686 
Publications range from general issues (such as ‗Barriers to Good Environmental 
Regulation‘) to more specific ones (such as ‗Promoting eco-efficient innovation in the 
construction sector‘).1687 In its 2008 publication on ‗Improving the Effectiveness of EU 
Environmental Regulation – A Future Vision‘, the network states that the paper is 
intended to help the Commission develop its strategy and vision for improving the 
effectiveness of EU environmental regulation.1688 It recommends that the Commission 
should include the network and other interested parties in this development.1689 Just as 
the EPA network‘s importance is increasing, its reports have reached a point where they 
are described as very influential.1690 
 
Website 
The purpose of the EPA network‘s website is the facilitation of cooperation between 
network members, as well as the provision of information to the general public.1691 In 
addition, the website offers a range of forums for information exchange or topical 
discussions for its members (out of public view) in order to ensure informal 
communication on different issues.1692 One of the reasons for the popularity of the EPA 
network‘s homepage is that it provides a single point of access to newsfeeds from all its 
member agencies.1693 In order to increase the target audience, updates from the national 
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agencies are linked to an automatic online translation service. The technical support 
required by the network is provided by the EEA.1694 
 
Financing 
Although there is some EEA funding, each member agency pays its own expenses. The 
EPA network‘s secretariat is partly funded by the seconded national expert‘s 
government and the EEA. The current arrangement has been up for discussion due to 
fears that some agencies with smaller budgets might otherwise have problems 
participating.1695 Alternatives (such as a membership fee) have been found to be 
impractical.1696 In discussions on possible financing options for the network questions 
such as how much each country would contribute could not be resolved in a satisfactory 
manner.1697 The majority of network members were in favour of the existing set-up 
entailing EEA involvement and a seconded national expert who fulfils the position of 
secretariat leader.1698 
 
The importance of informality 
The EPA network works on an informal and voluntary basis, allowing its members to 
cooperate on whatever issue they like.1699 It has been suggested that as the network 
becomes more established and increases its output, it is slowly becoming more 
formal.1700 The trend towards formalisation is due to the need to ensure that the meetings 
run smoothly and are well prepared as well as the need to define (at least) the EEA‘s 
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involvement more precisely.1701 Nonetheless, a conscious effort is made to preserve at 
least a degree of informality of the EPA network, especially at meetings.1702 As one EEA 
official pointed out: 
This is the network for the heads of the agencies; they decide. There are no 
unanimity requirements, no veto or anything. If you‘re on, you‘re on. If you cannot 
subscribe to something, you don‘t subscribe to it. And this balance of informality 
and then the formal preparations so people know what is going to happen. We have 
to keep this delicate balance and I think we have been very successful in kind of 
letting people know what is coming up or what will be discussed and what is likely 
to be addressed, so people can prepare. […] The informal part is very essential for 
this work.
1703
 
 
The participating agencies benefit from the informality and lack of need to report back 
to their supervising ministries, which allows them to talk about issues more freely.1704 
 
8.2.5 The importance and influence of the EPA network 
The network is increasingly gaining in importance in the policy loop by providing 
feedback for the Commission.1705 The EPA network has been described as ‗the key link 
that closes the circle‘.1706 The network provides an important link between policy-
makers and those implementing them.1707 This allows for more direct feedback about 
what is workable, what has been helpful and what needs to be done in order to operate 
more successfully.1708 A large number of (or all) member environment agencies coming 
together and passing on their opinion to the Commission will strengthen their case. 
Thus their collective output is potentially more influential than agencies contacting the 
Commission individually.1709 Moreover, early contact between the Commission and 
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network members allows the environment agencies to be informed of upcoming 
legislation at first hand.1710 In return, the Commission benefits from comments on its 
legislative proposals from agency officials who will be most affected by the 
implementation of these policy proposals.1711 The exchange of views with environmental 
agencies therefore offers valuable insights to the Commission in addition to its good 
connections with national environment ministries.1712 With EU legislation needing a 
good science and knowledge base, the EPA network‘s views can be considered an 
important contribution to improving legislation.1713 The EPA network feels that the 
Commission considers it to be an important source of information and takes its outputs 
seriously when trying to get feedback on its policies.1714 The cooperation benefits the 
network and the Commission which both highly value their contacts with each other.1715 
For the member agencies, the network can be described as a means of speaking to the 
Commission with one (more influential) voice, which is frequently made use of.1716 
According to one of the UBA‘s former presidents, the direct contact between the 
environment agencies and the Commission is viewed with concern by some national 
governments.1717 This is possibly the case because contact between the Commission and 
national environment agencies usually takes place through the ministries whereas the 
EPA network provides a forum for direct contact between the environment agencies and 
the Commission, resulting in some loss of awareness by the ministries of what is being 
discussed. Such concern could possibly be interpreted as an indication that the 
Commission takes the network seriously. The scepticism of national governments is, 
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however, not an ideal indicator of the network‘s success. It further highlights the need to 
maintain the informality of the network. Moreover, in the case of Germany and Britain, 
the national environment agencies‘ independence allows them to state their positions 
without requiring the approval of the supervising ministries anyway.  
In addition to the external dimension of the EPA network, there is also the internal 
one, allowing member agencies to learn from one another, such as understanding why 
certain policies are easily implemented in other countries or possibilities for improving 
their own procedures.1718 Finally, one EEA official pointed out that the EPA network is 
‗a truly unique thing […] it did not exist before‘,1719 and with the network still going 
strong, the member agencies consider their participation worth the time and money. One 
of the success stories of the EPA network is the inspiration it offers to countries outside 
Europe, leading to interest in Africa which aims to establish a similar network (as 
initiated by Ghana‘s Environment Protection Agency).1720 However, setting up a similar 
environment agency network outside Europe is challenging due to the financial 
constraints.1721 The EPA network includes many of the world‘s richest nations in which 
societal environmental concerns are high. Whilst in Africa the interest tends to be there, 
establishing such an environment agency network can be very costly.1722 Moreover, the 
existence of the EEA proved immensely helpful in setting up the EPA network in 
Europe.1723  
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8.2.6 Challenges  
The biggest challenge faced by the EPA network was during its early days. Although 
there was an overall agreement that what the network was trying to achieve was needed, 
the means were unclear.1724 Initially, the network did not have a secretariat, which could 
have taken on a guiding role. Due to the participating agencies‘ commitment, the EPA 
network managed to establish itself to the degree that its work (and worth) was 
recognized, by the Commission in particular but also by the member agencies 
themselves. Participation in the EPA network is not only beneficial for national 
agencies, it could potentially provide important links for regional agencies as well (if 
they were to become included in the network).1725 In the light of the different national 
set-ups and the (very) different degrees of importance given to the local level/agencies, 
the issue of the role of regional agencies in the EPA network needs to be discussed. 
However, with the need for the meetings to remain manageable, regional agencies have 
so far not been included in the EPA network. For example, the inclusion of the German 
Land environment agencies would immediately add 16 new members to the EPA 
network. Although not all member countries have as many regional agencies as 
Germany, managing the network would become near impossible if a large number of 
regional agencies were to join. The possible inclusion (or ongoing exclusion) of 
regional environment agencies is therefore another challenge faced by the EPA network. 
Many of the regional environment agencies are interested in its work and would 
probably join the EPA network if they had the opportunity to do so.1726 Regarding the 
inclusion of sub-national agencies, countries have the option to include representatives 
from sub-national level agencies as part of their national delegation. The number of 
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those representatives has to be limited to two per delegation to avoid EPA network 
meetings becoming unmanageable.1727 
Another issue faced by the EPA network is whether it should also include nature 
conservation agencies.1728 In 2007 the ENCA network was created. It works closely with 
the EPA network on issues of common interest and the two networks might be 
combined at some point in the future. This is because nature conservation is often part 
of the work of environmental protection agencies, and, in addition to avoiding 
overlapping networks, the environment needs to be considered as a whole (i.e. including 
nature conservation).1729  
Language barriers can also pose a problem, depending on the abilities of the heads of 
the agencies (though obviously not in the British case) as there is no translation service 
at the meetings which are held in English.1730 With the provision of a translation service 
being too costly, it is up to the EPA network members to make arrangements (such as 
English-speaking experts accompanying the director). On the EPA network‘s website, 
on the other hand, the published feeds from the different environment agencies are 
linked to an automatic online translation service, the introduction of which has led to an 
increase in traffic on the homepage.1731 
Another issue pointed out by former members was that the EPA network lacks 
stability, because in some countries a change in government also results in a change in 
environment agency director(s), requiring the contacts to be constantly renewed and 
new relationships to be built.1732 In countries where the heads of the agencies change 
frequently, the introduction of a more permanent contact, who would attend the EPA 
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network meetings together with the director, might be helpful. The informality of the 
EPA network means that such decisions would have to be made by the affected 
agency/agencies rather than formally set out in the network‘s guidelines.  
Due to the different set-ups and responsibilities of national environment agencies, the 
EPA network had to define what kind of institutions it was trying to include. Due to the 
wide variety of bodies being referred to as environment agencies, the EPA network had 
to establish who would be invited and allowed to attend its meetings.1733 The 2010 
revision of the network‘s guidelines includes the statement that  
[d]epending on the governance structures within the countries, environment 
ministries or organizations at a more local level can be regarded as member 
agencies.
1734
  
 
This inclusion allows countries to participate, which might not have an environment 
(protection) agency but where the tasks (normally delegated to an environment agency) 
are instead carried out by the ministry (or agencies which form part of the ministry). 
This is possibly the most significant change to the guidelines, as it allows the inclusion 
of institutions which are not typical environment agencies, although they can 
nonetheless provide useful contributions to the EPA network and feedback on policy. 
Moreover, the amendment might turn out to provide a solution to the ongoing challenge 
of France‘s membership in the network (which will be further discussed below). 
 
8.3 EPA network and the EEA, Germany, France and the UK 
Motivations leading to a country‘s participation in the EPA network differ. One EEA 
official pointed out that in some cases, EPA network membership is just down to 
whether the person in the right position considers participation important.1735 The 
                                                 
1733
 Interview British official (2010b) 
1734
 EPA network (2010) 
1735
 Interview EEA official (2008b)  
322 
 
member agencies from larger countries tend to have bigger budgets, allowing them to 
assign coordinators (who are not necessarily the directors) and/or people who prepare 
and represent them in the meetings.1736 The EPA network‘s (rotating) troika prevents the 
clear emergence of a limited number of leading national environment agencies.1737 The 
EEA provides consistency to the troika set-up by being a permanent member of the 
organizing committee which consists of the troika and the EEA‘s executive director. 
 
8.3.1 The EEA 
The EEA itself considers the EPA network an additional forum for exchange and 
strongly supports its informality.1738 The implementation of global and European 
agreements at the national (and local) level is of particular interest for the EEA which is 
also very interested in practical implementation and feedback on major concerns from 
the institutions involved in the EPA network.1739 
With regards to the EPA network, the EEA has a special role to play: on the one 
hand, the EEA is a member of the network, just like any national environment agency. 
On the other hand, the EEA played a crucial role in the creation of the EPA network, 
hosts and supports the network‘s secretariat and is a permanent standing member of the 
organizing committee. The EEA‘s work with the troika mainly takes place through the 
EEA‘s executive director, while the EPA network secretariat also receives additional 
support from EEA officials on content and progress coordination and the webpage. The 
EEA therefore has a dual role to play in the EPA network; it is not only a member 
agency but also a facilitator for the secretariat, which is required to be neutral. And 
although the actual involvement of the EEA with the EPA network varies, its advice and 
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support is regarded as incredibly valuable.1740 Therefore the location of the network‘s 
secretariat at the EEA, despite having previously been contested, has been overall useful 
for the EPA network, as it is at the centre of discussions and developments.1741 There 
have been discussions about locating the secretariat outside the EEA as the EEA has 
been criticised for being too influential in the EPA network.1742 Because the organizing 
committee‘s role includes the planning of upcoming meetings and the invitation of 
external participants, the EEA plays a major role in the setting of the agenda for the 
EPA network.1743 Moreover, as was mentioned above, the member agencies in the troika 
rotate constantly while the EEA is the only agency permanently involved through the 
organizing committee. The involvement of EEA officials in the EPA network‘s content 
and process coordination has been criticized for placing the EEA in a privileged 
position over other agencies. While it is true that there is a lot of engagement between 
the secretariat and the EEA, there is no risk of the EPA network becoming another 
network of the EEA.1744 Despite the interaction, the secretariat is very distinct from the 
EEA and every effort is made to ensure that it remains that way. As one EEA official 
stated ‗the secretariat is not a function of the EEA, it is servicing the network.‘1745 
Moreover, while it is true that the EEA may find itself in a privileged position when 
compared to the national environment agencies, this result appears to have come about 
by default rather than design. The EEA can provide the technical support and help with 
content and process coordination of the network, which some smaller and/or poorer 
countries and/or agencies would not be able to do. If the EEA were no longer to host the 
secretariat, then it would probably be hosted by bigger and richer national agencies, 
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which could lead to the dominance of the EPA network by these agencies. This could 
possibly be avoided through the financing of the secretariat through the introduction of 
financial contributions. But as with membership fees, the issue of contributions to 
finance the secretariat is controversial and might put agencies off from participating in 
the EPA network. 
Linking EPA network and EEA-relevant activities is considered important, 
especially when developing something like the SEIS, which strongly involves the 
national level. It therefore requires the additional link between the EEA and member 
agencies not involved in the Eionet (i.e. as NFPs) or with the EEA management 
board.1746 This further highlights the importance of the EPA network in connecting the 
activities of national agencies and the EEA. 
 
8.3.2 The UBA 
Although the EEA (together with a number of national agencies) initiated the setting up 
of the EPA network, the idea for creating such a network had come up in the UBA as 
well. While the UBA‘s idea for such a network was generally considered as good, 
nothing much came from it.1747 Thus, the UBA was clearly very much in favour of the 
creation of a heads of environment agencies network.1748 
Prior to the creation of the EPA network, the UBA participated in annual conferences 
with the directors of the environment agencies of the Länder 
(Umweltämterkonferenz).1749 Thus once again the national set-up is similar to the 
eventually emerging EPA network at the European level, although the former takes 
place in form of a conference rather than a network. The EPA network is not a copy of 
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German arrangements. However, the UBA‘s support for the EPA network could also 
have been influenced by the existence of a comparable arrangement at the national level 
that had already proven to be successful.   
The UBA has benefitted from regular contacts between agencies at the directorial 
level, the exchange of information between specialists and from making known to an 
international audience its own products, working results and positions.1750 As a further 
advantage, an UBA document lists the possibility to ‗influence European processes 
more strongly by providing scientific advice for policymakers jointly with other 
environment protection agencies‘.1751 These benefits are likely to apply to most 
countries in the network, although in the cited document they have only been explicitly 
related to the UBA. The UBA is ‗very much involved‘1752 in the EPA network‘s 
activities, most notably in the ‗interest groups‘ and their publications. Meetings are 
usually attended by the director of Division I (Umweltplanung und 
Nachhaltigkeitsstrategien) who is accompanied by the German NFP of the Eionet, who 
is also the German EPA network coordinator.1753  
For Germany, the attraction of the EPA network is not only the additional link to the 
Commission, but also the link between a wide range of participating agencies.1754 The 
EPA network has been described as a valuable network for the participating 
organizations.1755 Importantly, the close involvement of the UBA with the Eionet means 
that it has a particular interest in avoiding duplication of work. 
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8.3.3 The French case 
As was pointed out by one EEA official, ‗France is the last of the big countries not in 
the network‘.1756 This has been described as a regretful situation, not only due to the size 
of the country but also due to the perception within the network that participation would 
be beneficial for everyone, even countries who think they would not get anything out of 
it.1757 
With the EPA network being informal and, most importantly, voluntary, it is any 
country‘s right to decide not to take part. However, in the case of France the absence 
from EPA network meetings occurred following the beginning of restructuring 
processes at the national level which ultimately abolished the institution that had acted 
as France‘s EPA network member. Initially, the Ifen was representing France due to the 
lack of a French environment protection agency.1758 At the time, the French NFP at Ifen 
was located at the directorial level, and it was the individual who fulfilled the NFP role, 
who also attended the EPA network meetings.1759 With the restructuring of the Ifen in 
2004, the position of NFP was relegated from the directorial level.1760 The Ifen official 
who next became the NFP was thus no longer in the right position to attend EPA 
network meetings.1761 A change at the directorial level which took place during the same 
period (2004) led to the appointment of a director who had little interest in the 
international level, which ended the Ifen‘s participation in the EPA network.1762 
Nonetheless, other French agencies in the environmental field do exist which could 
take up the place which Ifen vacated in the network. It has been pointed out that there is 
no agency in France purely concerned with environmental protection, which makes a 
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potential French EPA network participant (in place of Ifen) harder to identify.1763 
However, the agencies in the EPA network are very diverse and there is the possibility 
for a (part of) the environment ministry to take part in the network if it feels better 
suited than the national agencies. Moreover, even the Ifen had experienced some 
difficulties fitting into the EPA network because it was not a scientific agency.1764 There 
was no French participation between 2004-2008, although the Ifen still existed. The 
SOeS, which took on the Ifen in 2008, has not sent its director to participate in the EPA 
network and appears unlikely to do so in the near future.1765 Some efforts have been 
made by the EPA network secretariat and French responses were received regarding 
potential participation. This was done in the hope that once another French institution 
has attended an EPA network meeting, interest would be generated and the benefits of 
participating would be recognized. 1766 
The main problem in France appears to be the choice of most appropriate institution. 
Agencies such as the ADEME are considered as too different (compared to participating 
agencies) to benefit from EPA network membership. However, this is the case for a 
number of participating agencies, the majority of which nevertheless consider EPA 
network membership as worthwhile, not despite the differences but (at least in some 
cases) because of them. Moreover, contact with the Commission through the network is 
considered as valuable.  
However, it would probably be an advantage for an institution which is not the SOeS 
(i.e. the ADEME) to participate as the SOeS already has the connection to the EEA and 
other agencies through participation in the Eionet. Agencies such as the ADEME, where 
such connections are less institutionalized, could possibly benefit more (see also EA and 
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EPA network participation below). Otherwise France might find itself in a similar 
situation as the UBA, where the NFP is also concerned with the EPA network‘s day-to-
day dealings which has the risk that participation in the EPA network might be 
perceived as less beneficial than for non-Eionet member environment agencies. 
Although the ADEME is considered the most suitable French agency to take part in the 
EPA network, it is uncertain whether it will attend future network meetings. 
Finally, it appears strange that an EU (founding) member state the size and 
importance of France neglects the opportunity to participate in a network that a large 
number of European countries/national agencies consider valuable. One French official 
acknowledges: ‗It is a bit of a shame that we are not taking part in the EPA network.‘1767 
It is even more regrettable because the network was considered a useful means for 
participation at the international level, while the Ifen was still a member.1768 The option 
of regional/local organizations or the ministry taking part in the network was included 
in the revised EPA network guidelines. This might pave the way for eventual French 
participation in the EPA network. One possibility might be to leave it up to the French 
institutions themselves to find one which is interested in participating in the EPA 
network. Another possibility would be to try and find the French institution most 
congruent with other agencies that already participate in the EPA network with the aim 
of getting it included as a French member. 
 
8.3.4 The EA 
In the late 1990s there was a distinct lack of British involvement in European networks, 
as Lowe and Ward point out:  
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An aspiration of the European Commission is to deal with expert, representative 
European networks. Likewise, effective action at the European level depends on building 
transnational coalitions. However, the agencies have found networking difficult, partly 
because of the lack of analogues in other European countries, but also because they feel 
uncomfortable about forming alliances which may seek to lobby not only the 
Commission but also other member states‘ governments.[...]1769 
 
Because the EA of England and Wales is not involved in the EEA‘s Eionet (where 
Defra represents the UK), contacts with (some of) its counterparts are not as easily 
established as is the case for environment agencies which are NFPs. The EA was keen 
to talk to other European agencies and supported establishing the EPA network. Zito has 
even described the EA as ‗one of the network‘s primary leaders‘.1770 One EA official 
further stated that it was the EPA network that ‗allowed the EA to have contact with 
other agencies.‘1771 
Overall, the EA‘s participation in the EPA network has been described as beneficial 
for the agency, even if the actual benefits are hard to measure.1772 Participation in the 
network has been useful in terms of bringing new issues onto the agenda and screening 
for legislation.1773 In addition, the EPA network has been described as an opportunity to 
view the work of the EA through other people‘s eyes, thus gaining new perspectives on 
your own agency‘s work and establishing relationships with the heads of other 
agencies.1774 The EA further stressed the network‘s potential as a valuable means for 
influencing the Commission which is listening to the EPA network.1775 As for the 
reasons for UK participation in the network, one EEA official speculated that  
they are curious to see what the others are doing. And the other reason of course is 
that the environment agency staff, people there, they don‘t have a dialogue with 
Brussels, with the EU Commission, with the EU institutions, a natural dialogue, 
and now they have, through the EPA network the directors of the England and 
Wales Environment Agency. They have been able to get appointments with the 
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Commissioners to speak about things, maybe they had that before, I don‘t know, 
but this is one of the drivers for them.
1776
 
 
A former EA official noted that participation in the network ‗had an impact and is 
worthwhile‘.1777 Thus it does not come as a surprise that the director of the EA (and the 
director of the SEPA) were in favour of the creation of the EPA network which they 
helped to set up. Participation in the EPA and IMPEL networks is considered a useful 
EA activity.1778 Senior EA officials deal with strategic thinking in the EPA network and 
EA officials, who deal more with practical issues, participate in IMPEL where they aim 
to contribute towards a level playing field regarding environmental policy 
implementation in.1779 Although there is still an adjustment period due to personnel 
change, former EA attendants of the EPA network were quite satisfied with how it is 
running.1780 
 
8.4 Discussion of Hypothesis III 
Hypothesis III stipulated that differences in national administrative traditions in 
environment agencies (e.g. the set-ups, roles and connections) lead to different 
motivations for participation in European networks (see also Chapter Two). The EPA 
network offers a variety of incentives for national agencies to participate in the network. 
The main idea behind its creation was to facilitate contact and exchanges about ways of 
working, problem perception and solutions between the different agency directors. The 
significant differences between some of the agencies were not considered a hindrance. 
Instead they provided a particular attraction for some EPA network members. 
Membership of the EPA network tends to be stable, although changes in top-level 
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personnel within the national agencies (which can be quite frequent in some countries) 
require constant efforts to (re-) establish contacts.1781 The possible inclusion of 
ministries in the EPA network in countries where environment agencies do not exist 
and/or their role is being fulfilled by the ministries, allows for different national set-ups 
to be accommodated. Discussion about the inclusion of sub-national agencies (for now 
at least) appears to pose more of a logistical issue than a principal one. The EEA‘s 
membership not only provided significant support throughout the EPA network‘s 
existence, but also offered member agencies with no or little contact to the EEA to 
establish a relationship. The additional (and very valuable) contact to the Commission 
proved to be another important asset of the network. 
With the different networks aiming to work closely together, an effort is made to 
avoid the duplication of work, although, for example, ‗interest groups‘/working groups 
in the different networks might come to different conclusions on some issues. Thus, 
while some degree of overlap is probably unavoidable, with roughly two thirds of EPA 
network members also hosting the Eionet‘s NFP for their country, it is nonetheless an 
important issue to be aware of. On the other hand, participation in ‗interest groups‘ is 
voluntary. Agencies do not have to participate if they feel the issues are already being 
sufficiently addressed elsewhere. Although a large number of the NFPs are located in 
environment agencies and contacts to the EEA and other agencies often already exist, 
these connections tend to be concentrated on the operational/topical level, not usually 
involving the heads of the institutions. 
The three main ways in which participation in the network can be useful for the 
directors of environment agencies are (1) contact with the directors of other agencies 
and the resulting opportunities for comparisons, understanding and cooperation; (2) 
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contact of the agencies with the Commission, either at network meetings or via reports 
or letters which are published in the name of the network; and finally (3) contact of the 
directors of national agencies with the director of the EEA.  
Hypothesis III focuses in particular on point (3) which it expects to be of higher 
importance for agencies which do not host the NFP and/or do not provide the 
management board member. Although the EEA has a special position in the network 
(due to its permanent position in the organizing committee and the additional support it 
provides to the secretariat), the focus on the contact to the EEA neglects the other 
benefits offered by network membership. In the early days of the EPA network, contact 
to the EEA could have been the main attraction for network participation, especially for 
an agency (such as the EA) which is quite different to many other member environment 
agencies and also does not participate in the Eionet. Exchange with environment 
agencies from other countries was also an obvious perk of EPA membership. The 
interest of the Commission in the EPA network and its work developed over time as the 
network became more established. While contact with the EEA is still an important 
aspect of the EPA network, overall it is more a combination of different aspects which 
member agencies consider beneficial for their participation. For individual agencies 
these aspects will be different in their relative importance, depending on their existing 
relationship with the EEA (e.g. through Eionet), Commission and national environment 
agencies. The benefactors of the EPA network are its members, the EEA and the 
national environment agencies (even if the importance attributed varies between 
different national agencies) as well as the Commission. 
The fact that Germany was not one of the main proponents when the EPA network 
was first created, does not mean that it was against its creation, only that it did not give 
it as much priority as, for example, England/Wales and Scotland did. Because the UBA 
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was already linked to the EEA and its work through the Eionet, the aspect of the EPA 
network creating an additional link to the EEA is likely to have been of much less 
importance for German support of the network. The exchange with other agencies and 
the possibility to address the Commission as part of a bigger group of agencies is 
obviously an important aspect for the UBA which is unaffected by its Eionet 
participation. 
In the French case, participation in the network ceased in 2004 while the Ifen was 
still operational. By early 2011 there was still no French representation in the EPA 
network. The reasons for the lack of French participation are complex and not simply 
due to France not considering EPA network participation to be worthwhile (see above). 
The SOeS, where the NFP is located has so far not participated in the network and is 
unlikely to do so in future. At the moment the ADEME considers itself as too different 
from other national environment agencies (despite agencies such as the EA still 
considering EPA network participation as beneficial). Moreover, due to its closeness to 
EU institutions (ensured by its Brussels office) and extensive bilateral projects with 
environment agencies in other countries, the ADEME does not appear to consider the 
EPA network as something it needs to get involved in.  
The benefits for the British set-up of environment agencies are obvious. Not only 
does the EPA network accommodate the separate environment agencies for Scotland as 
well as England and Wales easily, it also provides a more direct (and regular) contact to 
the EEA. This is supported by the role played by agencies (such as the EA and SEPA) 
whose directors were driving forces for setting up the EPA network. Contact with the 
other national environment agencies, the EEA and eventually also the Commission, is 
considered as very beneficial by and for the EA. 
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Despite (or because of) the differences of the national environment agencies, both the 
UBA and the EA consider meeting the heads of other European environment agencies 
as worthwhile. This is not because they are looking for ways in which the national set-
up of their own agencies could be improved, it is more a general interest in the way in 
which the other agencies work and an openness to the possibility of ―better ways of 
doing things‖. Similar to the creation of an EAS, there is no single best way for national 
environment agencies to operate. But because the exchanges are not motivated or 
followed by a harmonization drive, they take place more freely. Similarly, the direct 
contact of the EPA network with the Commission is of major benefit for both the UBA 
and EA. Despite the Commission‘s involvement only having emerged alongside the 
EPA network establishing itself, it is now an important recipient of EPA network 
publications and appears to appreciate the member agencies‘ feedback and position on 
EU legislation and a wide range of other issues.1782 The close involvement of the UBA 
in the Eionet means that it already has important links with the EEA. It is therefore 
possible to say that contact with the EEA is of higher importance for the EA than the 
UBA.  
The case of French initial participation and later lack of attendance, highlights the 
possibility that membership in the EPA network might not offer enough incentives for a 
country to ensure participation through the appropriate institution (usually the 
environment agency but possibly also the environment ministry). Generally, the lack of 
interdependences in the network makes it relatively easy for a member agency to leave. 
The French case is further complicated by the fact that the Ifen initially took part in the 
EPA network. French officials appeared to regret that France does not take part in a 
European network out of principle, rather than missing out on being an EPA network 
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member in particular.1783 Thus, just like the motivation for participation in the networks 
varies, there are also different reasons for non-participation, which include bad 
institutional fit.  
 
8.5 Conclusions 
The EPA network provides an important platform for exchange and debate for European 
environment protection agencies. Despite its relative youth – it only came into being in 
2003 – it has established itself and offers enough to keep environment agencies engaged 
and interested in membership. Interest from environment agencies in other parts of the 
world which are hoping to establish networks in their regions similar to the EPA 
network set-up can be considered as one of the network‘s achievements. 
The EPA network offers contacts and exchanges for directors from a wide range of 
environment agencies, including the EEA. Moreover, the creation of close links with the 
Commission (with the option to deliver feedback on environmental policy) adds another 
advantage for participants in the network, going beyond a pure exchange of information 
on national practice. The EPA network has been described as an important part of the 
policy-loop because it provides feedback to the Commission, even if it does not take 
part in the policy-making process. 
In addition to the organizational aspects of running the network, the secretariat also 
tries to ensure that the participating agencies are getting something out of the meetings 
and are part of the network. Overall, this seems to be the case in two of three case 
countries considered in this thesis. While participation in a network of heads of 
environment protection agencies can generally be considered as valuable for all 
environment agencies, in some cases, additional benefits come into play, as is the case 
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for agencies such as the EA. With the EA not forming part of the EEA‘s main network 
(i.e. the Eionet) the EPA network offers a direct link to the supranational EEA and the 
Commission via the network‘s publications (often by its ‗interest groups‘) in policy 
areas in which its contribution might not have been requested or indeed welcomed by 
Defra. 
The French case is more complicated. Initially Ifen representatives attended the EPA 
network plenary meetings. On the surface the non-participation of France appears due to 
the perceived lack of a national institution which is comparable to other national 
environment agencies in Europe. However, on closer inspection this argument is not 
convincing. The majority of national environment agencies throughout Europe differ 
significantly from each other and consider the variety of agencies in the network as 
enriching, rather than as a reason to refrain from participation. 
 One EEA official suggested that the bigger countries might not feel like they need 
the EPA network or consider participation as beneficial.1784 Even though this could 
easily be assumed, size does not appear to be the deciding factor for whether a country 
participates in the EPA network and/or whether it considers participation in it as 
beneficial. In the three countries considered, the institutional arrangements of the 
national agencies appear to be much more important for the benefits from participation. 
Thus, despite Germany and the UK being big European countries, the environment 
agency set-up in Britain in particular makes taking part in the EPA network very 
valuable for the EA (and SEPA). The UBA also considers EPA network participation as 
worthwhile, although the benefits are slightly less valuable due to a certain degree of 
duplication between its EPA network and Eionet work. Equally in the French case, the 
size of the country does not matter. The initial participation in the EPA network ended 
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due to institutional restructuring of Ifen and the ongoing lack of involvement is due to 
uncertainty about which French institution would be most suitable to participate in the 
network. The suggestion that participation in the EPA network is more important and 
more beneficial for smaller and/or recently created agencies might well be true. 
However, the focus on Germany, France and Britain in this dissertation does not allow 
for a closer analysis of some of the smaller and/or more recently created national 
environment agencies. 
Contact with the Commission and the exchange of information with their 
counterparts throughout Europe are important reasons for environment agency 
participation in the EPA network. However, the aspect of national environment agencies 
benefitting from contact with the EEA through the EPA network, is of more interest to 
members which do not already have direct links to the EEA.  
In categorizing the EPA network with the help of Rhodes‘ network model, it fits best 
into the category of intergovernmental networks.1785 Member agencies are equal (despite 
the EEA enjoying certain privileges), participation is voluntary and the issues addressed 
by the network are self-determined (with the guidance of the troika).1786 Moreover, the 
EPA network has no service delivery obligations and the interdependence of network 
members is low.1787 The Rhodes model assessment of the EPA network will be put in the 
context of the historical institutionalist framework used in this thesis in the concluding 
chapter (Chapter Nine). 
The most likely Europeanizing impact of the participation in the EPA network on the 
member countries is of a horizontal nature. However, the impact is different on 
individual member countries. The EPA network affects individual member agencies 
differently through, for example, the sharing of good practice. Participation in the EPA 
                                                 
1785
 Rhodes (1997:9) 
1786
 Ibid.:38 
1787
 Ibid.:38 
338 
 
network is unlikely to increase administrative integration, as the contact is largely 
limited to the heads of the national environment agencies (and their delegations). The 
introduction of the secretariat as the coordinating structure of the EPA network 
(similarly to the EEA being the coordinating structure of the Eionet) has allowed the 
network to be more proactive. 
Hypotheses I, which propagated the limited impact of the EEA on its member 
countries, also holds true in the case of the EPA network. For those agencies (such as 
the EA) that do not host NFPs, the EPA network provides the contact to the EEA but 
little other means of having an impact on national environment agencies. The impact of 
EPA network membership on increasing the convergence between national environment 
agencies through Europeanization is practically non-existent. These empirical findings 
seem to confirm hypothesis II (see Chapter Two). The working together of national 
environment agencies within the EPA network has not resulted in them becoming more 
similar (see also Chapters Four to Seven). As will be explained in more detail in the 
concluding chapter of this thesis, the national contexts and administrative traditions 
from which national environment agencies emerged and within which they operate 
remain the most influential factors which are likely to lead to continued divergence 
rather than (full scale) convergence. 
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Chapter 9: Concluding Chapter 
 
 
9.1 The creation of the EEA and national institutional change 
The creation of the EEA was a response to address the increasing demands of EU 
environmental policy.
1788
 The need for reliable comparable environmental information 
only became apparent over time, leading first to information programmes (such as 
CORINE) and eventually to the late creation of an environment agency at the European 
level. These developments took place because administrative innovations were required 
to address policy needs without further expanding the staff resources and competences 
of the Commission (which member states opposed), leading to the creation of an agency 
heading an environmental information network.
1789
 Schout pointed out that the resulting 
EEA set up ‗embodies a mixture of Community and intergovernmental elements‘1790 
which relies on member countries‘ cooperation in the provision of environmental data to 
the Eionet that is coordinated by the EEA. The distribution of the seats of the new 
European agencies across different member states has contributed to the geographic 
decentralization of EU institutions. However, this decentralization appears to be 
restricted to newly created EU bodies such as agencies. Due to the Eionet being a 
decentralized network, the EEA‘s creation has not had a centralizing effect on its 
member countries. Over time, the EEA has successfully expanded its remit from an 
institution purely concerned with the provision of environmental information to one 
which also provides, for example, environmental indicator assessments and policy 
effectiveness evaluation. 
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The Europeanization of national environment agencies and ministries is a 
development that started long before the creation of the EEA. Olsen‘s definition of 
Europeanization as ‗the penetration of European-level institutions into national and 
subnational systems of governance‘1791 describes well the EEA‘s arrangement with its 
member countries, as the Eionet involves a large number of actors in national 
institutions (most of them acting as NRCs coordinated by each country‘s NFP).  
However, the creation of the EEA has undoubtedly had an impact on the EU‘s 
institutional landscape, although the exact impact in terms of vertical, top-down, 
Europeanization is less obvious (see also part 7.4 of Chapter Seven). A simplification of 
Radaelli‘s definition of Europeanization,1792 which was introduced in Chapter Two, can 
be used to make it more relevant for the empirical research put forward in this thesis. It 
has therefore been amended in order to best analyse the Europeanization of national 
environmental administrations as a consequence of the creation of the EEA. According 
to Radaelli, the impact of Europeanization on different national environment agencies 
can be conceptualized as the process of the construction and institutionalization of 
formal and informal European-level procedures which are subsequently incorporated 
into domestic political structures.
1793
 
This dissertation has tried to explain how the creation of one particular European 
agency – the EEA – has affected the national environment agencies (and environment 
ministries) in Germany, France and Britain. Much of the existing research and literature 
on European agencies focuses primarily on the EU level (i.e. the role which these 
agencies play within the EU decision-making system). Groenleer‘s1794 and Martens‘1795 
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research on the relationship between the EEA (and other agencies) and the Commission 
constitute examples of EU-level focused agency research.  
The empirical evidence put forward and assessed in Chapters Three to Eight of this 
thesis shows that the creation of the EEA did not constitute a critical juncture or 
‗seismic event‘ in any of the three member countries considered in this thesis. Instead, 
the EEA had a more moderate impact which varied considerably between the three 
different case countries. There was hardly any impact in the British case, some domestic 
regulatory changes in the German case and a significant impact in the French case 
where a new domestic environment agency was set up as a consequence of the creation 
of the EEA. While the creation of a new agency was undoubtedly an important event in 
the French environmental institutional landscape, Ifen was not the result of a critical 
juncture in French politics. The institutional change that took place in France was not 
exclusively the result of the EEA‘s creation but also triggered by French domestic 
political factors which were salient at the time. This finding is not surprising because 
the creation of the EEA was not supposed to have the effect of a ‗seismic event‘ in its 
member countries. Assessing whether the setting up of the Ifen as a consequence of the 
creation of the EEA constituted a critical juncture in France was nonetheless a useful 
analytical exercise in order to establish that despite changes to the institutional 
landscape, it has not had an effect on the political system in France. Historical 
institutionalist theories argue that institutional change normally takes place 
incrementally although revolutionary changes can be triggered by ‗seismic events‘. 
However, as was already explained in Chapter Seven and will be explained in more 
detail below, the frequent changes encountered in the landscape of French 
environmental institutions do not seem to fit easily with historical institutionalist 
explanations.  
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Table 9.1 applies Bulmer and Burch‘s dimensions of establishing institutional change 
to the three case countries and the EU.
 1796
 It summarizes the way in which the 
countries‘ systems, organizations, processes and regulations have been affected by the 
creation of the EEA. The system dimension looks at the way in which the framework of 
state and government have been affected, while organizational change includes the 
distribution of authority and the structure of offices and positions.
1797
 The processes 
dimension focuses on the way organizations function and fulfil their tasks and the 
regulatory dimension is concerned with changes to rules or guidelines.
1798
 These 
dimensions provide a useful classification for assessing the impact of the EEA‘s 
creation on the three case countries. 
 
Table 9.1: Institutional change 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany 
 
France 
 
Britain 
 
EU 
 
System 
 
 
absorption 
 
absorption 
 
Absorption 
 
absorption 
 
Organizations 
 
 
accommodation 
 
partial  
transformation 
 
Absorption 
 
partial  
transformation 
 
 
Processes 
 
 
accommodation 
 
accommodation 
 
accommodation 
 
accommodation 
 
Regulation 
 
 
accommodation 
 
accommodation 
 
Absorption 
 
accommodation 
Source: Adapted from Bulmer and Burch (2009:29-30) and Börzel and Risse (2003:69-70) 
 
Table 9.1 also explains the degree to which the four dimensions have been affected. As 
was pointed out already in Chapter Two, Bulmer and Burch use Börzel and Risse‘s 
classification showing the degree to which the countries‘ systems, organizations, 
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processes and regulations have been affected by Europeanization.
1799
  According to 
Börzel and Risse, absorption describes the incorporation of European developments 
into domestic structures without significant changes to processes, policies and 
institutions (low domestic change).
1800
 Accommodation is used to describe the 
adaptation of processes, policies and institutions as a result of Europeanization pressures 
(modest domestic change) whereas transformation refers to fundamental changes 
replacing existing policies, processes and institutions (high domestic change).
1801
 
The Börzel and Risse classification is useful when trying to establish the dimensions 
of institutional change. However, I found it necessary to introduce the option of partial 
transformation (i.e. some degree of significant domestic change). The creation of the 
EEA and the Ifen have constituted a more significant process than accommodation, 
because the setting up of these two agencies goes beyond the adaptation of existing 
organizations. Transformation (in contrast to partial transformation) has been used in 
my thesis to describe developments involving a very high degree of significant domestic 
change, which neither the creation of the EEA (for the EU) nor the Ifen (for France) 
constituted. Thus, the addition of these two new institutions to the existing institutional 
landscapes in both the EU and French political systems is best described as ‗partial 
transformation‘ (as the description of accommodation does not do justice to the creation 
of a new institution). The creation of the Ifen did not lead to high domestic change. 
Similarly, the setting up of the EEA did not trigger big changes at the EU level. 
Transformation would therefore be too strong a term to describe actual institutional 
developments. 
Table 9.1 shows that the creation of the EEA had relatively little impact on the 
member countries which is in line with the historical institutionalism approach. It was 
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largely dealt with through accommodation and absorption. Table 9.1 also illustrates that 
the setting up of the EEA has not constituted a critical juncture for any of the three 
member countries. The creation of the EEA was absorbed in all three countries (and the 
EU‘s political system) through processes which accommodated participation in the 
EEA‘s Eionet. At the organizational level, partial transformation took place with regard 
to the creation of a new organization, namely the French Ifen. The EU‘s institutional 
landscape was also partially transformed when the EEA was set up. In Germany, the 
UBA accommodated the setting up of the EEA by creating the post of NFP. In the UK, 
Defra underwent little change because the NFP role was allocated to one of its 
statisticians, while Eionet participation had no discernable impact on the department 
(for a more detailed assessment on the choice of NFP locations see section 7.5 of 
Chapter Seven). The creation of the EEA has led to changes in regulations in France and 
Germany, but not in the UK. Thus Goetz‘s assessment of European integration resulting 
in modification rather than transformation of national executive arrangements also 
applies to the impact which the EEA has had in the three member countries considered 
in this thesis.
1802
 However, the EEA‘s impact on the UK has to be described as 
absorption (with a small degree of accommodation) and its impact on France as a large, 
but only temporary (i.e. partial) transformation. 
As was already pointed out, particularly in Chapter Seven, the limited impact of the 
EEA was not only due to the strength of national institutions and their ‗stickiness‘. 
Instead, the following factors also played an important role: (1) the comparatively late 
creation of the EEA; (2) the EEA‘s lack of powers; (3) the freedom given to the member 
countries regarding the organization of their network participation; and (4) the different 
degrees of involvement of agencies at the national level.  
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 Varying combinations of these four explanatory factors for the EEA‘s limited 
impact on national environment agencies/institutions are also likely to play a role in the 
networking set-ups of other EU agencies (with similar powers and tasks as the EEA). 
That the creation of European agencies appears to affect individuals involved in their 
networks rather than whole institutions (with the exception of the Ifen) is likely to be 
the case also in other policy areas, although further research would be needed. Chapter 
Two put forward three hypotheses which will now be reassessed. 
 
9.2 Limited impact of the EEA on national environment agencies 
Hypothesis I stated that the creation of the EEA has only had a limited impact on 
national environment agencies and other national institutions directly involved with it. 
As was explained in Chapter Three, the EEA was given only a relatively narrow 
mandate and very limited competences. It is therefore not surprising that it mainly 
affected the procedures regarding the reporting of data and information as well as the 
time frames within which the data sets had to be delivered by the members of the 
Eionet. While this potentially has an effect on all divisions and departments of the 
national environment agencies involved, it tends not to require significant institutional 
reforms or restructuring. 
Two out of the three case countries in this thesis confirm hypothesis I. In Germany 
and the UK, the EEA‘s influence on national institutional structures showed no 
significant impact on the systems or organizations. There were some minor procedural 
changes. In the German case there was also the introduction of reporting-related 
regulation which was triggered by the national UBA‘s participation in the EEA‘s 
Eionet. The introduction of new regulation in Germany was necessary due to the high 
institutional stability (and lack of flexibility) of the domestic political system, which 
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would almost definitely have rendered ineffective the introduction of merely procedural 
changes. British institutional arrangements required little change and were flexible 
enough to absorb the new EEA-induced procedures, whereas French flexibility coupled 
with less stable environmental institutions led to more elaborate changes. In France, the 
creation of the EEA had only a limited effect on the ADEME which, however, was not 
the main institution involved in the Eionet. Instead, it was the Ifen which was set up as a 
direct consequence of the creation of the EEA.  At first sight, the creation of the Ifen 
arguably appears to indicate the EEA had a much bigger impact than one would have 
expected from a historical institutionalist perspective. The political circumstances in 
France at the time play an important role in explaining the extent of the EEA‘s impact 
on France. However, on their own, the domestic French context variables are unlikely to 
have been sufficient to lead to the creation of a new environmental institution. Without 
the EEA, some institution similar to the Ifen might have been created but it is highly 
unlikely that it would have featured the same governance structures and set-up as the 
Ifen which mirrored those of the EEA. In addition, the Ifen‘s creation needs to be 
assessed in the context of the more flexible French environmental policy system, where 
changes take place frequently. The Ifen‘s dissolution in 2008 further highlights the 
fluidity of the French system. 
In the German and even more so in the British case, the impact of the EEA‘s creation 
was, as expected, very limited. The most likely reason being that environmental 
reporting was (and still is) a lot more centralized in Britain compared to Germany. 
According to British officials, the setting up of the EEA had no impact whatsoever on 
Defra and/or the EA and their predecessors.
1803
 Moreover, the creation of the EA was 
not due to EEA (or even EU) influences but was nationally motivated. The main reason 
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for the lack of impact was the fact that in Britain there was already a well-established 
environmental data collection and distribution apparatus in place prior to the setting up 
of the EEA. It had nothing to do with the existing scepticism by British governments 
(and the British public) towards the EU. In Germany, some procedural changes had to 
take place to ensure the reporting of the required data took place from the Länder level 
to the national level so that the UBA could fulfil its reporting obligations in the Eionet. 
This was done by introducing new legislation in the form of an agreement regulating the 
exchange of data between the two levels. The biggest impact on changes to the UBA 
took place as a result of German unification which was entirely unrelated to 
Europeanization. It led to a significant increase in the UBA‘s staff whose work now 
covered a much larger territory. 
The French case is a lot more complicated. In France, the impact of the creation of 
the EEA has been significantly bigger than one would expect from a historical 
institutionalist perspective. The impact was certainly significantly bigger than in the 
other two case countries assessed in this thesis. Regulation 1210/90 allowed the EEA 
member countries to decide for themselves on the best location for the NFPs and NRCs. 
Two (out of the three) case countries did what would be expected from a historical 
institutionalist perspective (and from the EEA‘s founding regulation) which is to find 
the most suitable position for the NFPs and NRCs within their existing national 
institutional arrangements. The only exception was France. The creation of a separate 
counterpart institution at the national level, although not unwelcomed, was not required 
by (or expected from) the EEA. Historical institutionalism normally expects exceptional 
circumstances as a pre-condition for drastic institutional change (such as the creation of 
a new national environmental body). One example would be the creation of the German 
BMU following the Chernobyl nuclear power station disaster in 1986 (see Chapter 
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Four). While the impact of the EEA‘s creation on France is bigger than on the other two 
case countries, the importance of the factors at the national level surrounding the Ifen‘s 
creation must not be neglected. One could argue that had the EEA been created five 
years later, the creation of the Ifen is unlikely to have taken place, whereas the impact 
on Germany and Britain could be expected to have been very similar (or indeed the 
same). 
Another reason for the limited impact of the EEA‘s creation on the national 
administrations in the member countries is due to the fact that the Eionet reporting 
obligations are not the main focus of the institutions involved. For the EEA to fulfil its 
role effectively the cooperation of the member countries is crucial. But for the affected 
institutions in the member countries, the fulfilment of their reporting role within the 
Eionet is just one of many tasks. Assessing any impact required the detailed focus on 
the differing NFP set-ups, as took place in Chapters Four, Five and Six.  
Although their respective national set-ups differ, all three countries are satisfied with 
their NFPs location and how they function.
1804
 Their NFPs‘ performances tend to 
occupy high positions in the priority data flow performance table (comparing the 
fulfilment of the reporting obligations of all EEA member countries). Germany 
managed to achieve 100 per cent of its reporting requirement for the first time for the 
2009/2010 period (over the last decade, Germany‘s performance has ranged from 64 to 
92 per cent).
1805
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The impact of the EEA’s creation on the member countries 
Changes in German political institutions and administrations tend to be procedural 
rather than systemic; they largely leave intact existing structures.
1806
 The UBA is overall 
functioning well despite the fact that it has to share responsibilities with the Länder 
environment agencies. However, shared competences between the UBA and Länder 
complicated the setting up of the information gathering process for the EEA at least 
initially.  The setting up of the Eionet cannot be classified as a critical juncture for the 
UBA. The EEA was never intended to have such an impact on the national level. In fact 
the EEA‘s intended lack of impact on member countries‘ core environmental 
administrations was the main reason why the UBA has not been affected on a large 
scale by the creation of an environment agency at the EU level. The ‗stickiness‘ of 
institutions hypothesis (which expected the UBA to be reluctant to change because it is 
a well-established institution) therefore appears to be less significant in explaining the 
lack of the EEA‘s impact on Germany.  
The situation was similar in the UK where reporting obligations to the EEA were 
easily fulfilled without significant domestic institutional changes. Eionet roles were also 
easily allocated (albeit sometimes too loosely). The EEA therefore had no significant 
impact on British institutions because the reporting obligations were comparatively 
easily fulfilled without requiring much procedural change. There was however an 
increased workload for key staff acting as the NFP and NRCs. The issue of opposing 
another EU-level development never arose because the effect of the EEA‘s creation and 
Defra‘s participation in the Eionet were not considered significant enough. 
The potential of EU-level developments (such as the creation of the EEA) to affect 
national institutional and administrative developments is related to the countries‘ overall 
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institutional flexibility and openness for institutional change. Ultimately, this flexibility 
was not only the main reason for the creation of the Ifen in France, but also its abolition. 
Despite being well-established and respected in the relevant national and international 
political and scientific circles, the Ifen was not ‗locked in‘ sufficiently to avoid 
relegation, loss of independence and ultimately its demise with a re-allocation of its 
roles to a new statistical service which formed part of the Environment Ministry. Thus 
the French national political system easily allowed for the Ifen‘s creation, change in 
status, reduced independence and eventual demise. Although the creation of the Ifen 
was a sudden change to the environmental institutional landscape, the move towards its 
dissolution was more gradual, therefore providing a better fit to the historical 
institutionalist approach. According to one French official ‗it was already apparent that 
the Ifen was going to be dissolved eventually‘1807 following the change in the Ifen‘s 
statute in 2004. Thus France‘s exceptionalism did not last for long. The reasons for the 
Ifen‘s dissolution appear to be purely political, highlighting that the EEA‘s continuing 
existence alone was not sufficient to ensure the continuation of the Ifen. 
The French case study does not confirm hypothesis I which, however, holds true for 
two out of three case countries. In Germany and Britain, the creation of the EEA has 
had only a limited impact on national environment agencies and other national 
institutions directly involved with it. The validity of hypothesis I for the French case 
will be discussed in more detail below (in section 9.5).  
Importantly, the empirical findings would probably have been different if the Central 
and Eastern European member countries had been included as case countries in this 
thesis because the EEA was very influential in these countries prior to them joining the 
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EU.
1808
 The counterfactual (i.e. the non-existence of the EEA) was assessed in more 
detail in Chapter Seven where I concluded that it strengthens the validity of hypothesis I 
(in the case of Germany and Britain).  
Bulmer and Burch‘s fifth dimension of establishing institutional change related to 
cultural aspects of an institution.
1809
 Despite a detailed assessment going beyond the 
scope of this thesis, it is analytically useful to briefly point out the importance of 
individual actors and the impact of the EEA‘s creation on the people directly involved 
in the Eionet (particularly NFPs and NRCs). Being able to benefit from the increased 
interconnectedness in subject areas between experts in different countries, is likely to 
have had an effect on cultural aspects of these experts‘ work (due to their increased 
interconnectedness in Europe). It is, however, unlikely that this involvement would have 
a wider impact going beyond the individuals directly involved. As with the impact of 
the EEA‘s creation on cultural aspects of institutions, assessing the importance of 
individual actors in the Eionet goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
9.3 National differences in environment agencies have prevailed 
Hypothesis II stated that differences in national environment agencies have prevailed 
despite (a certain degree of) Europeanization. The country chapters (Chapters Four to 
Six) focused on the roles and responsibilities of national environment agencies in the 
respective countries. In addition, their roles in EU-level activities and developments 
were considered with a particular focus on their involvement with the EEA while 
Chapter Seven provided a comparative assessment of their different roles. This is an 
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important aspect when aiming to assess whether and, if so, to what extent, the EEA has 
had a Europeanizing impact on national environment agencies.  
The creation of the EEA has not had an impact on reducing differences in national 
administrations. This was never an intention behind the creation of the EEA but could 
nonetheless have been an unintended side-effect. National environment agencies are 
subject to the Europeanization process regardless of whether they work closely with the 
EEA and/or form part of the Eionet. The EEA is not the main Europeanizing force in 
the agencies or ministries involved; it simply adds another layer of European activity to 
the work of national environment agencies. In addition to taking part in EU committees, 
national institutions are also affected by EU environmental legislation. The EEA‘s main 
impact was the creation of additional links and institutionalized connections through its 
network (for example, between NFPs or NRCs from different countries). The Eionet 
links national and European experts in specific areas of environmental policy. 
Depending on whether the NFP and/or the EEA management board members are 
located in the same institution, they can also create additional links between a national 
agency and its corresponding ministry. This was, for example, the case for the UBA‘s 
NFP and the German MB member in the BMU. However, such connections rarely have 
an influence beyond the officials immediately involved; usually they do not have a 
larger impact in the institution as a whole. An evaluation of the EEA in 2003 pointed 
out, however, that the Eionet played an important role in the Europeanization of 
national data systems.
1810
  
Although there are few areas of environmental policy that have not been affected by 
the EU and little work at national environment agencies (and ministries) which excludes 
European aspects, little administrative convergence has taken place. The result of 
                                                 
1810
 IEEP/EIPA (2003a:83), Groenleer (2009:225) 
353 
 
Europeanization is Europeanized institutions; it does not (usually) lead to administrative 
convergence.
1811
 Administrative convergence is not required because EU institutions 
and measures accommodate national differences. This is an important factor explaining 
the limited Europeanization effect of the EEA on national environmental 
administrations. Although procedures need to be put in place in order to ensure that the 
national institutions are able to meet EU requirements (including the provision of 
information and the implementation of legislation), these new procedures hardly ever 
impact on institutional structures. For an assessment of the drivers for and barriers to 
change see section 7.4.3 of Chapter Seven. Regarding the convergence-divergence 
debate, historical institutionalism also expects national differences to prevail as change 
usually takes place only incrementally. National institutional arrangements were 
compatible with Eionet reporting obligation requirements, which was facilitated by the 
degree of freedom granted to the member countries for choosing their NFPs and NRCs. 
When considering the high level of disagreement which often occurs between EU 
member states in the environmental policy-making process, it is highly likely that 
attempts to bring about the convergence of national (environmental) administrative 
systems would lead to even greater opposition due to concerns about the infringement 
of national sovereignty. Moreover, most countries consider their national administrative 
system as the most efficient for their particular polity. It would be hard to argue that 
there is one single best way to organize national administrative institutions in different 
EU member states. Because administrative convergence is not an EU membership 
requirement, national differences can be expected to remain. It is also unsurprising that 
the EEA‘s creation has not contributed to the emergence of increasing administrative 
convergence as there is no evidence of the emergence of a European administrative 
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model (or even an EAS).
 1812
 Wessel‘s fusion theory (and to a lesser extent 
neofunctionalism) would nonetheless have expected national environment agencies to 
become merged with supranational institutions, in this case the EEA.
1813
 Based on the 
empirical findings of my research it is possible to identify the following four main 
reasons why this has not happened: (1) the EEA and its national counterparts fulfil very 
different roles at their level of activity; (2) the EEA‘s Eionet has had only a very 
selective impact on the participating institutions as a whole; (3) Eionet participation 
requirements for the member countries were flexible enough to accommodate existing 
national differences; and (4) in cases where adjustments were necessary in order to fulfil 
Eionet reporting obligations, the introduced changes differed from country to country. 
This makes very unlikely the fusion of institutional arrangements as a consequence of 
the EEA‘s creation. The historical institutionalist approach is a more appropriate 
theoretical framework for two out of the three case countries, as it considers as unlikely 
the convergence of national administrative systems and their institutions (due to the 
‗stickiness‘ of institutions and national path dependencies).  
It is the Eionet‘s structure in particular which significantly facilitates countries 
working together more closely while connecting subject areas across countries through 
NRC meetings. Such closeness can be a significant advantage for officials who want to 
be able to quickly identify contact persons in other countries. However, their 
cooperation is again unlikely to lead to more convergence among different national 
environmental administrations.  
As Jordan and Liefferink pointed out, procedures tend to be more strongly affected 
(and also more easily changed) by Europeanization than structures.
1814
 While 
participation in the Eionet is an important factor in the harmonization of environmental 
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information (including the reporting formats) it is unlikely that harmonization (or 
convergence) effects will be felt beyond procedural changes.  
Environment agencies which are not part of the Eionet because they do not host an 
NFP tend to have little involvement with the EEA. The EEA‘s creation has therefore 
had even less of an impact on these agencies, although some of them are involved with 
the EEA through other channels of contact. Participation can still take place through 
NRC locations in environment agencies, although their impact on the host institutions is 
even more limited than that of the NFPs. For example, the EA has little direct 
involvement with the EEA outside the EPA network. 
Similarly, due to their focus on research and technical innovation as well as on 
providing advice and expertise nationally, the ADEME is not closely linked to the EEA 
although it is very active at the international level. However, the EEA and the ADEME 
fulfil quite different roles. The EEA is therefore not a priority for the ADEME. Of the 
national environment agencies considered in this thesis, the ADEME is the only agency 
with an office in Brussels. A national environment agency having an office in Brussels 
clearly indicates its commitment to and interest in EU level developments. However, 
both the UBA and the EA also have a strong European outlook due to the nature of the 
work. 
The option of participating in the EPA network creates another level of contact with 
the EEA. However, it is less likely to have an impact on member agencies, because the 
EPA network is not hierarchically structured. Relationships between the national 
environment agencies and the EEA in the EPA network are more like those of equal 
partners. In the Eionet, the roles of the different agencies are more distinctive and there 
appears to be a clearer separation in the way in which the work is done with a clear 
distinction between the different components of the network (i.e. data reporters and data 
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recipients). Moreover, although member countries have to participate in certain EEA 
networks, being able to choose where they would like to allocate the NFP within their 
national environmental administrations allowed for flexible arrangements. Participation 
in the Eionet is compulsory although there are no immediate consequences for poor data 
reporting other than being placed at the bottom of the list of the priority data flow which 
measures all the member countries‘ data reporting performances. The EEA can do little 
more than use moral suasion and/or rely on naming and shaming to improve the data 
flow from member countries. Participation in the EPA network, on the other hand, is 
voluntary. No French institution is represented in the EPA network (see Chapter Eight 
and below). 
The environment agencies (and ministries) in the three case countries remain first 
and foremost national institutions which form part of the wider national administrations. 
Even if the national environment agencies‘ outlook includes the EU (and international) 
level, the main point of reference remains the national level (including the national 
administration). Differences in the national political systems matter for the role which 
national environment agencies fulfil. The participation in the Eionet required changes in 
regulation in Germany (affecting procedures) and led to the Ifen‘s creation in France. 
Fulfilling the reporting obligations of the Eionet has been handled differently in 
different member countries, although some harmonization was required regarding the 
reporting formats. 
While significant changes to the UBA have taken place over time, they were largely 
the result of internal and/or national factors and not mainly due to Europeanization 
pressures and/or the creation of the EEA (see Chapter Four for more details). Although 
the roles of the EA in England and Wales and the Ifen and the ADEME in France are 
very different from the role of the UBA in Germany they were also mainly derived 
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within the national environment administrations. The creation of the EEA has not had a 
lasting effect on domestic environmental institutions in Britain and France. Similar to 
the UK, the French NFP is now located in the environmental statistics service of the 
environment ministry and is still able to fulfil its reporting obligations as when it was 
located in the Ifen.  
The creation of the EEA has not led to administrative convergence in the three case 
countries assessed in this thesis, but neither have existing differences between 
environment agencies and/or ministries in the member countries become more 
pronounced. Because the EEA does not aim to harmonize administrative structures in its 
member countries, its impact on the harmonization of environmental data reporting is 
already a significant achievement. 
 
9.4 Different national environment agency motivations for participating in 
European networks 
Hypothesis III suggested that differences in national administrative traditions lead to 
different motivations for the participation of national environmental agencies in 
European networks. The Eionet required a hierarchical set-up with the EEA at the top 
whereas the EPA network is not a network of the EEA. In theory, the EEA is a network 
member like the other national environment agencies, although in practice it has been 
criticised for having the position of a primus inter pares.  
The EPA network contributes to the Europeanization of its member agencies by 
facilitating contact between the heads of different environment agencies in Europe. The 
EPA network was created following an initiative of the member countries (with the 
support of the EEA). It is not an EU initiative. However, because a large number of 
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EPA network members are also EU member states (which use the network as a link to 
the Commission), its work is largely related to EU environmental policy. 
Chapter Eight identified the following three main reasons why EPA network 
participation is considered beneficial for national environment agencies. First, it creates 
(additional) contacts with the heads of other European environment agencies; second, it 
increases contact with the Commission; and, finally, it established (additional) direct 
contact to the director of the EEA. Over time, the EPA network has therefore evolved 
into more than simply an arena which provides a link to the EEA. The provision of a 
forum for the heads of environment agencies to meet and exchange experiences and 
ideas as well as the ability to come to a common position on certain issues, which are 
then forwarded to the Commission, are also valuable assets of the EPA network.  
While the contact to the EEA might be a motivating factor for a national 
environment agency to join, it is by no means the only benefit these agencies can draw 
from their participation in the EPA network. The importance attributed to access to the 
EEA varies considerably among the three case countries. This is not surprising as the 
network was created as a platform for national environment agencies to meet and 
exchange views and experiences. Its main aim was not the provision of a direct link to 
the EEA (which is more of a welcome side-effect). For agencies such as the UBA which 
are already connected to the EEA through the Eionet, this additional contact is not 
perceived as superfluous because of the already existing connection. But the UBA 
attributes fewer benefits to this additional connection compared to the EA and SEPA. 
The EPA network accommodates the UK‘s environment agency set up well by allowing 
more than one agency per member country to participate.  
Out of the three case countries studied in this thesis the French case is a peculiar one. 
The Ifen could be considered the most Europeanized environment agency because its 
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existence and institutional set up was the direct French response to the creation of the 
EEA. In the early years of the EPA network, the Ifen was a member of the EPA 
network. Its eventual lack of participation is therefore arguably more of an exceptional 
case than if the Ifen had never been a member of the network in the first place. The case 
of the Ifen is a good example for highlighting that institutions do matter. While the 
dissolution of the Ifen (and the resulting move of NFP to the SOeS) has not affected the 
French performance in the priority data flow, changes to the institutional status led to a 
lack of representation in the EPA network.  
This lack of French representation in the EPA network is also surprising as the 
British and German agencies (similar to most other European agencies) find 
participation beneficial.
1815
 Whether it is the perceived or real lack of benefits for 
French institutions or general lack of interest in participating in the EPA network is 
impossible to establish. There appears to be a lack of agreement in France about which 
national institution(s) would be the most appropriate to attend EPA network 
meetings.
1816
 The two most obvious candidates would be the ADEME and the 
Environment Ministry (i.e. possibly the SOeS service of the ministry which took over 
the Ifen) although neither of them has so far shown any particular interest in taking part 
in the EPA network. As pointed out in Chapter Eight, French regrets about a lack of 
national participation in the EPA network appear to have little to do with the fear of 
missing out on EPA network activities. Instead they appear to be mainly due to the view 
that a large member state like France should be represented in such a large European 
network.  
Over time, the EPA network has evolved into a network from which both member 
environment agencies and the Commission have benefited although this was not 
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 Interview EEA official (2010b), Interview German official (2010), Interview British official 
(2010b) 
1816
 Interview EEA official (2010b), Interview French official (2010b) 
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immediately apparent when the network was set up. Receiving feedback from national 
environment agencies has become an important part in the policy loop.
1817
 The 
recognition of the EPA network‘s activities by the Commission has become one of the 
main benefits for member agencies. The Commission‘s involvement in the EPA 
network shows that its work is considered as valuable not only by the network members 
themselves but also by an important EU policy actor (i.e. the Commission). The 
network has now matured, although is still open for a review of its procedures. It is also 
open to considering the inclusion of regional agencies and nature conservation agencies 
amongst others.  
Applying Rhodes‘ network model, the EPA network can best be classified as an 
intergovernmental network.
1818
 It is voluntary, shows limited interdependence and 
extensive horizontal articulation (see Chapter Eight). The Eionet, on the other hand, 
resembles more closely a policy community (see Chapter Three). Although Rhodes‘ 
model can also be used to assess the distribution of powers within and between 
networks, the latter is arguably less relevant for the EPA network because it does not 
explicitly aim to exert power over other agencies/institutions. Instead, it aims to 
cooperate with other networks in its field (such as the ENCA and IMPEL networks). 
The establishment of the rotating troika (see Chapter Eight) prevents any one member 
agency becoming too dominant within the EPA network. However, the EEA has 
nevertheless gained a privileged position as a standing member of the organizing 
committee (which consists of the EEA and the troika) although this position has been 
questioned by some member agencies (see Chapter Eight).  
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Kassim has argued that the network approach is not well suited for application at the 
EU level.
1819
 The combined Europeanization and historical institutionalist approach, 
which was put forward in Chapter Two and applied throughout this thesis, provides 
more useful analytical insights than Rhodes‘ network approach. Participation in the 
EPA network did not have a significant impact on its members, although this might 
change over time. After all, the network was only created in 2003. Although network 
theory can provide a useful analytical framework, it was not chosen for the assessment 
of the EPA network and the Eionet, because it neglects the impact of network 
participation on (the institutions of) the member countries which was the main research 
focus of this thesis. Therefore historical institutionalism was the more useful analytical 
approach for an analysis of the new empirical data about the Europeanization of 
national environment agencies gathered for this thesis. 
The national environment agencies‘ contributions to the network (including its 
projects and publications) appear to be greater than the influence which network 
participation has on member agencies. This is not surprising, because even the (more or 
less) compulsory participation in the Eionet has not resulted in major changes at the 
national level. The only exception constitutes the French Ifen. The EPA network, which 
was created ten years later than the Eionet, operates more loosely. It is therefore 
unlikely to have had a strong direct effect on its member agencies. The EPA network is 
more likely to contribute to horizontal Europeanization than the Eionet through the 
sharing of experiences and good practice between the heads of environment agencies. 
While the Europeanization effect of the EPA network on participating national 
environment agencies is very difficult to measure, it is nonetheless safe to conclude that 
the network is likely to have contributed towards the Europeanization of national 
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 Kassim (1994:25) 
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environment agencies if only by establishing closer links between national environment 
agencies and providing an additional channel of communication with the Commission. 
Moreover, some member agencies may emulate approaches successfully used in other 
member agencies about which they have been informed through the EPA network. 
Policy learning may therefore be facilitated through horizontal Europeanization. 
However, so far this did not appear to be the case for the UBA and the EA, arguably 
because of the large size of these two agencies and how well they are established within 
their national political systems. It could be different for smaller countries/agencies 
which, however, did not form part of the case studies assessed in this thesis. 
Differences in national administrative traditions in environment agencies do indeed 
lead to different motivations for the participation in European networks. It is therefore 
not surprising that national environment agencies‘ motivations differ for participation in 
the EPA network.  In the case of the EPA network, the exchange with other national 
environment agencies and the Commission appears to be rated as important and 
valuable by all network members. The fact that the EPA network also provided a 
contact point for national environment agencies and the EEA was considered more 
significant for the EA than the UBA which has already had a close connection to the 
EEA through the Eionet. Moreover, participation in the Eionet also establishes 
additional links between national agencies (in member countries where environment 
agencies act as NFPs and to a lesser degree NRCs), even if it is not at the directorial 
level. Such connections are also missed out on by non-Eionet environment agencies 
(such as the EA).  
The inclusion of the EPA network as a case study in this thesis allowed for the 
assessment of the way in which one of the national environment agencies (i.e. the EA of 
England and Wales) assessed in this thesis has been able to establish regular contact 
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with the EEA without being a member of the Eionet. Even though such contact has not 
had a significant impact on the EA and its work, it nonetheless highlighted how regular 
contact to the EEA could be established. Unfortunately, the lack of French participation 
in the EPA network made impossible a comparative assessment of the impact which 
EPA network participation has had on all the three case countries. 
 
9.5 Appropriateness of the theoretical framework  
Using historical institutionalism in combination with Europeanization theories has 
allowed for a theoretical framework which has generated very useful analytical insights 
for all three countries considered. This is even true for the French case study. Without 
the special attention which historical institutionalism gives to developments over a 
longer period of time, the creation of the Ifen would have appeared more important than 
it actually was. Only by adopting a long term perspective was it possible to show that 
Ifen was abolished twenty years after its creation. This empirical finding confirms the 
importance of the longitudinal perspective which is central to a historical institutionalist 
analysis. The fact that the Ifen was abolished does not negate the impact which the 
creation of the EEA has had on the French environmental institutional landscape, even 
if it is no longer visible. A shorter timeframe might not have been able to pick up the 
major changes which occurred to the Ifen (including changes to its statute, its 
attachment to the Environment Ministry and its eventual dissolution). Taking only a 
snapshot assessment of the French case study would have led either to the detection of a 
dramatic impact (i.e. the creation of the Ifen) or, following the abolition of the Ifen, 
none whatsoever. The flexibility of the French system and the high frequency of 
institutional change at all levels (including the ministries) needs to be taken into 
account. The flexible French political system and the right timing regarding the political 
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mood were important factors which allowed for the creation of the Ifen as a direct 
response to the setting up of the EEA. The fact that the set-up of the Ifen‘s governance 
structure mirrored that of the EEA provides evidence for the impact by the latter 
institution on the French national environmental administrative system. After all, the 
Ifen was supposed to be the French national equivalent to the EEA. Although significant 
changes did take place in France, they did not result in a critical juncture at the national 
level. The French reaction to the setting up of the EEA was by no means required for 
French Eionet participation. This means that the expectation that a country will 
introduce as few changes as possible when responding to EU level developments and 
requirements (such as the creation of a supranational agency) requires revision. 
The overall bad fit of the French case study with the historical institutionalist 
framework suggests that it would be necessary to modify the overall theoretical 
framework applied in this thesis. In order for it to become applicable for all three case 
countries it would arguably be necessary to combine historical institutionalism with 
another theoretical approach which is more sensitive to frequent institutional changes 
(such as those which took place in the French political system). Alternatively, the 
impact of the EEA‘s creation on its member countries could be assessed in a different 
theoretical framework altogether. However, despite this weakness the overall theoretical 
framework applied has allowed for a useful analysis of the empirical data gathered for 
this thesis. 
It would be impossible for an environmental institution in any EU member state not 
to have been affected by Europeanization. Europeanization does not necessarily lead to 
convergence between national administrative systems. Even the establishment of 
increased links between experts in different institutions and different countries can be 
considered a dimension of Europeanization. The Europeanization approach was useful 
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for assessing the impact of the EEA‘s creation on its member countries. But it was less 
useful for an assessment of hypothesis III and the analysis of the benefits for national 
environment agencies of participating in the EPA network. While the EPA network 
structure easily accommodates the British environment agency set-up, the projected 
benefits of the creation of such a network goes beyond the particular needs of any one 
member country and its environment agencies.
1820
 Although Britain was an important 
driver behind the creation of the EPA network, it was not the only country supporting 
the creation of the network. 
Europeanization has taken place but the EEA had only a relatively small impact on 
national environmental administrations which reacted differently to the setting up of a 
new supranational environment agency. The three different national set-ups have 
furthered Europeanization without having triggered administrative convergence (see 
hypothesis II). The flexibility of the Eionet easily accommodates continued divergence 
in its member countries. 
The EEA is not as well-known as it could be (and probably should be) and the 
Europeanization of national environment agencies stems to a much larger degree from 
the effects of EU environmental policy than the setting up of the Eionet. It is plausible 
to argue that had the EEA been created around the time when environmental policy 
emerged as a new common policy field in the early 1970s, its influence might have been 
greater, at least in those countries that did not yet have distinctive environmental policy 
structures in place.  
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Case Countries 
The rationale behind choosing the three case countries assessed in this thesis stemmed 
from the need to compare countries of similar size which have been long-term EU 
members. In other words, the case country selection was driven by the desire to 
undertake a most similar case study (see also Chapter One). Although the UK was not a 
founding EU member state, it joined in 1973, at a time when the environment emerged 
as a distinct EU policy area.  
France turned out to be the most complicated case out of the three countries assessed. 
It constituted an exceptional case which makes it harder to generalise about the impact 
of the EEA on member countries. France serves as a good example of the significant (if 
temporary) impact which the creation of an EU agency can have on the national level. It 
is no coincidence than the creation of the EEA had the biggest impact on France out of 
the three case countries considered. The flexibility of institutions in the French political 
system (and particularly in the environmental field), fits badly with the historical 
institutionalist framework. Observing French environmental institutions over time only 
highlights their instability. Frequent changes (and the reversal of these changes) in the 
French political system do not appear to have required critical junctures.  
The creation of the EEA cannot be considered as having had the effect of creating a 
critical juncture for any of its member countries. The EEA was not the reason for the 
creation of the Ifen, it was merely the trigger for changes at the national level. Historical 
institutionalism can be considered a very useful analytical framework for the assessment 
of the impact of the EEA‘s creation on its member countries, although it was not able to 
explain all of the particularities which I uncovered in the French case study.  
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9.6 The EEA’s (near) future and future research on the EEA 
Shared Environmental Information System 
The biggest project which the EEA and its member countries are currently tackling is 
the creation of the SEIS.
1821
 The SEIS aims to combine existing data gathering and 
information systems related to environmental policies and legislation. It is a joint 
initiative by the Commission and the EEA, which work closely together with the 
member countries for the creation of an EU-wide environmental information system. 
Key elements of SEIS are the management of environmental information and data as 
closely as possible to its source, the provision of more readily available environmental 
information and the creation of a decentralised, compatible and interconnected 
information system.
1822
 
For member countries, the creation of SEIS and its main goal of making 
environmental information accessible as close to the source as possible is a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, the more direct information delivery systems are able to 
cut out middle men, (potentially) the faster and less costly they can become. On the 
other hand, member countries will lose a considerable degree of control over their 
national environmental information. This is because information would no longer need 
to be requested (by the EEA, the Commission, etc.) but could be directly accessed in 
member countries once it has been made available through SEIS. The need to provide 
the data in a comparable way is likely to increase further the convergence of reporting 
formats and procedures. However, it is unlikely to have a significant Europeanizing 
impact on the institutions (such as national environment agencies) which collect and/or 
provide the information. The member countries generally support the creation of SEIS 
as it will allow them to focus on the provision of information (which only needs to be 
                                                 
1821
 Interview EEA official (2010c) 
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done once) and removes the reporting obligations to a large number of institutions 
which need to be supplied with the environmental data (e.g. the Commission, the EEA, 
Eurostat and the JRC). 
How will the move towards a shared environmental information system affect the 
Eionet? The likelihood of the completion of SEIS leads to the question of whether the 
Eionet will become obsolete. Predicting the possible impact of SEIS on the Eionet is 
further complicated by the fact that the Eionet will become the core of SEIS which 
makes these networks inseparable.
1823
 SEIS merely adds new dimensions to the existing 
Eionet network. It is also very difficult to predict whether the move towards accessing 
information closer to the source will make (at least in some cases) the roles of NFPs and 
NRCs redundant. It has been suggested that it would be desirable for the Eionet to 
continue to exist as a network with a special focus on what has been called the ‗people 
network‘,1824 connecting national experts across all topic areas. However, others have 
predicted the eventual demise of the Eionet as a direct consequence of the creation of 
SEIS.
 1825
 The direction which the Eionet and the EEA are likely to take will only begin 
to become clearer once SEIS has been set up.  
 
Future research 
This thesis has focused primarily on three large EEA member countries. It has not 
analysed the impact which the creation of the EEA has had on small and/or medium-
sized EU members. Nor has it assessed the EEA‘s newer member countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe or non-EU members (such as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, 
Switzerland and Turkey) which are EEA member countries. 
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The hypothesis which stipulated only a limited impact of the EEA on its member 
countries would probably need to be amended for the Central and Eastern European 
member states and the non-EU member states which are EEA member countries. The 
EEA has had a significant impact on the national environmental data reporting 
arrangements in some of the new member countries.
1826
 However, this is almost 
exclusively due to the circumstances encountered in most Central and Eastern European 
member countries. So in order for it to hold true for all member countries, the 
hypothesis would have to accommodate the extraordinary conditions allowing for the 
EEA and the participation in the Eionet to be influential in those countries. 
The longevity of the existence of particular institutional set-ups was an important 
explanatory factor for the three case countries which were assessed in this thesis. The 
large-scale restructuring of political systems and institutions in Central and Eastern 
Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed those countries to create new 
institutions which were required in order to be able to become EU member states. 
The differentiation of national NFP locations might also be beneficial for researching 
the impact of the EEA on its member countries in future research. It might also produce 
analytical advantages to research EEA member countries according to whether their 
NFP is located in the national environment agency, the environment ministry or in 
another institution. This might increase the comparability of the assessed impact by the 
EEA on its member countries.  
This thesis has shown how the creation of the EEA has impacted on national 
administrations in three case countries. It has revealed that once the EEA had begun its 
work, its main network, the Eionet, quickly became institutionalized. This is likely to 
have been similar for other EU agencies that needed to set up networks. It is also 
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reasonable to expect that the creation of other EU agencies has had a similar degree of 
impact on the administrations they are involved with on the national level. The degree 
of impact can range from no noticeable effect to major changes such as the creation of a 
new institution in a member country. Moreover, this thesis has shown that countries will 
sometimes go beyond what is required from them in order to optimise their participation 
in EU networks and/or their cooperation with EU agencies. However, the degree of 
impact of EU agencies on national administrations is likely to vary from country to 
country and may even differ between different policy areas. More research on a wider 
range of EU agencies and national agencies and ministries would be necessary in order 
to be able to arrive at more unequivocal generalizations. 
Network governance has been an efficient way for the EU to expand its work without 
increasing the size and/or powers of the Commission. The inclusion of a large number 
of national experts in EU level work can only be considered as beneficial as they have 
the experience of conditions and what can be achieved at the national level. Whether the 
EEA and the Eionet could become a model for the rest of the world will depend on the 
areas in which (environment???) agencies are being established elsewhere in the world. 
However, it is likely that such network governance – even if it is largely concerned only 
with the provision of information within certain policy areas – will require some sort of 
regulation and coordinating entity, able to ensure that commitments are being met.  
 
9.7 Concluding remarks 
In their study on the Europeanization of national environmental policy, Jordan and 
Liefferink pointed out that  
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[i]t is probably impossible to determine precisely whether weak convergent 
pressure from the EU or the resilience of national institutional forms is the 
dominant causal factor.
1827
  
 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the assessment in my thesis which focuses on 
the impact which the creation of the EEA has had on national environment 
administrations. The possible exception is the French case, where national institutional 
forms in the environmental field cannot be described as particularly resilient. The lack 
of pressure on the member countries and its institutions from participation in the Eionet 
coupled with the deeply ingrained existing national institutional and administrative set-
ups leaves little room for the EEA to have a significant impact (in terms of institutional 
changes) on its member countries. The French case study does show, however, that 
some member countries do more than simply meet the reporting obligations without 
being required to do so. 
The EEA‘s biggest achievements were the speed with which it has managed to 
establish itself (once the decision to locate it in Copenhagen had been taken), the 
creation and maintenance of a well functioning Eionet and the improvement of its 
relationship with the Commission. Out of those three major achievements it is only the 
Eionet-related issues which directly affected the member countries. Wynne and 
Waterton suggested a move of regulatory cultures to more information-dependent 
styles, increasing the importance of agencies providing relevant information.
1828
 
However, even traditional regulation benefits from the improved provision of 
environmental information, both in the policy-making process and in the assessment of 
its effectiveness. The EEA has managed to move beyond the provision of environmental 
information by being able to exploit the vague wording of its founding regulation. It has 
thus been able to become more than merely an ―information agency‖.  
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The creation of the EEA did not constitute a critical juncture in its member countries. 
Instead it led to the addition of another layer to the already existing national and EU 
institutions and networks, which makes the focus on developments over a longer period 
of time even more important. In the French case, the impact of the EEA was 
significantly larger than what could have been expected from the way in which the 
legislation establishing the creation of the EEA was intended and what could be 
expected from a historical institutionalist perspective.  
The EEA‘s role with regard to the Eionet has been remarkably stable when 
considering that it had to go through the process of establishing itself vis-à-vis the 
Commission, EP, Eurostat, the JRC and its member countries. Over time, the 
relationship of the EEA with the Commission has changed significantly while moving 
from a considerable degree of suspicion towards more cooperation. But since the Eionet 
has been up and running, the role of the EEA has remained the same. The Eionet has 
changed mainly as regards the role of the NFPs (task expansion), the number and areas 
covered by NRCs and by ETCs. 
The impact of the creation of European agencies needs to be considered at all levels 
affected (i.e. not just the supranational), not least because member countries remain the 
essential component of its networks without which the EEA would be unable to 
function. As one interviewee pointed out: ‗The EEA is only as strong as its member 
countries: the EEA can only have the ideas and the member countries have to make it 
happen‘.1829 The way in which this cooperation is organized in the different member 
states and how the participating institutions have been affected by the Europeanization 
of national (environment) agencies deserves close analysis. Moreover, the EEA/Eionet 
set-up is generally perceived as successful. It has even been advocated as a model for 
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other regions in the world (for example, in Southeast Asia and the Arctic).
1830
 Thus even 
though the impact in member countries might be limited, its influence is not restricted to 
the EU or Europe alone.  
The lack of impact by the EEA regarding administrative convergence in member 
countries was predicted by the historical institutionalist perspective. The creation of the 
EEA did not contribute to the convergence of national institutional arrangements 
involved in its networks or the emergence of an EAS (resulting in identical 
administrative organizations). Successful Eionet participation does not tend to require 
institutional change at the domestic level. While it is in the (European) agencies‘ 
interests to foster good cooperative relationships with their main contact points in the 
member countries, they are more concerned about, for example, the harmonization of 
environmental data reporting formats than a push towards administrative convergence. 
Moreover, while convergence is a possible consequence of Europeanization, the process 
of Europeanization can take place without resulting in harmonization or convergence, it 
may even lead to divergence.
1831
 
There are now a large number of European agencies, many of which lack regulatory 
powers. They often rely on the establishment of (information) networks in their member 
countries. The contribution of EU agencies to the Europeanization of national 
institutions is not limited to the EEA but potentially involves all European agencies. It 
deserves further investigation. The environment is a policy area where the activities of 
the EU have a significant impact on its member states. The importance of the particular 
policy field in which an EU agency is active is not the only variable which explains an 
agency‘s impact on member countries, although agencies in less established EU policy 
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areas are likely to have even less of an impact on institutions in their member countries 
than was the case for the EEA.  
The different impact which the EEA has had on the three member countries assessed 
in this thesis does not affect the broad consensus which exists about the need for and 
usefulness of the EEA. Its roles might change in future but the EEA can be considered 
an important addition to the European institutional landscape. The future of the Eionet 
partly depends on the success of SEIS and the extent to which its continuation will be 
supported. Without the Eionet the EEA would have been unable to fulfil its reporting 
obligations and it remains to be seen whether the Eionet will become obsolete with a 
fully functional SEIS. Currently it is intended to continue with the Eionet as the national 
officials involved in its running consider it as providing invaluable contacts and 
opportunities for cooperation in all areas of environmental policy. The setting up and 
maintenance of the Eionet therefore constitutes one of the EEA‘s biggest achievements 
up to now.  
It could be argued that if the long exposure of national administrations to EU 
environmental legislation, institutions and influences has not resulted in significant 
convergence at the national levels,
1832
 the creation of the EEA was also unlikely to bring 
about such convergence. As Olsen states 
European level developments do not dictate specific forms of institutional 
adaptation but leave considerable discretion to domestic actors and institutions. 
There are significant impacts, yet the actual ability of the European level to 
penetrate domestic institutions is not perfect, universal or constant. Adaptations 
reflect variations in European pressure as well as domestic motivations and 
abilities to adapt. European signals are interpreted and modified through domestic 
traditions, institutions, identities and resources in ways that limit the degree of 
convergence and homogenization.
1833
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This observation also applies to the EEA and the Eionet‘s impact on its member 
countries. Differences among national environment agencies are likely to prevail in 
future. 
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